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Preface
Since our earliest records, humans have been interested in seeing into the future.
One famous account documents how the King of Lydia (an ancient Greek region
in modern-day Turkey) solicited the council of the oracle of Delphi. King Croesus
wanted to know what the outcome would be, should he seek war with the Persian
empire. The oracle answered that if the King attacked the Persians, he would destroy
a mighty empire. Interpreting this prediction in his favour, Croesus went into bat-
tle but suffered a crippling loss, ultimately fulfilling the prophecy and destroying a
mighty empire – his own.
Several years later, the Athenians too went to the oracle to ask what they should do
about the growing Persian threat. The oracle proclaimed an equally poetic and am-
biguous prophecy, but the Athenians did what we should always do when faced with
a serious forecast: they discussed and debated. They asked the important questions:
what does this really mean, how seriously should we take it, and what should we do
about it? The Athenians eventually decided to seek a naval battle and defeated the
vastly superior Persian army at sea.
These days we laugh at prophets that proclaim to know the future, however we put
a considerable amount of faith in mathematical models that aim to do just that. In
many fields, including economics, better models and larger datasets have progressed
our knowledge substantially. This collection of essays pursues this approach, with the
intention to inform the current debate on urban and transport policy, while providing
well thought-out estimates for the potential impact of automated vehicles (AVs). By
learning from the past, I believe that we can design and imagine better policies for
the future. However, we must not fall into the same trap as King Croesus and rather
learn from the Athenian experience.
The results in this dissertation provide order of magnitude estimates for the impacts
of AVs on parking, traffic, accidents, and urban density, but they are far from defini-
tive. We, too, need to ask the important questions. Do we want AVs to drive around
empty? How large are the safety gains and under which conditions do we expect
them to arise? Should cities spread out further? Rather than prescriptive answers, I
hope that these predictions can serve as a starting point for a serious discussion about
these topics, along with how we want our cities to look like and the types of policies
we could use in order to get there.

1
Introduction
The internal combustion engine and mass production of the automobile transformed
cities in the twentieth century. In 2012, private motorised vehicles accounted for half
of all passenger trips in large global cities and transported people ten times more
kilometres than by public transport. On average, every household owned one car.1
While this masks considerable heterogeneity between cities, countries, and regions,
it clearly points towards cars as the dominant transport mode of the era. So how did
cars become so widespread and what are the implications for our cities?
Cars solved many problems facing cities at the time, including pollution (horse
manure), high commuting costs, and unaffordable housing. Compared to earlier
technologies, cars offered more flexibility in terms of routes and schedules, lower
marginal costs per kilometre, higher speeds, and more privacy. The adoption of
the internal combustion engine was also aided by the availability of cheap fuel,
mass production techniques, government support, and the perception towards
transportation at the time (Sovacool, 2009). However, while the rapid adoption of
cars in the mid-to-late twentieth century solved many urban issues, it brought about
a new set of societal challenges, which we are still dealing with today.
Steadily increasing levels of car ownership have resulted in gridlock, unsafe levels
of air pollution, environmental degradation, social exclusion, injury, and loss of life.
Where cars promised breathtaking speeds, average traffic speed in many large cities is
less than 30 km/hr, causing e270 billion in annual travel time losses in the European
1These statistics are based on the UITP (2015) dataset of 63 large global cities in 2012, predominantly
in developed countries.
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Union (EU) alone.2 While our streets are clean from horse manure, cars instead pol-
lute our air, which results in health problems and lower life expectancy causing an es-
timated annual loss ofe35 billion in the EU (Greenstone and Hanna, 2014; Landrigan,
2017; European Commission, 2019a). Although cars have allowed urban dwellers
to escape the overcrowding and high urban rents in the inner city, they require an
immense amount of space. This has resulted in urban sprawl and its associated ex-
ternalities, including social exclusion, habitat loss, and pollution (Glaeser and Kahn,
2004; Nechyba and Walsh, 2004; Su and DeSalvo, 2008; Brueckner and Helsley, 2011).
Finally, traffic accidents cause over 25,000 deaths and more than one million injuries
annually in the EU, resulting in an estimated e280 billion of societal costs (European
Commission, 2019a).
While these adverse outcomes are tragic and partially avoidable, the fact that cars
have been adopted en mass around the world signals that the net welfare gains to
society must be positive. We can travel faster, more conveniently, and cheaper than
ever before in history. However, our experience with the car should serve as a warn-
ing for future transport technologies. As we have seen with the push-back against
congestion tolls and parking prices, it is far more difficult to start charging for things
that people used to get for free (Shoup, 2005; Anas and Lindsey, 2011; De Borger
and Proost, 2012). Therefore, governments should take a proactive stance towards
anticipating and implementing policies ahead of time to mitigate adverse transport
externalities.
This leads us to where we are today. Although the rise of smartphones over the
last two decades has brought about a flurry of innovation in ‘last-mile’ transporta-
tion technologies such as shared taxi’s, industry leaders, politicians, and academics
claim that we are on the cusp of the next transport revolution: the automated vehicle.
Automated vehicles (AVs) are considered to be a disruptive technology with the po-
tential to transform our concept of mobility. By utilizing sensory equipment to map
and detect their surroundings, AVs are expected to be able to operate without human
intervention.3 This appears to be increasingly feasible as demonstrated by industry
commitments, technological advancements, political support, and cultural attitudes
(Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015; Milakis et al., 2017; Soteropoulos et al., 2019).
The goal of this dissertation is to “study the present in the light of the past for the
purposes of the future” (Keynes, 1924, pg.322). I apply a quantitative approach, us-
ing data sources that are currently available, to study the effects of private vehicles
2Average speed on the road network in a global sample of 26 large cities from the UITP (2015)
database was only 29 km/hr in 2012.
3We define an AV as a vehicle that can perform all driving tasks without requiring a human driver.
This corresponds to the level 5 AV definition by the European Parliamentary Research Service
(2016).
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on urban economic outcomes. These empirical analyses focus on market and govern-
ment failures in the ownership and use of private vehicles with a purpose to inform
urban and transport policy. In the spirit of Keynes, these insights are then applied
to provide policy makers with a glimpse into what an AV future might look like –
absent policy intervention.
In cities, parking occupies a large share of land and is often provided to residents and
visitors at prices below the market rate. According to economic theory, this causes
excess car ownership and use however, we lack well defined quantitative estimates
of these effects. Chapter 2 studies the effect of a large citywide increase in hourly
on-street parking prices on parking and traffic demand in Amsterdam. Chapter 3
then focuses specifically on residents and examines to what extent residential park-
ing prices effect car ownership decisions. In both chapters, we aim to draw policy
conclusions on the quantitative impact of parking prices on car use to gauge the im-
plications of underpriced parking.
Vehicle accidents account for over e200 billion in annual costs within the EU, so it
comes as no surprise that reducing the number of road accidents is a major policy
goal. All EU countries currently ban phone use by drivers however, surveys indi-
cate that 60% – 70% of drivers admit to “sometimes” using their mobile phone while
observational studies find that 1% – 11% of drivers were physically observed to be
on the phone at any given time (European Road Safety Observatory, 2015). Chapter
4 studies how the rise in smartphone use over the past decade has impacted road
safety. This is essential to understand because although it is illegal, enforcement is
difficult. A quantitative estimate of the number of accidents caused by smartphone
distractions provides valuable information to policy makers on the size of the issue,
and in turn, how serious the regulatory response should be.
The urban economics literature has demonstrated that highways have had a substan-
tial impact on decentralisation over the twentieth century (Baum-Snow, 2007, 2010;
Garcia-López et al., 2015; Baum-Snow et al., 2017; Levkovich et al., 2017). However,
highways only explain a portion of car-induced decentralisation. Various other poli-
cies and implicit subsidies such as free parking, low fuel taxes, and the absence of
road pricing, are likely to impact mode choice and thereby urban form. This is impor-
tant because the urban spatial structure changes slowly, so transport policies can have
long-lasting and irreversible impacts on urban economic outcomes. Therefore, Chap-
ter 5 uses car ownership as a comprehensive measure to study the overall long-term
effect of cars on urban density. This has important implications for vehicle taxation
and car ownership growth in middle-income countries.
In each chapter, the empirical estimates are applied to predict the order of magnitude
impacts of AVs over space, under the assumption that policy and the behavioural
3
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phenomena studied remain largely unchanged in the future. AVs are expected to
impact urban mobility along four major dimensions: parking, safety, cost, and conve-
nience (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015). Parking patterns are likely to change as AVs
can self-park in areas with lower parking prices. AVs are also expected to be safer
than human drivers as they are less likely to get distracted, drunk, or sleepy. Finally,
passengers taking an AV will be able to participate in other, leisurely or productive,
activities such as sleeping, reading, and working, instead of driving, without having
to pay a driver.
These mobility changes are expected to result in improvements to accessibility and
safety, increases in car demand, and a redistribution of people and jobs over space
(Meyer et al., 2017; Gelauff et al., 2019). Chapters 2 and 3 examine how lower park-
ing prices are expected to impact traffic and vehicle demand within cities. Chapter 4
provides an indication for the potential safety benefits from AVs due to fewer smart-
phone distractions. Chapter 5 then examines how increases in vehicle access and de-
mand, due to cheaper and more comfortable car travel, are expected to impact urban
population density in the long-run.
Chapter 6 concludes with an outline of the main results and a discussion of the key
implications for urban transport policy and AVs.
4
2
Hourly parking prices and traffic
2.1 Introduction
Parking prices are a widely accepted policy tool to manage parking and traffic de-
mand in cities. The theoretical economic literature has extensively studied parking
policy as a second-best alternative to tackle traffic externalities by reducing the num-
ber of car trips in urban areas.4 In light of the technical and political challenges of
implementing road pricing, parking policies have come under renewed interest be-
cause they already exist in many cities and therefore extending these policies may be
more feasible (Small and Verhoef, 2007). Nevertheless, the empirical literature has yet
to confirm or refute the effectiveness of parking prices in reducing traffic demand.
This chapter is based on join work with Hans Koster, Leonardo Nunes, and Jos van Ommeren. The
authors would like to thank Lea Bou, Joris Klingen, Maurice de Kleijn, Rossy Nguyen, Giles Oster-
meijer, Kalani Ostermeijer, Fillipo Tassinari, Erik Verhoef, and online conference and seminar par-
ticipants at Eureka, ITEA, and the UEA. We would also like to thank Abdel En-Nali, Barry Ubbels,
Leon Deckers, Marco van Leeuwen, Martijn Kobus, and Rutger van Zaanten at the Gemeente
Amsterdam for many enlightening discussions and granting access to on-street parking and traffic
data, and Ron Peerenboom at the Ministry of Infrastructure for providing the off-street parking
data.
4See e.g. Anderson and de Palma (2004), Albert and Mahalel (2006), Arnott and Inci (2006), Arnott
and Rowse (2009), Calthrop and Proost (2006), Fosgerau and De Palma (2013), and Arnott et al.
(2015).
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In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by examining to what extent hourly on-street
parking prices are an effective second-best policy tool to mitigate urban traffic exter-
nalities by reducing citywide road traffic. We focus on the city of Amsterdam, where
on-street prices are high and comparable to off-street prices. We use information on
on-street parking, off-street parking, and traffic flow for a period during which on-
street parking prices were suddenly and strongly increased throughout the city.
To estimate the causal effect of the price increase on parking demand and traffic flow,
we apply an event study approach, where we examine changes in parking demand
before and after the policy change, controlling for seasonality, location fixed effects,
and time trends. Our key identification assumption is that the timing of the policy is
random and that in the absence of the policy, parking as well as traffic flow should
follow similar trends in the pre and post period, for which we provide convincing
graphical evidence. Alternatively, we exploit spatio-temporal variation in parking
prices, which identifies local parking demand elasticities to support our citywide es-
timates.
We first show that the price effect on on-street parking demand is large and robust.
The increase in parking prices due to the policy caused overall hourly on-street park-
ing demand to decline by around 17% and the number of arrivals to decline by 9%,
corresponding to a citywide price elasticity of demand of -0.37 and -0.19, respectively.
We also find negative, but much smaller, effects in the (commercial) off-street parking
market, as off-street providers increased prices as a reaction to the policy, but to a
lesser extent. Taking into account that about one quarter of car trips in Amsterdam
use hourly on-street parking, this implies that the policy decreased citywide traffic
flow by around 2.5%. Furthermore, we find that the total effect on parking arrivals
and exits is over twice as large during afternoon peak hour traffic as compared to the
morning peak. These results are confirmed using traffic counts from road loop data,
where we find a subsequent average reduction in traffic flows of around 2% – 3%,
and larger effects in the afternoon.
These findings are important to understand the extent to which prices reduce parking
demand and traffic at the city level. One straightforward implication is that parking
prices reduce overall traffic flow and thereby serve as a second-best congestion and
environmental policy. Interestingly, we show that even though parking prices were
not differentiated within the day, the policy had larger effects on traffic during the
evening peak hours because of heterogeneity in parking demand within the day. Our
estimates are also relevant for cities aiming to convert on-street parking into alter-
native uses, such as parks, cycling lanes, and restaurants, without causing additional
externalities from cruising or additional costs from building new off-street capacity.
Our paper relates to three strands of literature. First, our paper relates to the empirical
6
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literature studying the effects of prices on demand. Lehner and Peer (2019) present
a meta-analysis on the price elasticity of parking.5 Second, our paper relates to a
large theoretical literature, which emphasises the importance of using parking prices
to reduce congestion (Albert and Mahalel, 2006; Arnott and Inci, 2006; Shoup, 2006;
Arnott and Rowse, 2009; Arnott and Inci, 2010; Fosgerau and De Palma, 2013; Arnott
et al., 2015). Third, our paper links to the literature on second-best congestion policies.
This includes public transport subsidies (Anderson, 2014), licence plate restrictions
(Davis, 2008; Kreindler, 2016), and HOV lanes (Bento et al., 2014; Hanna et al., 2017).
Most closely related to our paper, Krishnamurthy and Ngo (2020) study the effects
of a local parking policy on traffic flow and find that the introduction of a dynamic
pricing scheme in San Francisco resulted in 6% lower vehicle counts in treated areas.
However, the latter study is silent on the effect at the city level.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we estimate on-
street as well as off-street parking demand functions for the whole city of Amsterdam,
where we exploit a substantial increase in the hourly price for on-street parking for
essentially the whole city. In the parking demand literature, typically a local price
change is investigated, either for a specific parking garage or parking zone (Kelly
and Clinch, 2009; Van Ommeren and Wentink, 2012; Krishnamurthy and Ngo, 2020).
Effects on local parking demand are then a combination of a reduction in car use and
substitution to other locations.6 Using all on-street parking data and a representa-
tive sample of commercial off-street garages for essentially the whole city offers the
key advantage that we are able to address substitution over space to other locations
within the city.7 The policy we examine increased average prices by 66%, from e2.55
to e4.22 per hour, so the price increase was not only large in relative terms, but also
in absolute terms.
Second, our study presents a significant improvement in data quality compared to
the previous literature (Lehner and Peer, 2019). We use administrative micro-data
from over 70 million parking transactions at more than 3,000 parking meters and 60
visitor permit zones throughout the city, which represents the complete hourly on-
street parking market. These data allow us to estimate citywide parking elasticities
and distinguish between the extensive (parking arrivals) and intensive margin (park-
5Notable contributions include Kelly and Clinch (2009) (on-street parking demand), Pierce and Shoup
(2013), Ottosson et al. (2013), Chatman and Manville (2014) (on-street parking occupancy), and
De Groote et al. (2019) (off-street parking demand).
6For example, it is unclear whether the effects on traffic flows found in Krishnamurthy and Ngo
(2020) were redirected to other locations in the city that were not part of the pilot programme.
7For larger cities it is unlikely that many motorists decrease parking demand within the city by in-
creasing parking demand just outside the city. Even if this would be the case the reduction in
citywide traffic flow is still captured by the reduction in parking demand in the city as drivers do
not enter the city.
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ing duration). This is crucial, as information on parking arrivals allows us to gauge
the effects on traffic flow. Furthermore, we also have a representative sample on off-
street garages which indicates that off-street prices in Amsterdam also increased in
response to the policy and rules out substitution to off-street parking.
Third, using traffic flow data from road loops, we explicitly estimate the effect of the
citywide increase in parking prices on traffic flow within the city, largely confirming
the parking results.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the policy context
and data, Section 4.4 explains the methods employed, and Section 4.5 discusses our
results, robustness checks, and implications. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
2.2 Data and context
2.2.1 Context
Amsterdam is a historic European city, characterized by narrow one-way streets and
by a transportation system that offers many modal alternatives to travellers. In 2017,
auto travel represented 27% of trips, while cycling, walking, public transport, and
scooters, each accounted for 26%, 19%, 26%, and 2%, respectively (Gemeente Amster-
dam, 2019). About half of all car trips, excluding those made by residential parking
permit holders, are made by non-residents.8
Figure 2.1 illustrates a map of the Amsterdam municipal area and shows the major
transport and parking infrastructure. Travelling from one side of the city to the other
by car is fastest and most convenient via the A10 ring road, so most cars do not travel
through the city unless they are going to a destination within the ring road. The river
IJ cuts the city in two parts. Access from the South to the North of Amsterdam by car
is only possible via three tunnels, one to the West and two to the East of the central
train station.9 The dark gray area indicates the paid parking area which represents
63% of the total on-street parking supply in Amsterdam. Peripheral areas without
paid parking are predominantly residential suburban or industrial, are generally not
well connected to tram, metro or bus lines, and are generally not considered as a vi-
able substitute for motorists with a destination in the paid parking area. There are
8Trips to and from home by Amsterdam residents account for around 30% of all car trips, however
these do not end in (hourly) paid parking.
9For non-motorized transport, the only way to get to the North side is by ferry from Amsterdam
Central Station, or by taking the North-South metro line that was opened in July 2018.
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Figure 2.1: Major transport and parking infrastructure in Amsterdam.
three clusters of off-street parking garages. The first cluster, which contains the ma-
jority of garages, are located around the city centre and are small in terms of capac-
ity. The other two clusters are around the South Axis business park and the Bijlmer
ArenA towards the South East, which tend to have larger capacities.
2.2.2 Parking policy in Amsterdam
In this section we briefly describe the policy context and main impacts of the policy
we analyse (for a more detailed overview, please see Appendix 1). In Amsterdam on-
street parking is accessible to drivers who pay hourly rates as well as residents using
residential permits, close to their home.10 Around one third of motorists (excluding
residents parking with a permit) use off-street commercial parking garages. These
garages are mainly provided by private operators and charge slightly higher prices
10This is in contrast to countries such as the UK, where most cities have ‘residential parking only’
areas. Residential permits are only valid in a residential permit zone.
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as compared to nearby on-street parking.
In May of 2018, the city of Amsterdam committed to a mobility agenda to priori-
tise cycling and pedestrian transport, while reducing car use in the city (Gemeente
Amsterdam, 2018a, pg.47). Following a decade of constant on-street parking prices,
the new coalition government, headed by the Green party, mandated a parking price
increase for (hourly) on-street parking and the conversion of freed on-street parking
supply to other uses. By late October 2018, it was announced that (hourly) prices
were to be raised throughout the city effective Sunday April 14, 2019 (week 16).
A map of Amsterdam municipality illustrating the spatial extent of the paid parking
area and parking prices per zone before and after the policy can be seen in Figure 2.2.
There are eight price zones that differ in their hourly prices. Prices are the highest in
the historical city centre and fall with distance to the centre. Price increases were large
in both relative and absolute terms (see Figure 2.A.4 in Appendix A). Average hourly
on-street prices (weighted by the number of arrivals per area) increased by e1.67,
or 66%, from e2.55 to e4.22. In the historic city centre, hourly prices went up from
e5.00 to e7.50, making Amsterdam the most expensive city for on-street parking in
the world (Parkopedia, 2019).
Price increases were implemented in every parking zone except for three non-central
industrial zones with a time limit of three hours and a few streets with a time limit
of one hour, priced at e0.10 and intended to be used for shopping (see Figure 2.A.1
in Appendix A).11 The largest relative price increase occurred just outside the city
centre where prices doubled from e3.00 to e6.00. The smallest relative price increase
occurred in northern areas and a few peripheral areas of the city where price increases
were negligible.
The new policy did not alter paid parking hours. Paid parking hours, which vary
by zone, start at 9:00 and end between 19:00–23:59. For the majority of parking areas
within the ring road, parking hours end after 21:00. Furthermore, as shown in Figure
2.2, the policy did not affect the total paid parking area, but it slightly changed the
delineation of certain parking zones within this area.12
Alongside the price increase, the municipality aims to gradually reduce the supply
of on-street parking in areas where parking pressure was relieved due to the price
increase. In 2019, 1,141 parking places were redeveloped into public spaces such as
park benches, playgrounds, and bicycle parking (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2020). The
11Reducing parking demand through time limits is common in North American and Australian cities,
but is relatively rare in Europe.
12The policy also expanded a visitor permit scheme which accounts for a small share of on-street
parking demand (1.57%). In our analysis, visitor permits are included.
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Figure 2.2: Hourly parking prices pre and post policy.
reduction was gradual, relatively uniform over space, and represents less than one
percent of the total paid on-street parking supply. Hence, this is unlikely to be a con-
founding factor in evaluating the effect of the price increases, because the reduction
in supply was a response to lower demand, and the reduction is only a fraction of
the decrease in demand implied by our results. Hence, the reduction in supply is
unlikely to have contributed to increased cruising and therefore to reduced parking
demand.
Hourly prices at commercial off-street garages (weighted by garage capacity) were,
on average, almost 30% higher than nearby on-street prices before the policy (e3.33
and e2.57, respectively), but after the policy the difference was less than 10% (e4.37
and e4.01, respectively).13 So prices for off-street parking garages increased substan-
tially (by 19% – 31%), but less than the on-street prices close to these garages (which
went up by 56%).14 While cruising for parking is limited compared to other major
cities, the reduction in the difference between on-street and off-street parking prices
suggests a (small) reduction in the level of cruising costs (Arnott et al., 2015).
13We define ‘nearby’ as parking meters within a 500 m buffer around each off-street garage and cal-
culate the average price of these parking meters. Note that off-street day prices are generally lower
than for on-street parking (before and after the policy) so the overall price difference is less than
indicated in the main text.
14In our full sample it is 31%. For some garages we do not observe prices pre-policy. Excluding these
garages results in an increase of 19%.
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2.2.3 Parking data
2.2.3.1 On-street parking
The on-street parking analysis is based on administrative data of 87.51 million unique
on-street parking transactions from 2017 to 2019, provided by the municipality of
Amsterdam.15 This micro dataset contains information about the start and end time of
each transaction, as well as other transaction attributes such as the total price charged,
the parking meter, as well as the type of use and method of payment.16 We exclude
3.51% transactions which are used for special purposes, such as handicapped parking
and long term construction work.
Motorists are required to pay at the closest available parking meter, but the majority
use mobile phone apps (76%). The latter allows for flexibility in terms of duration
as compared to physically paying at the machine, where duration must be chosen
beforehand. On-street parking is also possible via visitor permits, which are available
through residents. These permits offer a discount of between 50% – 75% on the hourly
rates for up to 40 hours per residential household per month, and must be activated
via an online web application.17 Each transaction is tied to a vehicle number plate and
enforcement is performed using a car equipped with cameras, therefore infraction is
difficult, however illegal parking still accounts for over 2% of arrivals (Egis Group,
2019).18
We exclude 3.85% of transactions shorter than five minutes and 0.01% of transactions
longer than one week as they are likely to be the result of human and machine errors.
Furthermore, we exclude transactions on Sunday (3.3%) as parking hours and rates
differ compared with the rest of the week and on-street parking tends to be free.
Finally, there was a large expansion of the parking area in the North of Amsterdam
on July 1, 2018, corresponding to the introduction of a new metro line. Because the
North is geographically separated from the main area of Amsterdam by the IJ river
and faces different trends, we exclude this area (7.5% transactions) and perform a
sensitivity check where we include these parking areas, while controlling for area
15For 2017, observations for 9 weeks are missing.
16Parking meters are close together. The median distance between a parking meter and the next closest
parking meter is 69 meters.
17Transactions have a visitor parking zone as a spatial identifier which contains about 42 parking
meters per zone.
18In 2017, the municipality issued 780,000 fines, which corresponds to around 2% of arrivals (Parool,
2019). This is a lower bound of the prevalence of illegal parking as it is inevitable that some in-
fractions go undetected. Nevertheless, the effect on arrivals is likely to be smaller because many
infractions occur due to underpayment. If no infraction is detected, the number plate data is re-
moved on privacy grounds.
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specific time trends.
After these selections we are left with 67.13 million parking transactions, of which
98.7% pay the full price and park for an average duration (weighted by the number
of arrivals) of 2.4 hours, while 1.3% use visitor permits with a slightly higher average
(weighted) duration of 3 hours. Using these micro data we calculate daily parking de-
mand per area resulting in a panel of 2.71 million daily observations.19 For motorists
that pay the full price we know the parking meter and for those that use visitor per-
mits, we know the visitor parking zone. In total we have 3,238 parking meters and 67
visitor parking zones.20
Daily parking demand per area is measured in three ways: volume (total hours
parked), the number of arrivals, and the mean duration of arrivals. Most transac-
tions (96.2%) start and end on the same day, therefore volume is (approximately)
equal to the product of arrivals and duration at the daily level. Based on hourly data
from the nearest weather station, obtained from KNMI,21 average daily temperature
(°C), windspeed (kmph), and a dummy for rain and temperatures below 0 °C be-
tween 08:00 – 20:00 are added. We also add public holidays and school holidays as
additional controls as vacation times change by region from year to year.
2.2.3.2 Off-street parking
We observe the location and hourly prices for all 70 off-street garages. Garages have
an average capacity of 455 spaces. The municipality of Amsterdam owns 40% of
garage capacity and charges market prices, so these garages are defined as commer-
cial.
For a (representative) sample of 27 garages (out of 70), we have occupancy data based
on API requests to dynamic parking information systems which allow us to calculate
hourly parking volume.22 There are two limitations of these data. First, we do not
19We trim outliers with volume ≥ 1000 hours, duration ≥ 24 hours, and arrivals and exits ≥ 500 cars
(0.2% of observations). See Section 1 in Appendix A for a detailed description of the aggregation
process.
20Most parking meters are active throughout the entire period. However, 73 parking areas were either
defective for a period of at least one month or were added/removed during the study period. These
areas correspond to 0.56% total arrivals, are evenly spread throughout the city, and are included in
the analysis.
21Data from the Schipol weather station is used, located 12 km away from the city center. The KNMI
is the Dutch National Weather Institute.
22See Figure 2.A.1 in Appendix A for spatial distribution of garages in the sample. Garage occupancy
is observed every 2 minutes.
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observe the number of off-street garage arrivals (or exits) in which we are interested
to gauge the policy effect on traffic flow. As will be explained in detail later on, the
estimate of the policy effect on volume can be used to bound the effect on the num-
ber of arrivals. Second, we only observe garage data after July in 2018. This means
that we have less information on longer term (pre)trends, however given a sudden
change in on-street prices, we still expect to be able to detect changes around the
policy window.
Our aggregated daily dataset consists of 10,395 daily parking volume observations
for 16 commercial garages, covering 31% of total commercial off-street capacity, and
7 P&R facilities, covering 63% of P&R capacity, between July 4, 2018 and February
29, 2020.23 Average hourly prices at commercial garages increased by 23%, while
prices at P&R facilities, which charge cheap daily rates of e1, conditional on drivers
parking after 10:00 and demonstrating a valid public transport ticket to and from the
city centre, did not change.24
2.2.4 Traffic data
We further obtain hourly flow data from primary (non-highway) roads measured
using induction loops at various points within the city for the years 2018 and 2019
from the municipality of Amsterdam. Our aggregated data consists of 12,696 daily
observations for a total of 31 loops where traffic flow are collected, where each loop
represents one flow direction.25
2.2.5 Trends
Figure 2.3 shows that on-street parking volume and the number of arrivals both ex-
hibit a slight positive linear growth rate, as indicated by the black linear fit, over the
period before the introduction of the policy, while duration is constant. There is a
sharp decline in parking demand at the beginning of the policy, followed by a con-
23We exclude 0.75% of observations for unrealistic outliers and 5.18% of observations with incomplete
hourly data. We drop 4 garages because of missing data and select the period until March 1, 2020
due to COVID-19 lock-down measures.
24Other drivers pay hourly rates that are similar to on-street prices. Based on other monthly data from
the municipality, we can calculate that there are almost 2,000 daily P&R arrivals (80% of these exit
the same day).
25Several loops have defective measurements and experienced nearby road works over the period
of study. We pre-select locations for which we have consistent observations over the period of
analysis.
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Figure 2.3: Mean daily on-street parking demand per area.
tinuation of the linear trend until the end of 2019. It can also be seen that there is a
dip in the volume and number of arrivals around the school summer holidays and
there is variation in the number of arrivals around April and May, which is the result
of a large number of public and school holidays falling in this period (7 out of of 11
mandatory public holidays fall in April or May).
Figure 2.B.5 in Appendix B illustrates trends in traffic flow over time.26 Traffic flow
appears to follow similar patterns over time as parking demand with dips in the
summer period and more fluctuation around holidays.
Figure 2.4 shows that commercial off-street parking volume is constant pre-policy,
while P&R volume is falling. At the beginning of the policy, there appears to be a
slight drop in commercial off-street parking and an increase in P&R demand.
2.2.6 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics. Panel A shows that there are around
25 daily arrivals per parking area and the mean duration is 2.5 hours, the prod-
uct of which approximately equals the daily parking volume per area, which is 61
26As we do not have a balanced panel, the data is demeaned per loop-direction to ensure comparabil-
ity over time.
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Figure 2.4: Mean daily off-street parking demand per garage.
hours parked.27 Panel B shows that the average daily volume at off-street commer-
cial garages is about 1,700 hours while P&R facilities have slightly over double the
daily volume. Panel C indicates that average daily traffic flow is about 9,000 cars per
loop-direction.
In Appendix 5 we present histograms of the key variables and the distribution within
the day. Figure 2.A.5 shows that on-street parking volume peaks between 10:00 and
15:00 and gradually falls until midnight. Average duration is constant during the day
and becomes slightly longer in the evening. Arrivals peak at 09:00 when paid parking
starts and is relatively constant until 18:00, after which arrivals begin to fall. There
are few exits before 10:00 and peak around 15:00. Figure 2.A.8 indicates that off-
street parking volume follows a similar hourly distribution and accounts for around
one third of total paid (hourly) parking demand. Finally, Figure 2.A.9 illustrates that
traffic flow peaks at 08:00 and 17:00, but does not fluctuate a great deal over the day.
2.3 Empirical methods
Our aim is to estimate the causal effect of parking policy on parking demand and
traffic flow at the city level. The policy implied higher on-street and off-street prices
as the policy induced commercial off-street providers to increase garage prices. The
causal effect of the policy on parking demand is estimated using an event study ap-
27There are slightly fewer observations for duration as a small proportion (2.02%) of parking areas
face no arrivals on a given day.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: On-street parking
Volume (hours) 2,710,535 59.37 73.99 0.00 999.97
Arrivals (# cars) 2,710,535 24.76 27.66 0.00 439.00
Duration (mean hours) 2,655,737 2.52 1.43 0.08 23.99
Panel B: Off-street parking
Volume commercial (hours) 6,514 1,704.61 1,242.71 0.00 6,181.83
Volume P&R (hours) 2,797 3,863.66 1,564.74 0.00 11,288.00
Panel C: Traffic flow
Flow (# cars) 12,696 8,863.69 3,786.36 1,994 26,060
proach, controlling for seasonality, area fixed effects, and time trends. Our key identi-
fication assumption is that the timing of the policy is random and that in the absence
of the policy, parking demand would have followed a similar trend in the pre and post
period, for which we provide convincing graphical evidence (see Section 2.4.1.1). We
first introduce the econometric model, and subsequently discuss how we deal with
various endogeneity issues that arise in our setting.
2.3.1 On-street parking
We first aim to examine to what extent the policy impacted on-street parking demand
using only temporal variation from the introduction of the parking policy. Hence, our
dependent variable of interest is parking demand, which we define as Dit, for each
parking area i at day t. Parking demand is measured in three ways: volume (i.e.
‘total demand’), arrivals (i.e. the ‘extensive margin’), and average duration (i.e. the
‘intensive margin’). Parking areas i = 1, ..., n, n+1, ..., N refer to n parking meters and
N − n visitor permit areas. We consider the following exponential mean function:
E[Dit] = exp(βTt + φi + κSt + τWt + L(t)), (2.1)
where E[Dit] denotes the expected demand and the policy effect is denoted by Tt =
{Pt, log(p̄t)}.28 Pt is a dummy equal to one after the policy was introduced and log(p̄t)
28This is estimated using a Poisson Quasi-Maximum likelihood estimator. The exponential mean
model has an advantage over log transformations because it allows for zero counts and is insensi-
tive to the level of spatial aggregation. In Table 2.B.5 of Appendix B we show that our estimates are
conservative compared to the log transformation.
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equals the natural logarithm of the average price level over the city at time t. There-
fore β represents the semi-elasticity of citywide parking demand with respect to the
policy and citywide average prices, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the
time-invariant level of a parking area.
We have a slightly unbalanced panel as new parking meters have been added
over time. Therefore we include parking area fixed effects, φi, which capture
time-invariant characteristics related to demand, such as the availability of
substitutes (i.e. public transport) and the attractiveness of the area (i.e. availability
of shops and firms), and parking supply (i.e. parking demand by residents with
a permit). Parking demand fluctuates over the year due to time varying demand
factors, such as holidays, weekends, and weather conditions. While this is unlikely
to affect the consistency of our estimates, we control for temporal fluctuations in
demand to improve efficiency by including fixed effects, represented by St, for
day-of-week, week-of-year, public holidays, school holidays, and a vector of weather
controls Wt.29 Finally, time trends are an important confounding factor as our key
identifying assumption relies on the correct specification of the time trend. Trends in
parking demand appear to indicate a small, positive, linear time trend (see Figure
2.3), therefore in our main specification we include a linear time trend, L(t), and
perform various sensitivity checks where we include parking area specific trends
and include higher order polynomials. Lastly, in spirit of a Regression Discontinuity
Design, we also perform the analysis over a shorter time window of one, two and
three-months pre-post, to abstract from longer term trends.
2.3.2 Off-street parking and overall parking demand
One issue with equation (2.1) is that the policy may induce motorists to substitute
to off-street garages (including P&R), which would result in an overestimate of the
policy effect on traffic. As mentioned in Section 4.3, prices at off-street garages also
increased and parking off-street remained more expensive than on-street, however
off-street parking became relatively cheaper. Furthermore, the price for P&R garages
did not change, so it became more attractive for drivers to park in the outskirts of the
city and to take public transport into the city.
To get an understanding of the overall effect on (hourly) paid parking demand, we
first estimate the effect of the policy on commercial off-street and P&R parking de-
29Weather controls include average daily temperature, windspeed, and a dummy for whether there
was rain or temperatures below 0 °C between 08:00 – 20:00. These controls potentially increase the
efficiency of the estimates. They will also improve the consistency as the price increase was not on
the first of January, so it is partially correlated to seasonal factors.
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mand separately. This provides an indication of how increasing hourly on-street
parking prices affects off-street parking demand. To estimate the overall effect of
the parking policy on the entire market for hourly parking in Amsterdam, we in-
clude all hourly parking (including on-street parking) into one combined estimate.
We only have parking volume data for a sample of garages over a shorter period, so
we weight each off-street and P&R garage by the sum of total capacity divided by
the sum of capacity for garages we observe.30 Under the assumption that the policy
effect on garages in our sample is representative, the combined regression estimates
the overall effect of the parking policy on the entire market for hourly parking in
Amsterdam.31
Another potential issue with equation (2.1) is that the policy may induce drivers to
park (for free) outside the paid parking areas and commute into the city using public
transport. Although we cannot measure this effect, it is likely to be small for three
reasons. First, the majority of motorists park for a short period of time (64% park
for less than two hours), so the additional time cost of parking outside the paid area
frequently exceeds the duration of the activity. Second, it costs around e4.00 for a
return trip by public transport from outside the paid parking area to the city centre,
so the monetary opportunity costs are substantial. Third, motorists are unlikely to
significantly contribute to traffic within the paid parking area, which we are mainly
interested in.
Finally, if the policy induces more illegal parking our estimates of parking demand
may be downwards biased (Yang and Qian, 2017). This can take the form of drivers
that leave after the end time stated in the transaction data, or that simply park illegally
(without paying). In Amsterdam, this is unlikely to be a large issue as enforcement is
strong and technologically advanced.32
2.3.3 Temporal and spatial variation in on-street prices
On-street parking price increases varied throughout the city (see Figure 2.A.4 in Ap-
pendix A), so we expect drivers to react to spatial differences in prices within the city
to varying degrees. Therefore our second identification strategy exploits both tem-
poral and spatial variation from changes in parking prices as an internal consistency
check to verify that parking price changes are driving our results, rather than other
30In effect, commercial garages get a weight of 3.2 and P&R facilities get a weight of 1.6 each.
31In Amsterdam, in contrast to many other cities around the world, (free) parking offered by retail
companies (e.g. supermarkets and malls) is negligible, so traffic related to shopping is included in
hourly parking demand measures.
32Illegal parking accounts for about 2% of arrivals (see Section 4.2).
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confounding factors. We estimate a similar equation as above:
E[Dit] = exp(β log(pit) + φi + κSt + τWt + L(t)), (2.2)
where the policy effect is now captured by log(pit), which represents the natural log of
on-street parking prices for parking area i at time t. Here, β represents the elasticity
of parking outcomes with respect to parking prices at a specific parking location, but
does not provide an unbiased estimate of the citywide parking price effect, estimated
in equation (2.1), as it captures spatial substitution within the city. For instance, if
prices in one area increase, while in a neighbouring area prices stay the same, we
might expect drivers to substitute to these areas, in which case demand shifts to an-
other location within the city, but overall citywide parking and traffic demand remains
unchanged. So, prices in neighbouring areas may affect parking demand at location
i.
Therefore, we estimate two variants of equation (2.2). First, parking areas far from
boundaries are likely to have less substitution due to long walking distances, so we
examine whether excluding parking areas close to the border of parking rate zones
affects our estimates. Second, we calculate the difference in parking prices between
parking area i and neighbouring areas, j 6= i, by calculating the average price of
parking meters within a 500 meter buffer. We then include this variable non-linearly
into equation (2.2) to check whether differences in neighbouring prices influence the
local estimates.33
We also apply a different empirical strategy where we estimate a variant of equa-
tion (2.2) that exploits spatio-temporal variation from changes in price differences
between locations using a two-way fixed effects model. Therefore, we include park-
ing area fixed effects, φi, and day fixed effects, γt, leading to the following regression
equation:
E[Dit] = exp(β log(pit) + φi + γt), (2.3)
where all time-varying covariates are absorbed by the day fixed effect and β rep-
resents a difference-in-differences estimator, where treatment is continuous and is
determined by the intensity of relative price changes.34 Therefore, our alternative
identifying assumption is that in the absence of the policy, areas with larger relative
33According to Van der Waerden et al. (2017), the maximum distance car drivers are willing to walk is
about 50 m for work, 100 m for weekly shopping, and above 500 m for non-weekly shopping. As
we focus on weekdays and Amsterdam has considerably larger spatial differences in parking fees
we apply a slightly conservative approach with 500 m.
34In effect, we compare changes in parking demand for areas that experience, for example, a 50%
increase in prices with areas that experience an 80% increase in prices and identify β based on the
difference in changes (i.e. 80%− 50% = 30%).
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price increases should face similar changes in parking demand as compared to areas
with smaller changes.
2.3.4 Traffic effects
We focus on paid parking arrivals, which capture a substantial share of total traffic,
but far from all. Total traffic also relates to trips by residents using residential parking
permits or private parking, by commuters who predominantly use (free) employer
parking, by public and shared transport vehicles, such as buses and taxi’s, and by
delivery vehicles. Therefore, we also examine to what extent the policy impacted
traffic outcomes in the city using traffic flow data in order to validate our estimates
of parking demand. We define log(Fit) as the natural logarithm of total traffic flows
(measured by cars per day) for each measurement area i at day t and estimate a model
with the same set of controls as in equation (2.1):
log(Fit) = βPt + φi + κSt + τWt + L(t) + εit, (2.4)
where β represents the semi-elasticity of citywide traffic flow with respect to the pol-
icy. The (loop-direction) area fixed effect, φi, captures time-invariant characteristics of
the traffic measurement location, such as the road type, route direction, and proximity
to the highway. As in (2.1), our identification strategy exploits temporal variation in
the introduction of the parking policy. Standard errors are clustered at the week-year
level.
2.4 Results
In this section we first demonstrate that the policy had a large, robust, impact on both
on-street and off-street parking demand, including the number of arrivals. We then
investigate the impact on overall traffic flow and examine the heterogeneity within
the day.
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Figure 2.5: On-street parking volume policy effect after including all controls.
2.4.1 Parking
2.4.1.1 Identical trends
In Section 4.2 we have shown that on-street parking demand has a slight positive
trend and a sharp decline after the policy is introduced. In Figure 2.5 we plot esti-
mates of a weekly policy effect, while including all controls and fixed effects as in
our preferred specification in (2.1).35 Here, the coefficients are estimated by including
year-week dummies and excluding the week prior to the introduction of the policy.36
There appears to be no significant pre-trends, and the overall impact of the price in-
crease in April 2019 is clear from the immediate and sustained drop in overall parking
demand of around 20%. We find effects of around 10% for arrivals and duration (see
Figures 2.B.1 and 2.B.2 in Appendix A).
35For the raw weekly aggregates see Figure 2.B.1 in Appendix B.
36Specifically, the figure plots the βτ coefficients from estimating:
E[Dit] = exp
(
156∑
τ=51
βτPt−τ + φi + κSt + τWt + L(t)
)
, (2.5)
where Pt−τ is a year-week dummy and βτ is the effect of the policy for each year-week t. Given
week fixed effects in this setting, we omit the year-week dummies for 2017 and the missing weeks
from 2018; otherwise perfect multicollinearity emerges. The error bars represent the 95% confi-
dence interval for each weekly point estimate, clustered at the parking area level.
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Table 2.2: Citywide results: On-street parking volume
Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Policy effect -0.178∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Price citywide (log) -0.366∗∗∗
(0.014)
Year 2019 0.019∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Post week 15 -0.041∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
Time trend 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes
Public holiday FE Yes Yes Yes
School holiday FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,710,535 2,710,535 2,710,535 2,710,535 2,710,535
Pseudo R2 0.0057 0.69107 0.71469 0.71491 0.71491
Notes: Estimated using Quasi-ML Poisson regression. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the parking area level. Weather controls include the average daily temperature, windspeed, and
a dummy for whether there was rain or temperatures below 0 °C between 8-20hr.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
2.4.1.2 On-street parking
Table 2.2 shows the estimation results for parking volume with incremental levels of
controls and fixed effects. Column (1) shows that with only a year dummy and a post
week 15 dummy, we find a statistically significant effect of 16.3%.37 Columns (2) and
(3) show that controlling for parking area fixed effects and time varying controls (day-
of-week, week-of-year, public and school holiday fixed effects, and weather controls)
has essentially no effect on the coefficient of interest. In column (4) we replace the
year dummy with an annualised daily linear time trend. The coefficient on the time
trend indicates that there is a positive, and statistically significant, increase in parking
37The year dummy captures annual growth in parking demand over time and the post week 15
dummy captures seasonal differences in demand over the year which are correlated to the intro-
duction of the policy, such as summer school holidays. Note, the coefficients from a Poisson model
can be interpreted as a percentage change using (eβ − 1) · 100%.
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Table 2.3: Citywide results: On-street arrivals and duration
Arrivals Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy effect -0.091∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Price citywide (log) -0.191∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.007)
Year 2019 0.016∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.0007 0.0002 0.0002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Post week 15 -0.061∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
Time trend 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.0010 0.0010
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,710,535 2,710,535 2,710,535 2,655,737 2,655,737 2,655,737
Pseudo R2 0.00258 0.68113 0.68113 -23.52087 -21.08404 -21.08404
Notes: Estimated using Quasi-ML Poisson regression. Duration is weighted by the average number
of arrivals per parking area. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the parking area level.
Weather controls include the average daily temperature, windspeed, and a dummy for whether there
was rain or temperatures below 0 °C between 8-20hr.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
demand by around 4% annually.38
Our preferred specification in column (4), which controls for parking area fixed ef-
fects, seasonality, and trends, implies that the citywide effect of the parking policy
resulted in 16.8% fewer on-street parking hours. In column (5) we replace the post
indicator with mean citywide on-street parking prices pre and post policy. The result
indicates that the citywide parking demand elasticity with respect to parking prices
is equal to -0.37.
In Table 2.3 we estimate the policy and price effect on arrivals and duration. Both
effects remain highly stable to the introduction of controls. In our preferred specifi-
cation (column (2)), the number of arrivals declines by 9.2%, which corresponds to a
citywide price elasticity of -0.19, while average duration declines by 8.7% with a city-
38We divide the daily time trend by 365 so the coefficient can be interpreted as an annual effect.
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Table 2.4: Results: offstreet parking.
Volume
On-street Off-street Combined (on & off) P&R Combined (all)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Policy effect -0.190∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.019) (0.003)
Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,434,729 6,514 1,441,243 2,797 1,444,040
Pseudo R2 0.73038 0.72621 0.82366 0.47118 0.87003
Notes: Subsample of on-street parking data starting on 2018-07-04. Garages in column (3) and (5) are
weighted by the inverse proportion of garage capacity in the sample as compared to the entire off-street
parking market. In effect, commercial garages get a weight of 3.2 and P&R facilities get a weight of
1.6 each. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the year-week level. Weather controls include
the average daily temperature, windspeed, and a dummy for whether there was rain or temperatures
below 0 °C between 8-20hr.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
wide price elasticity of -0.18.39 It appears that the citywide price elasticity of arrivals
is approximately equal to the price elasticity of duration (by construction, the sum is
approximately equal to the volume elasticity).40
2.4.1.3 Off-street parking and overall parking demand
Our estimates for the impact of the parking policy on on-street parking ignores the
effect on the off-street parking market. The policy may have increased off-street de-
mand as drivers substitute away to off-street parking or it may have decreased off-
street demand because garage prices increased. In Table 2.4 we estimate the policy
impact on parking volume at commercial off-street garages.
One issue is that we have a much shorter period of observation for off-street parking
demand (only from July 2018). To examine the importance of having a shorter ob-
39Note the effect on duration captures that drivers park for a shorter duration and driver sorting, i.e.
that drivers with long durations stopped parking.
40Arrivals increase by about 4% annually, while duration remained constant, consistent with trends in
Figure 2.3.
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served period, in column (1) of Table 2.4 we first re-estimate the main results in the
on-street market for parking volume over the same time period for which we have
off-street data. Due to the shorter time period and detailed set of temporal controls,
the year dummy and time trend (included in Table 2.2) cannot be identified, however
the effect of interest is essentially identical to our main result. This implies that con-
trolling for this variable is not essential and this specification can be used to estimate
the effect on off-street parking.
In column (2) we estimate the impact on commercial off-street garage demand and
find a negative and statistically significant effect of around 5%. In column (3) we esti-
mate the effect on on-street and off-street demand combined. The estimate indicates
that the combined parking demand declined by 15.9% due to the policy. In column
(4) we find a positive and statistically significant effect of around 5% on P&R facil-
ities. This makes sense as P&R prices did not change and therefore these garages
became more attractive. As P&R arrivals are small compared to on-street parking ar-
rivals (2.35% arrivals), these findings have little impact on overall traffic flow within
the city.41 In column (5) we estimate the policy effect on the demand for on-street,
off-street, and P&R combined. The estimated effect, which represents the overall
citywide impact of the parking policy on the entire hourly parking market is 14%.42
This implies that the policy did not result in a net increase in demand for off-street
parking, but even a decrease because off-street garages responded by raising prices,
albeit to a lesser degree than on-street.
We do not have information on off-street parking arrivals, but our estimates for vol-
ume suggest that the policy effect on on-street arrivals is likely an underestimate of
the total policy effect on traffic flow. Under the assumption that the reduction in
off-street arrivals accounts for half of the reduction in off-street parking volume, as
is the case with on-street parking (see Table 2.3), these results indicate that off-street
arrivals declined by about 2.5%, or about a quarter of the percentage decline in on-
street parking (and about one eighth in absolute value). As this estimate is based on
an assumption which seems plausible, but we cannot test, later on we will also make
the more conservative assumption that the reduction in on-street volume is entirely
due to a reduction in duration, so there was no net effect on the on-street arrivals.
41Applying the estimate from column (4) suggests that overall arrivals increased by around 48 cars
due to P&R, or 0.61% of the reduction in total daily on-street parking. In addition, P&R garages
are all outside the main city limits, so for traffic flow within the city, it is plausible that this effect is
negligible.
42In Table 2.B.7 of Appendix B, we further examine the sensitivity of off-street parking demand to
other specifications. We show that the effects are similar when we focus only on parking garages
located in the city centre, control for changes in short-term capacity throughout the week, and
include an extended period until February 2020.
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Table 2.5: Local on-street parking demand elasticities
Volume Arrivals Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price (log) -0.429∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.035) (0.015) (0.028) (0.008) (0.014)
Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes
Public holiday FE Yes Yes Yes
School holiday FE Yes Yes Yes
Date FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,710,535 2,710,535 2,710,535 2,710,535 2,655,737 2,655,737
Pseudo R2 0.71649 0.7175 0.68148 0.68242 -21.07682 -21.06902
Notes: Estimated using Quasi-ML Poisson regression. Duration is weighted by the average number
of arrivals in a parking area. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the parking area level.
Weather controls include the average daily temperature, windspeed, and a dummy for whether there
was rain or temperatures below 0 °C between 8-20hr.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
2.4.1.4 Temporal and spatial variation
On-street parking price increases varied throughout the city between 0% and 100%
(see Figure 2.A.4 in Appendix A). We therefore expect drivers to react to spatial dif-
ferences in prices within the city to varying degrees, and areas where price increases
are higher should face larger reductions in demand as compared to areas where price
increases are lower.
In columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 2.5, we estimate equation (2.2).43 The results in-
dicate that the average local price elasticities are somewhat higher than the citywide
effects in Table 2.3, and are equal to -0.43, -0.21, and -0.21, for on-street volume, ar-
rivals, and duration, respectively. In columns (2), (4), and (6) we estimate equation
(2.3), therefore time-varying controls are essentially absorbed by the day fixed effects
and the regression exploits spatio-temporal variation in the difference in changes in
parking prices between areas. The elasticities are of a similar magnitude and still
statistically significant at the 1% level, despite larger standard errors.
These local estimates may be biased downwards (overestimate) if prices in neigh-
bouring districts are cheaper as this may cause drivers to substitute over space. There-
43In these regressions, we exploit both temporal and spatial variation in on-street parking prices, so
we can interpret the price coefficients as on-street parking elasticities at the local level.
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fore, in Table 2.B.1 in Appendix B we show that controlling for differences in on-street
parking prices within 500 m and excluding areas within 500 m of a price boundary
has little effect on the results, suggesting that substitution over short distances is rel-
atively minor. This is not surprising as prices decline gradually with distance to the
city centre, also after the increase in prices. Therefore changes in price discontinuities
over space are small.
2.4.1.5 Robustness checks
Our preferred specification of the citywide effect indicates that on-street parking ar-
rivals decline by around 9% due to the policy. Furthermore, we find that it is unlikely
that many drivers substitute to off-street parking and we find similar policy effects
locally. In this section we perform a range of additional robustness checks. Tables
and additional discussion of the results are available in Appendix B.
Our key identification assumption relies on the correct specification of the time trend.
Therefore, in Table 2.B.2 we consider how the specification of the time trend impacts
the estimated policy effect on arrivals. Some areas may have become more attractive
for parking over time, so we interact the time trend with parking price regimes, but
find essentially identical effects. It may also be the case that time trends are non-
linear, so we allow for a flexible time trend by adding a third-order polynomial term
and find that the policy effect becomes somewhat smaller.44 To abstract from long-
run trends we also estimate the policy effect using a shorter time window around the
introduction in week 16, 2019. We gradually make the time interval larger from one
month pre-post to two and then three months pre-post. The results suggest that the
short-run effects are similar in magnitude to the estimated policy effect with the linear
time trend, which may indicate that the non-linear time trend is absorbing part of the
policy effect of interest. Therefore, in our main estimates and in further analysis, we
apply a linear time trend.
In the main analysis we exclude the Northern part of Amsterdam because they ex-
perienced an expansion in the parking area in July, 2018. In Table 2.B.3, we include
the Northern part of Amsterdam and a specific time trend for new areas and find es-
sentially identical results. Furthermore, prices are the highest in the city centre and
fall with distance to the periphery. Therefore, we also estimate the policy effect sep-
arately for central and non-central parking zones and find that the policy effect and
44The second-order term on the time trend is negative and significant, which is not intuitive, as there
is no convincing explanation for why parking demand should fall in a time of strong economic
growth. This suggests that there is ‘overfitting’, which makes this specification less convincing.
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price elasticity of arrivals in central zones is around 50% larger than the effect outside
these areas.
Motorists may be substituting to other on-street options. This is relevant because
other parking policies may have (un)intentional consequences. In Table 2.B.4 we ex-
amine to what extent drivers substituted to discounted e0.10 shopping areas (with
time limits of either one or three hours) and visitor permits as a result of the policy.
We show that there was a significant increase in arrivals of around 7% at inner city
shopping areas (which have one hour time restrictions) while there was no increase in
demand in the peripheral industrial parking areas (which have three hour time lim-
its). This result is interesting as shopping areas generate substantially more traffic per
parking space as they have a higher turnover.45 Finally, we show that visitor permit
demand increased substantially as a result of the policy by around 65%, which indi-
cates that residents make significantly more use of these discounts due to the policy,
although it is still a small share of total arrivals (1.8% after the policy).
Finally, standard errors may be too small if parking demand is serially positively cor-
related (Bertrand et al., 2004). To address this issue, we cluster our standard errors
at the time-invariant level of a parking area. In addition, we run a robustness check
where we focus only on time-series variation around the policy introduction and ag-
gregate our data into six periods, pre and post week 15 in each year (therefore, for
each parking area, we have only six observations). Table 2.B.6 presents the results.
The results are essentially identical to our main estimates and the standard errors
only slightly increase.
2.4.2 Traffic
2.4.2.1 Implied traffic effects using parking estimates
Our main estimate indicates that on-street arrivals decline by around 9%, whereas
off-street arrivals decrease by around 2.5%. Given 84,600 daily on-street arrivals pre-
policy, the arrivals effect implies there are around 7,800 fewer cars travelling within
the city due to the policy. Furthermore, given the off-street estimate of 2.5% and
around 42,000 daily off-street arrivals, this implies an additional reduction of up to
1,200 arrivals, or an overall reduction in flow of around 9,000 cars. Travel surveys
indicate that there are approximately 640,000 daily (one-way) car trips within the paid
45It follows that the policy effect would have been much larger in the absence of these discounted
shopping areas, and would be much smaller in the hypothetical case that Amsterdam would have
much more discounted shopping areas.
29
Chapter 2. Hourly parking prices and traffic
Table 2.6: Main results: Traffic flow.
Flow (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Policy effect -0.030∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Price citywide (log) -0.055∗∗∗
(0.011)
Post week 15 0.005
(0.006)
Year 2019 0.036∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Time trend 0.031∗∗∗
(0.006)
Loop-direction FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,696 12,696 12,696 12,696 12,696
R2 0.93704 0.96235 0.96235 0.96937 0.96937
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the week-loop level. Weather controls include
the average daily temperature, windspeed, and a dummy for whether there was rain or temperatures
below 0 °C between 8-20hr.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
parking area of Amsterdam, excluding tourists. Under the assumption that trips that
end in on-street parking travel a similar distance within the city, this implies around
2.4% – 2.8% less traffic flow as a result of the policy.46
2.4.2.2 Traffic effects based on loop data
In Table 2.6 we directly examine the effect on traffic flow by estimating equation (2.4).
In column (1) we include a year dummy, a post week 15 dummy, and loop-direction
fixed effects, which are important because we have an unbalanced panel and traffic
flow varies by location. We find that the policy results in around 3.0% less traffic
flow. In columns (2) and (3), when we control for additional time-varying controls
and a linear trend, the effect becomes smaller and equal to around 2.1%. Finally, in
46For every return trip, we assume one parking action. Survey data on trips within Amsterdam sup-
port this assumption with few trips including more than one destination. Therefore, 9,0000.5×640,000 =
2.8%, of which 2.4% corresponds to reductions in on-street parking.
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column (4) we interact the time trend with each loop-direction fixed effect to capture
area specific trends and find that the policy reduces traffic by around 2.8%.
Consequently, this implies that the citywide effect of the parking policy results in
around 2% – 3% less traffic flow. The estimated effect is in line with the estimates
implied by the impact of the parking policy on parking demand. In column (5) we
replace the policy dummy with citywide on-street parking prices pre and post policy.
This implies that the citywide traffic elasticity with respect to prices, is around -0.06,
or a quarter of the size of the arrivals elasticity in Table 2.3, consistent with the share
of (hourly) paid on-street parking in the total number of daily trips.
2.4.2.3 Implied traffic effects within the day using parking estimates
Up until now, we have focused on the effect of the policy on arrivals and traffic flow
at the daily level. However, when used as a second-best congestion policy, it is more
efficient when the policy reduces traffic during peak hours of the day. Generally, it
is believed that hourly parking charges only reduce congestion by reducing the total
number of trips, as fees do not differentiate by how much a given driver adds to
congestion (Small and Verhoef, 2007). Therefore, in this section we examine how the
policy effects vary within the day. We emphasise here that we also focus on exits, as
within the day, the effects on arrivals and exits differ from each other.
Figure 2.6 plots the effect of the policy on the number of cars arriving or exiting within
the day. Here we estimate the level effect because it is the absolute number of cars
during peak hours that matters for congestion. Panel (a) indicates that the policy
effect on arrivals is relatively uniform up to 20:00 and becomes becomes smaller late
in the evening as there are few arrivals during this time. Panel (b) shows that the
policy effect on exits is largest in the evening peak hours between 16:00 – 20:00. In
panel (c), we provide an estimate of the citywide reduction in traffic flow generated
by on-street parking within the day. We find that the largest reductions in traffic are
in the afternoon peak hours between 16:00 – 20:00 (a reduction of around 1,300 cars),
which is more than double the reduction between 08:00 – 12:00 (around 500 cars).
This traffic effect is driven by two key factors. First, the traffic generated by on-street
parking varies within the day, with the sum of arrivals and exits peaking between
14:00 – 16:00 (see Figure 2.A.7 in Appendix A). Second, the behavioural responses to
prices differ within the day, with larger arrival and exit price elasticities in the evening
(see Figure 2.B.6 in Appendix B). This is in line with trip purpose data from travel
diaries which indicate that most activities involving parking are not work related
(see Figure 2.A.10 in Appendix A).
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Figure 2.6: Policy effect based on parking data within the day.
2.4.2.4 Traffic effects within the day using loop data
In Figure 2.7 we show the policy effects and the implied total effect on citywide traf-
fic within the day. This is calculated by multiplying the estimated hourly effects in
percentages by the mean number of trips for each hourly interval (see Figure 2.B.7 in
Appendix B).47 Although the standard errors are larger, we find a similar patten and
similar order of magnitude to the on-street parking estimates from Figure 2.6.
47The mean number of trips per hour are estimated based on the proportion of traffic over the day
(from the loop data) and the total number of car trips (from travel survey data), where the number
of trips T for each hour h equals: Th = MeanFlowh∑24
i=8MeanFlowi
× Tday .
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Figure 2.7: Policy effect based on traffic flow data within the day.
2.4.3 Counterfactuals
2.4.3.1 Welfare implications
A higher on-street parking price may generate societal benefits, because it reduces
cruising and travel externalities from congestion, pollution, and accidents, while also
freeing up parking space for other uses. Furthermore, it generates revenues that can
be used to finance public goods, such as parks and pedestrian walkways. It also
increases the producer surplus of commercial parking operators. Meanwhile, it will
also impose societal costs in the form of a lower consumer surplus due to higher on-
street and off-street prices. In this section we aim to provide a back-of-the-envelope
welfare calculation where we distinguish between the implications to residents, non-
residents, and commercial operators (see Section 7 in Appendix B for details).
In order to get a benchmark estimate we make several simplifying assumptions. First,
we assume that, conditional on the supply of off-street parking and the provision of
residential permits, on-street parking prices after the policy are at the socially optimal
level. This is potentially a restrictive assumption, but it seems plausible in the light
that hourly on-street parking prices were lower than hourly off-street prices and on-
street prices had remained constant for the last 10 years, despite strong increases in
prices of substitutes (housing, commercial land, and off-street parking), as well as
increases in national income and car ownership. Second, we assume that prices for
commercial providers are above marginal costs. This makes sense because there is
no free entry into the off-street market in Amsterdam and therefore off-street parking
supply is essentially fixed.
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We first calculate the daily welfare effects, excluding travel externalities. Daily park-
ing demand is approximately equal to 213,000 hours on-street and 106,000 hours off-
street before the policy. Considering that the policy caused parking demand to de-
cline by 17% on-street (36,000 hours) and 5% off-street (5,000 hours), the net gain to
society is approximately e27,000 per day.48
This benefit however excludes travel externalities in the form of congestion, pollu-
tion, and accidents. Our estimates suggest that the policy caused the number of car
trips to decline by about 2.4% (15,600 trips). Taking into account that the average
trip distance within Amsterdam is around 7 km, this implies that overall VKT in the
city declined by about 109,000 km.49 The passenger vehicle externality of petrol cars
(the sum of congestion, pollution, and accident externality) is thought to be about
e0.12 per km in the Netherlands (Schroten et al., 2014), slightly above the (implicit)
marginal tax on fuel ofe0.09 per km, therefore the societal benefits are approximately
e3,000. This may be an underestimate because pollution externalities are larger in ur-
ban areas and we exclude VKT outside of Amsterdam. Nevertheless, pollution only
accounts for a small share of marginal external costs and motorists may substitute
trips to other locations, so these effects may be small.
The above benefit also excludes cruising for parking. Arnott et al. (2015) find that in
a static parking market where on-street and off-street parking are perfect substitutes,
the number of cars cruising for parking is proportional to on-street arrivals and the
fee differential between on-street and off-street parking. This differential was reduced
by e0.40 per hour. Given an average parking duration of 2.4 hours, this implies that
the policy reduced the willingness to pay to avoid on-street parking search by up to
e0.96. Taking the average VOT for car travel in the Netherlands of around e15.40,
this roughly translates to travel time savings of around 4 minutes. Given 77,000 daily
arrivals after the policy, the expected increase in welfare is maximally e74,000 per
day. This may be a large overestimate because (a) cruising only occurs at peak hours,
(b) we ignore price differences between discounted shopping areas, and (c) motorists
may prefer to park off-street for reasons other than avoiding private cruising costs,
and (d) some garages are cheaper for day parking. Therefore we assume that the
private cruising gains are around one quarter of the size (e18,000 per day), but ac-
knowledge that this estimate has extreme uncertainty.
48This is equivalent to the rule of half (0.5× dP × dQ). In the on-street market, supply can be replaced
by other uses, therefore the policy leads to welfare gains, whereas in the off-street market, parking
becomes idle which is a welfare loss (maximum capacity off-street during the day is generally
below 80%). Hence reductions in demand on-street lead to a welfare gain (of e30,000) but changes
off-street results in a small welfare loss (of e3,000).
49This is potentially a gross underestimate of the total distance reduction as non-residents travel much
longer distances, on average 36 km, outside of Amsterdam.
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Adding up the gains in the parking market (e27,000), the reduction in traffic exter-
nalities (e3,000), and the gains from less cruising (e18,000) implies an overall daily
societal gain of around e48,000 due to the price increase. This gain however masks
substantial heterogeneity between residents, non-residents, and commercial opera-
tors. The total daily gains to residents are approximately e195,000, commercial prof-
its increase by around e52,000 (of which one third, e17,000, goes overseas), and non-
residents lose around e196,000 (see Appendix B for calculations). Given that there
are around 850,000 inhabitants in Amsterdam, this suggests that the annual gains
are around e84 per inhabitant. These benefits are largely in the form of increased
government revenues (35%) and the hypothetical value of reclaimed land previously
designated to on-street parking.
2.4.3.2 Automated vehicles
In the near future, automated vehicles (AVs) will not require parking close to their
destination. This has implications for parking demand in cities because AVs will
either not park at all or will be able to park outside the city where parking is cheaper
(Gelauff et al., 2019; Millard-Ball, 2019). We make several (heroic) assumptions on
how AVs might operate and apply our estimates to gauge the order of magnitude
impacts of AVs on traffic flow in the city centre and in the periphery of Amsterdam
in a partial equilibrium setting (see Section 8 in Appendix B for more details).
We first consider a (private ownership) AV scenario where all motorists, currently
using (hourly) paid on-street parking, park outside the city and pay cheaper rates.
Given that the proportion of traffic generated by on-street parking is around one
quarter, our estimates for the price elasticity of arrivals and duration imply that traffic
flow is expected to increase by about 27% – 33%, of which 2 and 8 percentage points
are generated by new car trips due to the lower parking prices in the periphery and
in the city centre, respectively, but the majority (25 percentage points) is generated by
empty AVs travelling to and from parking facilities outside the city.
In the alternative (shared) AV scenario, AVs do not drive to the periphery but parking
prices become essentially zero. Our estimates then imply that duration increases by
2.9 hours in the city centre and 2.6 hours in the periphery, while traffic increases by
around 16% and 12%, respectively.
This counterfactual application assumes that there will be no policy intervention. This
is unlikely as parking is heavily regulated in most cities and AVs are likely to have
large effects on traffic and government revenues, so local governments may respond
by implementing road pricing or other vehicle restrictions.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide novel evidence on the effect of parking policy on citywide
parking demand and traffic flow. We use temporal variation from a large citywide
increase in average hourly on-street parking prices of 66%. Our findings show that
overall on-street parking demand fell by around 17%, while the combined demand
for the entire hourly parking market (on-street and off-street) declined by 14%. We
do not find that the reduction in on-street parking is offset by an increase in demand
off-street.
Our results also show that on-street parking arrivals declined by 9% which corre-
sponds to a citywide parking price elasticity of -0.19. Taking into account that about
one quarter of car trips in Amsterdam uses hourly on-street parking, this implies an
effect on citywide traffic flow of around 2.4%. This result is confirmed using traf-
fic road loop data, where we find a subsequent reduction in traffic flows around the
city of around 2% – 3%, and larger effects in the evening. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests an increase in welfare, mainly enjoyed by local residents.
Our findings also have implications for policies that aim to reduce citywide traffic.
Generally, it is believed that parking charges only reduce congestion by reducing the
total number of trips, as fees do not differentiate by how much a given driver adds
to congestion. Our results show that the parking policy had larger effects during
evening peak hours because at these times, parking demand is more elastic and there
is more traffic generated by on-street arrivals and exits. Theoretical models can better
reflect reality by accounting for this heterogeneity.
Our study also has implications for policies aiming to replace on-street parking spaces
with other uses. Even before COVID-19 forced many cafes, bars, and restaurants to
spread out onto side-walks and parking spaces, cities around the world have been
looking for new ways to improve the urban environment. Higher parking prices can
be used as a policy tool to raise government revenues and convert on-street parking to
other uses, such as parks, cycling lanes, and restaurants, without causing additional
externalities from cruising or building new off-street capacity.
Further research should aim to study the long-term impacts of parking policy and ex-
amine the wider implications on modal choice and the decision to travel. It is unclear
from this study whether drivers switch to other transport modes or stop travelling
entirely. This has implications for the economic effects of transport policy, such as
shop revenues and pedestrian activity.
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Appendix 2.A Additional descriptives
2.A.1 Detailed policy context
Parking policy in Amsterdam is also described in detail in a range of studies such as
Van Ommeren et al. (2011) and De Vos and Van Ommeren (2018). The total on-street
parking supply in Amsterdam is 260,000 (including residential areas in the periph-
ery), 163,000 of these are located in paid parking areas. Almost all on-street parking
is shared between residents using permits and all other paid (hourly) parking. Minor
exceptions to shared use include disabled parking spots, reserved for residents, and
discounted shopping streets which have time limits of one hour and can not be used
with a residential permit.
During the day, the majority of on-street parking demand comes from residents us-
ing cheap residential permits, with the remaining share available for hourly parking,
which is substantially more expensive. For example, in the city centre, permit fees
cost around e1.50 per day (e535 per year), while an identical on-street spot currently
costs non-residents e80 per day. According to the transport department at the mu-
nicipality, approximately 80% of on-street parking is occupied by residential permit
holders during the day however, this is likely to vary by location in the city.
Around one-third of visitors parking in Amsterdam use off-street commercial parking
garages, which are mainly provided by private operators and charge approximately
the same price as nearby on-street parking. Cruising for parking is limited compared
to other large cities because of high on-street prices however, relatively higher (pre-
policy) off-street prices in the inner city may indicate the presence of cruising. Fur-
thermore, cruising is likely to occur in the evening as residents come home from work
and in a limited number of discounted shopping streets and industrial zones (e0.10),
where one and three-hour parking duration restrictions apply, respectively.
Visitor permits allow residents to obtain a 50% – 75% discount on the hourly on-
street fares to their visitors. The permit is limited to a maximum number of hours
per residential household and can only be used within the close vicinity of the resi-
dence (valid within the residential parking zone). After the policy change, this limit
increased from 10 or 30 hours to 40 hours per month.
Parkers always have to provide their license plate number when a transaction is ini-
tiated, tying the car identifier to a specific parking location. Vehicles from an enforce-
ment entity, fitted with cameras, sweep the number plates of all vehicles parking
on-street and send the information to a centralised system. Licence plates are then
cross-checked against a database of paid (hourly) transactions and residential per-
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Figure 2.A.1: Parking infrastructure in Amsterdam (detailed).
mits. Local authorities are then automatically alerted when an infraction is detected
and fines are sent to the address of the car owner (Egis Group, 2019). Parking fines
increased by e15 in May 2019 from e47.60 to e62.60 in 2019. In 2017, there were
780,000 parking fines in the city, which represents about 2% of the annual number of
parking arrivals and adds up to around e40 million in fines (Parool, 2019).
2.A.2 Substitutes to paid on-street parking
As discussed in the main text, the key issue is that motorists may switch to off-street
parking. In Amsterdam, motorists parking without a residential permit may also
switch to other on-street parking alternatives, namely discounted shopping zones
(e0.10) designated for shopping and discounted visitor permits available to residents.
In our analysis, we explicitly control for these factors by including these substitutes
in our main regressions. Here we discuss these types of parking in more detail and
the implications for our results.
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Figure 2.A.2: Aggregating transactions data to parking demand.
Figure 2.A.1 illustrates the areas with time restrictions and a fixed rate of e0.10, des-
ignated as shopping and industrial activities. Although these areas are small, the
proportion of arrivals is not negligible (13.5% of all arrivals). Parking in these areas
is particularly attractive for drivers parking up to one hour (26.88% of arrivals pre
policy). So, we include these areas when estimating equation (2.1) and in a sensitiv-
ity check, examine to what extent separately estimating the effect on shopping areas
affects our main results.
Residents have access to visitor permits that offer a 50% – 75% discount on the hourly
paid on-street rates. This option becomes more attractive after the price increase and
some car drivers that used to pay hourly rates may start using these visitor permits,
so we also include parking demand at the residential parking zone level when esti-
mating equation (2.1) and examine to what extent excluding these groups affects our
main results.
2.A.3 Detailed data description
2.A.3.1 Aggregating parking data
In this section we describe in more detail how we aggregate the transaction data to
create the parking demand variables in our analysis. We define:
• t1 and t2: as the interval start and end time,
• tsi and tei: as the transaction i start and end time.
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Figure 2.A.2 illustrates the four distinct cases that a transaction can fall into and the
approach to aggregate the data into daily (or hourly) data. The time window is rep-
resented by t1 and t2, which is the start and end of the day in our main application,
so t1 = 00:00 and t2 = 11:59. In the first case from the top, the transaction starts before
and ends within the time interval. In this case, the car is parked for dit = tei− t1 hours
during the time interval and corresponds to one exit. In the second case from the top,
the transaction starts within and ends after the time interval. In this case, the car is
parked for dit = t2 − tsi hours and corresponds to one arrival. In the third case from
the top, the transaction starts within and ends within the time interval. In this case, the
car is parked for dit = tei − tsi hours and corresponds to one arrival and one exit. In
the last case, the transaction starts before and ends after the time interval. In this case,
the car is parked for dit = t2 − t1 hours and does not correspond to an arrival or an
exit.
Therefore, we can calculate the total number of hours parked (volume), arrivals, and
the mean duration per day (or any other time interval) and area as:
• Volume (parking hours): Vt =
∑N
i=1 dit,
• Arrivals (number of cars): At =
∑N
i=1[t1 ≤ tsi < t2],
• Mean duration (of arrivals): Dt = (
∑N
i=1[t1 ≤ tsi < t2]Di)/At.
2.A.3.2 Holidays definition
In the Netherlands, there are five school holiday periods, of which two (Christmas
and May) are the same for the entire country and three (spring holiday in February-
March, summer holiday in July-Aug, and autumn holiday in October) are staggered
by region and therefore start and end at different times. There are three school regions
(north, middle, and south), of which Amsterdam is part of the Northern region, so we
include school holidays from this region. In our analysis, we include separate fixed ef-
fects for each type of public and school holiday, and distinguish between whether the
holiday falls on a weekday or weekend (in essence, we interact a weekend dummy
with each holiday). Therefore we add a total of eight dummies for school holidays
(week or weekend) and seven dummies for public holidays.
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2.A.3.3 Off-street parking data
The majority of municipality-owned garages are located around the Bijlmer arena to
the South-East of the central part of the city. Commercial and public garages located
in the close vicinity charge similar prices.
P&R tickets are valid for the entire day, under the condition that drivers can show
a validated travel card indicating that they used public transport to travel to and
from the city centre on the day. There are three tariff types for P&R facilities. Peak
hours (8.89% arrivals) which cost e10 per day, off-peak hours (63.18% arrivals) and
weekend (27.94% arrivals) which cost e1 per day.
2.A.4 Trends
Figure 2.A.3 indicates that this relation holds for (hourly) paid parking and
discounted shopping areas (which account for 98.51% of arrivals), while parking
with a visitor permit essentially has no growth in demand up until the policy
announcement at the end of October 2018, after which the trend appears to become
positive. This is likely to be associated to the information relating to the upcoming
policy adjustment and news articles about the availability of permits. Data from
the municipality also indicates a substantial growth in the request for these permits
around this time.
2.A.5 Distribution of key variables
2.A.5.1 On-street parking prices
Figure 2.A.4 illustrates the effect of the parking policy on the distribution of parking
prices, weighted by the number of arrivals. As can be seen, the policy results in
a large shift in prices at all levels, except for discounted parking areas which remain
unchanged. Panels (a) and (b) further illustrate the large absolute and relative change
in parking prices. Panels (c) and (d) illustrate the absolute and relative change in
prices throughout the city. It indicates that price changes varied substantially over
space, but not uniformly with distance from the city centre. This is primarily because
the delineation of some parking zones changed as a result of the policy.
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Figure 2.A.3: Sum of weekly on-street parking volume (millions of hours) by type.
2.A.5.2 On-street parking demand
Figure 2.A.6 illustrates the distribution of the dependent variables over the day. Vol-
ume is low before 06:00 and steadily increases throughout the day with the highest
occupancies around 14:00, after which volume begins to decline. Parking arrivals are
relatively uniformly distributed over the day with a spike at 09:00 when paid parking
becomes active. There are also some arrivals before 09:00 because people using their
phone or arriving early can already arrange parking to avoid forgetting and receiving
a fine. Arrivals start to decline around 19:00. Exits rates are highest around 15:00, and
also face a spike around 19:00 when many areas become free. Figure 2.A.7 illustrates
the arrivals, exits, and the total per two hour interval. This essentially shows the dis-
tribution of traffic over the day generated by (hourly) on-street parking. The key take
away is that traffic generated by on-street parking is relatively uniform between 10:00
– 18:00, with the peak between 14:00 – 16:00.
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2.A.5.3 Off-street parking demand
Figure 2.A.8 compares daily on-street and off-street parking volume (excluding P&R)
per hour. We assume that the occupancy rate in our sample is representative for all
garages and approximate off-street parking volume for all garages by multiplying
the mean daily parking volume in our sample of garages by the proportion of total
capacity (1/0.31). The figure illustrates that the proportion of off-street to on-street
parking demand is approximately one third (0.36).
2.A.5.4 Traffic flow
Figure 2.A.9 illustrates the traffic flow and speed data. As can be seen, traffic flow is
low in the evening hours and relatively uniform over the day, with a peak at 08:00
and 17:00. Traffic speed, as measured by the loop data, is also relatively uniform with
only a small drop in average speed during the day when traffic flow is higher.
2.A.6 Additional descriptives
Figure 2.A.10 illustrates the stated purpose of car trips that end in the paid parking
area of Amsterdam. We exclude trips by residents “returning home” as residents have
access to permits and therefore these trips would generally not end in paid (hourly)
parking. Overall, around one-third of trips are by commuters, which are more likely
to be non-residents. These commuting trips may end in paid on-street parking how-
ever, commuters are likely to have access to (free) employer parking. The last three
columns show that the proportion of non-work car trips is increasing throughout the
day.
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Figure 2.A.4: On-street parking prices pre and post policy.
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Figure 2.A.5: Histograms of on-street parking demand variables.
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Figure 2.A.6: Histograms of hourly on-street parking demand.
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Figure 2.A.7: Traffic from on-street parking within the day.
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Figure 2.A.9: Histograms of hourly traffic flow based on loop data.
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Figure 2.A.10: Purpose of car trips ending in Amsterdam excluding residential parking.
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Appendix 2.B Additional results
2.B.1 Identical trends on-street parking
Our key identification is that in the absence of the policy, parking demand would
have followed an identical trend as in the pre-period. In Figure 2.5 we show the
estimated policy effect at the weekly level after including all controls. In this section,
we show that the raw on-street parking trends show similar patterns to the estimated
policy effect and that the effects for arrivals and duration are similar to the effect on
parking volume. We also show the common trends for off-street parking demand and
traffic flow.
Figure 2.B.1 shows that parking demand follows a very similar trend before and after
the policy. Furthermore, the effect of the policy is clear from the sharp decline when
the policy becomes active.
Figure 2.B.2 shows that the effect on arrivals is slightly more volatile than the effect
on volume and duration, which show a sharper, more stable drop in demand. This
is likely due to large events or activities around the city. While this may affect the
precision of the policy estimate, it does not affect the consistency, under the assump-
tion that the events are uncorrelated to the policy. This seems to be the case as the
fluctuations appear to be random.
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Figure 2.B.1: Mean on-street parking volume, arrivals, and duration per area.
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Figure 2.B.2: Estimated policy effect after including all controls.
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Figure 2.B.4: P&R off-street parking identical trends.
2.B.2 Identical trends off-street parking
Figure 2.B.3 and 2.B.4 show the raw trends in mean commercial off-street parking vol-
ume. The data is somewhat noisier because we have fewer observations as compared
to the on-street data. However, there appears to be no discernible trend in commer-
cial off-street parking, while demand is lower in the post period. Meanwhile, parking
volume at P&R facilities appears to be declining over time, and there is a sharp in-
crease when the parking policy is introduced. Demand then appears to shrink, and
in early 2020, demand is similar to the same period in 2019. Note that due to the
shorter time period for which we obtain off-street parking data, we cannot estimate
the weekly policy effect after controls while including week fixed effects.
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Figure 2.B.5: Aggregate traffic flow trends.
2.B.3 Identical trends traffic flow
Figure 2.B.5 presents the trends in traffic flow. The top plot indicates that flow appears
to follow similar trends to on-street parking demand with a noticeable dip around the
summer school holiday period. However, the aggregate data is quite noisy because
the panel is unbalanced and road traffic is unequally distributed over the network
so the mean is somewhat sensitive to missing data. Therefore in the middle plot, we
demean the data by the average flow per traffic loop. The trend becomes clearer, al-
though it is difficult to discern a significant policy effect. Therefore in the bottom plot,
we control for all temporal and spatial factors as in Table 2.6 and find that the effect is
approximately 2% however, we acknowledge that the effect is still quite noisy at the
weekly level and is somewhat sensitive to summer vacations and other holidays.
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Table 2.B.1: Sensitivity: spatio-temporal variation. Local results: On-street parking.
Volume Arrivals Duration
Diff 500m Excl 500m Diff 500m Excl 500m Diff 500m Excl 500m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price (log) -0.434∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.073) (0.015) (0.045) (0.008) (0.027)
Price difference (500 m) -0.063∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.009
(0.019) (0.016) (0.007)
Price difference2 (500 m) 0.013 0.003 0.009∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.005)
Price difference3 (500 m) 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0009)
Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,709,707 349,429 2,709,707 349,429 2,654,913 341,875
Pseudo R2 0.71699 0.70869 0.68185 0.64658 -21.0789 -18.42167
Notes: Estimated using Quasi-ML Poisson regression. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the parking meter level. Season FE include day-of-week, week-of-year, and public holidays. Weather
controls include the average daily temperature, windspeed, and a dummy for whether there was rain
or temperatures below 0 °C between 8-20hr.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
2.B.4 Robustness on-street parking
2.B.4.1 Local price effects and neighbouring prices
The local estimates in Table 2.5 may be biased downwards (overestimate) if prices in
neighbouring districts are lower, which may cause drivers to substitute over space.
In Table 2.B.1 we show that controlling for differences in on-street parking prices
within 500 m and excluding areas within 500 m of a price boundary has little effect
on the results, suggesting that substitution over short distances is relatively minor.
This is not surprising as prices decline gradually with distance to the city centre, also
after the increase in prices. Therefore changes in price discontinuities over space are
small.
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2.B.4.2 Specification of time trend
In Table 2.B.2 we consider how time trends affect the results. In column (1) we inter-
act the time trend with eight parking rate zones post policy, includinge0.10 shopping
areas, and add a separate category for residential permit zones. This captures poten-
tial linear differences in the attractiveness of parking areas over time, for example,
because more tourists visit the city centre by car. The results suggest that the policy
effect on arrivals is essentially the same and equal to 9.2%. In column (2) we include
a flexible time trend by adding a third-order polynomial term and find that the ar-
rivals rate effect declines to 6%. In column (3) we interact the flexible time trends
with parking rate zones (as in column (1)) and find that the effect becomes 5.8%. In
column (4) – (6) we examine the policy effects using a shorter time period event study
approach in the spirit of regression discontinuity design. Therefore, we exclude week
fixed effects and time trends. We gradually make the time interval larger from one-
month pre-post to two and then three months pre-post. The results suggest that the
short-run effects are around 10%, which is slightly larger than the estimated policy
effect that takes longer-term trends into account.
2.B.4.3 Heterogeneity location
In the main analysis, we exclude the North part of Amsterdam because they expe-
rienced an expansion in the parking area in July 2018. In Table 2.B.3, we include
parking data from the North part of Amsterdam and a specific time trend for new
areas which captures growth in demand in these areas over time. We find essentially
identical results with parking arrivals decline by about 8.9% as a result of the pol-
icy. Furthermore, prices are the highest in the city centre and fall with distance to
the periphery. Therefore, we also estimate the policy effect separately for central and
non-central parking areas and find that the arrival effect is about 11.5% in central ar-
eas, which is around 50% larger than the effect outside these areas (7.9%) and is also
reflected in a larger price elasticity.
2.B.4.4 Heterogeneity discounted shopping and visitor permits
We have included parking observations in discounted e0.10 shopping areas (with
time limits of either one or three hours) and visitor permits in all our main on-street
analysis. It is likely that the policy positively affected demand for these parking op-
tions as they became relatively cheaper. In Table 2.B.4 we examine to what extent
drivers substituted to these options as a result of the policy. First, we examine to
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Table 2.B.2: Sensitivity: long term trends. Citywide results: On-street parking.
Arrivals
Zone × trend Flex trend Zone × flex trend 1 month 2 months 3 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy effect -0.097∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Year 2019 -0.037∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Time trend 0.104∗∗∗
(0.016)
Time trend2 -0.039∗∗∗
(0.012)
Time trend3 0.003
(0.002)
Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes
Public holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,710,535 2,710,535 2,710,535 177,926 336,011 494,087
Pseudo R2 0.68209 0.6812 0.68289 0.71678 0.70417 0.69892
Notes: Estimated using Quasi-ML Poisson regression. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the parking meter level. Season FE include day-of-week, week-of-year, and public holidays. Weather
controls include the average daily temperature, windspeed, and a dummy for whether there was rain
or temperatures below 0 °C between 8-20hr.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
what extent the estimates change if we exclude observations of these two options.
The first three columns indicate that the policy effect on arrivals is slightly stronger
when excluding demand for visitor permits, but is much stronger when excluding de-
mand for discounted shopping areas. This makes sense as only 1.3% of arrivals use
residential permits while a relatively large proportion (13.5%) use shopping areas.
Columns (4) and (5) indicate that this result is mainly driven by an increase in de-
mand for parking in inner-city shopping areas (which have one hour time restric-
tions) where arrivals increased by around 7%, while there was no increase in demand
in the peripheral industrial parking areas which offer three hour time limits. This
result is interesting as shopping areas generate substantially more traffic per parking
space as they have a higher turnover. It follows that the policy effect would have been
much larger in the absence of these discounted shopping areas, and would be much
smaller in the hypothetical case that Amsterdam would have much more discounted
shopping areas. Column (6) indicates that parking using visitor permits increased
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Table 2.B.3: Sensitivity: Area. Citywide results: On-street parking.
Arrivals
Incl North Centre Centre Non-centre Non-centre
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Policy effect -0.093∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Price citywide (log) -0.233∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.015)
Year 2019 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Time trend (daily/365) 0.042∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Time trend (daily/365) × IDnewNoord 0.278∗∗∗
(0.028)
Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,867,996 1,093,002 1,093,002 1,617,533 1,617,533
Pseudo R2 0.69644 0.61186 0.61186 0.70532 0.70532
Notes: Estimated using Quasi-ML Poisson regression. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the parking meter level. Season FE include day-of-week, week-of-year, and public holidays. Weather
controls include the average daily temperature, windspeed, and a dummy for whether there was rain
or temperatures below 0 °C between 8-20hr.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
substantially as a result of the policy by around 65%.50
2.B.4.5 Sensitivity to spatial aggregation
In Table 2.B.5 we assess the sensitivity of our main results at various spatial scales
and compare the estimates from a Poisson and log model. Columns (1) – (3) indi-
cate that the policy effect on parking volume is identical when estimated using a
Poisson model. Meanwhile, the results from a log model are largest when estimated
at the level of the parking meter and become smaller when areas are aggregated to
the visitor permit zone and then to the aggregated parking zones. Furthermore, the
50This effect is a combination of the increase in on-street parking prices (so the discount increased
in absolute value), more information about the availability of discounts, and an increase in the
number of available hours from 10 or 30 to 40 hours per household per month.
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Table 2.B.4: Sensitivity: substitutes. Citywide results: On-street parking arrivals.
Arrivals
Excl 10c Excl Res Excl both Only 10c 1hr Only 10c 3hr Only Res
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy effect -0.116∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.502∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.021) (0.050)
Year 2019 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.050 -0.044 -0.048
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.042) (0.035) (0.040)
Time trend (daily/365) 0.046∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ -0.035
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024)
Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,587,339 2,658,249 2,535,053 71,109 52,087 52,223
Pseudo R2 0.64749 0.6789 0.64388 0.62668 0.83756 0.79011
Notes: Estimated using Quasi-ML Poisson regression. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the parking meter level. Season FE include day-of-week, week-of-year, and public holidays. Weather
controls include the average daily temperature, windspeed, and a dummy for whether there was rain
or temperatures below 0 °C between 8-20hr.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
estimates in the log model are most consistent with the Poisson model at a more ag-
gregated level. We conclude from this exercise that the log model is more sensitive
to the level of spatial aggregation and that the Poisson model is preferred as it does
not suffer from aggregation issues and provides a conservative estimate of the policy
effect.
2.B.4.6 Standard errors
Standard errors may be too small if parking demand is serially positively correlated
(Bertrand et al., 2004). To address this issue, we cluster our standard errors at the
time-invariant level of a parking area. In addition, we run a robustness check where
we focus only on time-series variation around the policy introduction and aggregate
our data into four periods, pre and post-policy in 2018 and 2019.51 Table 2.B.6 presents
the results. The results are essentially identical to our main estimates, and the stan-
dard errors only slightly increase. This rules out any autocorrelation in error terms
51Therefore, for each parking area ID we have four observations.
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Table 2.B.5: Sensitivity: Spatial aggregation. On-street parking.
Volume Volume (log)
Meter Visitor permit Agg zone Meter Visitor permit Agg zone
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy effect -0.184∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.016) (0.031) (0.008) (0.015) (0.028)
Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,710,535 64,202 7,452 2,660,882 64,202 7,452
Pseudo R2 0.71491 0.96301 0.99132 0.35161 0.74497 1.13052
Notes: Column (1) – (3) are estimated using Quasi-ML Poisson regression without weights. Column
(4) – (6) is estimated using OLS and is weighted by the mean number of arrivals per parking area.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the parking area level.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at
1%, 5%, and 10%.
Table 2.B.6: Sensitivity: Standard errors. On-street parking.
Volume Arrivals Duration
(1) (2) (3)
Policy effect -0.175∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Post week 15 -0.042∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Year 2019 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ −1.563× 10−5
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003)
Area FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,707 19,707 19,707
Pseudo R2 0.85468 0.76404 -21.96828
Notes: Estimated using Quasi-ML Poisson regression. Parking demand is aggregated into pre and post
in 2018 and 2019, therefore we omit all time series variation other than the policy effect. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the parking area level.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10%.
and highlights that our results and standard errors are hardly affected by serial cor-
relation.
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Table 2.B.7: Sensitivity: offstreet parking.
Volume
City centre Capacity Incl. 2020 (Off) Incl. 2020 (P&R)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Policy effect -0.073∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021)
Capacity (dynamic) -0.002∗∗∗
(0.0003)
Year 2019 -0.009
(0.021)
Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,713 6,514 7,269 3,126
Pseudo R2 0.7563 0.73151 0.72393 0.44097
Notes: Estimated using Quasi-ML Poisson regression. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the year-week level. Season FE include day-of-week, week-of-year, and public holidays. Weather
controls include the average daily temperature, windspeed, and a dummy for whether there was rain
or temperatures below 0 °C between 8-20hr.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
2.B.5 Robustness off-street parking
In Table 2.B.7 we further examine the sensitivity of off-street parking demand to other
specifications. Column (1) shows that the effects are slightly larger when we exclude
parking garages outside the city centre. In column (2), we also control for changes in
short-term capacity throughout the week which may occur if commercial garages are
also providing long-term parking to residents. The result also becomes slightly larger.
In column (3) and (4) we include an extended period until February 2020, which also
gives similar estimates to our main results.
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Figure 2.B.6: Policy effect (percentages) on arrivals and exits within the day.
2.B.6 Heterogeneity on-street parking
The effects of the policy on the number of cars are equal to the policy effect in per-
centage terms multiplied by the average daily number of cars arriving or exiting per
hour in the preceding year. Figure 2.B.6 shows that the policy effect on arrivals in per-
centages is relatively uniform up to 18:00 and becomes stronger in the evening, while
the exit effect in percentages becomes stronger throughout the day. This indicates
that motorists typically arriving and leaving in the evening are more price sensitive,
which makes sense as parking is not work-related. This is confirmed in Figure 2.A.10,
which indicates that over 90% of trips in the evening are non-work related while in
the morning it is less than 50%. Furthermore, Figure 2.A.7 shows how daily on-street
parking arrivals and exits vary over the day just prior to the policy. Notably, the peak
in implied on-street traffic (the sum of arrivals plus exits) is highest around 15:00.
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Figure 2.B.7: Policy effect (percentages) and daily implied traffic flow within the day.
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2.B.7 Welfare calculations
In this section we document how we calculate the back-of-the-envelope welfare ef-
fects presented in Section 2.4.3.1.
2.B.7.1 On-street market
Given the rule of half, the change in consumer surplus equals
∆CS = 0.5(Q + Qn)(Pn − P ). Plugging in values, we get e326, 000 in the
on-street market (0.5(213, 000 + 177, 000)(4.22− 2.55)).
The change in government revenues equals to the revenues under the new policy
minus the revenues under the old price scheme, so ∆R = PnQn − PQ. Plugging in
values gives e204, 000.
We assume that the new pricing policy is socially optimal, therefore the reduction
in total social costs equals to the change in parking demand multiplied by marginal
social cost (i.e. the opportunity costs of the land), which is (by assumption) the new
price level. This equals ∆TSC = Pn(Q−Qn) = e152, 000.
Adding the government revenues, the change in total social costs and subtracting
the change in consumer surplus gives the welfare gain of e30,000. This can also be
calculated using the rule of half (0.5× dP × dQ).
2.B.7.2 Off-street market
The change in consumer surplus in the off-street market equals: e108, 000
(0.5(106, 000 + 101, 000)(4.37− 3.33)).
Given that off-street parking is about half the size of the on-street market, 40% of
off-street garage capacity is owned by the municipality, 20% is foreign-owned, and
average prices off-street increased by around e1.00 we can calculate the change in
profits as ∆π = PnQn − PQ multiplied by the share of total capacity. Therefore, gov-
ernment revenues increase by about e35,000 (40% of total) and commercial operators
gain e52,000 (60% of total), of which one third (e17,000) goes overseas.
In the off-street market, parking becomes idle and can not be replaced by other uses.
Therefore the reduction in demand off-street is a welfare loss (note maximum capac-
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ity off-street during the day is generally below 60%). Hence reductions in demand
off-street results in a welfare loss of e3,000.
2.B.7.3 Travel externalities
The change in travel externalities approximately equals the reduction in the number
of car trips (arrivals effect times two) multiplied by the average distance of a trip
within Amsterdam and the marginal passenger vehicle externality per km. Therefore
∆Evkt = (2 × 7, 800 trips)(7 km)(e0.12 − e0.09) = e3, 000. This excludes additional
externalities from road traffic occurring outside of Amsterdam. Non-residents tend to
travel longer distances (36 km) which may reduce an additional 226,000 km ((36 km−
7 km)(2× 7, 800 trips)) of road traffic.
This will be an upper bound estimate if drivers travelling longer distances are less
sensitive to price changes and a lower bound if travel externalities are larger in urban
areas and motorists that do not use the car to travel to Amsterdam do not substitute to
alternative destinations. One may also argue that congestion costs are overestimated
because they are mainly incurred during peak hours. Our estimates from Figure 2.6
imply that around 39% of the reduction in traffic due to the policy occurs during peak
hours, so this is unlikely to significantly effect our main estimates.
2.B.7.4 Cruising costs
Before the policy off-street parking was 30% (e0.76) more expensive than on-street
parking and it was reduced to 10% (e0.36). Given an average parking duration of
2.4 hours, this implies that drivers were willing to pay up to e0.96 to avoid parking
on-street and have to search for parking.
Taking the average VOT of car travellers in the Netherlands of e15.40, this roughly
translates to travel time savings of around 4 minutes, which would increase welfare
by around e74,000 per day (e0.96 × 77, 000 Arrivals). However, this is likely to be
a large overestimate for four reasons. First, in a dynamic model, cruising does not
occur in the morning when occupancies are still low. Second, we have ignored that
the price differences between paid parking and discounted shopping areas which
have increased because of the policy. Third, motorists may prefer off-street parking
for reasons other than cruising. Finally, some off-street garages offer discounts for
day parking, so this price difference (for longer durations) is likely to be smaller.
Therefore it appears more reasonable that cruising costs are around one-quarter of
the total amount (e18,000 per day).
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2.B.7.5 Overall
Adding up the gains in the parking market (e27,000), the reduction in traffic exter-
nalities (e3,000), and the gains from less cruising (e18,000) implies an overall societal
gain of around e48,000 due to the price increase.
As around half of all vehicle trips in the city are by residents, the gain to residents
equals ∆WR = 0.5(∆CS + ∆Etravel + ∆Ecruising) + ∆R + ∆TSC = e195, 000.
Meanwhile, the change in welfare for non-residents is negative and equals
∆WN = 0.5(∆CS + ∆Etravel + ∆Ecruising) = −e196, 000. Given that there are around
850,000 inhabitants in Amsterdam, this suggests that the annual gains per resident
are around (195, 000 ∗ 365 days)/850, 000 = e84.
2.B.8 Automated vehicles
In this section we document how we calculate the back-of-the-envelope implications
for AVs presented in Section 2.4.3.2.
We consider the potential impact of AVs in the city centre (25,928 daily arrivals) and
in peripheral areas (49,651 daily arrivals) where hourly parking prices are currently
around e6.75 and e3.50, respectively. We assume that the price elasticities we es-
timate are symmetric. Furthermore, we assume that cars can park outside the city
in designated parking areas for a fee of e2.50 per hour (the lowest price in the pe-
riphery) and that the cost to travel to and from this area is e2.00 from the city centre
and e1.00 from the periphery. The hourly and fixed costs are divided by parking
duration, given the new hourly prices, to come to an ‘effective’ hourly price.
We consider two scenarios for AVs. On the one hand, if households own private AVs
and parking costs at the destination are sufficiently high, it is likely that AVs will
be parked at locations in the periphery, where parking costs are relatively low. At
these locations, parking costs will approximately equal the current on-street parking
price in the periphery plus additional costs of travelling to and from the parking area.
Therefore in the private AV scenario, we assume parking costs approximately equal
current parking prices in the periphery, e2.50, plus the travel costs. On the other
hand, if AVs are shared, then cars will only need to be parked during the evening and
parking costs will be almost zero as they are shared between many users. Therefore,
in the shared AV scenario, we assume that car users incur a small fee to hail a trip of
e2.00.
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2.B.8.1 Private AV scenario
We first consider the private AV scenario where effective hourly prices become e3.20
in the centre ande2.90 in the periphery. Effective hourly prices are equal to the hourly
price outside the city plus the travel costs to and from the periphery divided by the
number of hours. We first calculate the expected number of hours parked using the
hourly price only.
Our estimates for the price elasticity of arrivals and duration imply that car demand
by motorists currently paying hourly on-street parking will increase by about 14%
(4,000 car trips and 0.4 hours) in the centre and 4% (2,000 car trips and 0.2 hours) in
the periphery. As each additional trip results in one car travelling to and from the
periphery to park, this corresponds to twice the amount of traffic generated by one
parking trip. Taking our estimate for the effect on traffic flow, this then implies an
increase in traffic of around 8% and 2%, respectively.
Given that about one-quarter of traffic is related to on-street parking, additional traf-
fic generated by empty cars travelling to and from the periphery would result in sub-
stantially larger effects. Assuming that each trip needs to be made twice, this roughly
translates to an overall increase in traffic flow of about 27% – 33%, in the periphery
and centre, respectively.
2.B.8.2 Shared AV scenario
In the shared AV scenario, effective hourly prices become around e0.40 and are the
same in the centre and in the periphery. Hourly parking prices are essentially zero, so
the effective hourly price is composed only of the trip fee divided by the duration of
the trip. In our to calculate the expected change in duration using our log-log model,
we take e0.01 for the hourly parking price.
Our estimates then imply that car demand by motorists currently paying hourly on-
street parking increases by around 55% (14,000 car trips and 2.9 hours) in the centre
and 42% (21,000 car trips and 2.6 hours) in the periphery. This corresponds to an
increase in traffic of around 16% and 12%, respectively.
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3
Residential parking costs and car
ownership
3.1 Introduction
Parking has far reaching consequences on urban life. In cities, where land is scarce,
the opportunity cost of parking is high, as on-street spots compete with pedestrian,
cycling, commercial, residential and recreational uses. Nevertheless, cities devote
a substantial amount of space to implicitly subsidised parking which may induce
excess vehicle demand (Shoup, 2005). This raises an important open question, to what
extent do parking costs affect vehicle demand in cities?52 We address this question by
estimating residential parking costs and examining to what extent these costs affect
household vehicle demand.
This chapter is based on Ostermeijer et al. (2019) as published in Regional Science and Urban Eco-
nomics. We are grateful for suggestions and comments by seminar audiences in Amsterdam (Eu-
reka), Dusseldorf (UEA), New York (UEA) and Hong Kong (ITEA) and two anonymous referees. A
special thanks to Devi Brands, Jesper de Groote, Joris Klingen, Maurice de Kleijn, Paul Koster, Su-
san Ogilvie and Barry Ubbels for comments, programming help and discussions on earlier drafts.
We also thank the NVM and Bisnode for providing data.
52Various other factors have been proposed to explain car ownership and car use in cities such as
density, land use and accessibility. See, for example, Dargay (2002); Bhat and Guo (2007); Matas
et al. (2009); Ewing and Cervero (2010) and Ding et al. (2017).
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Theory indicates that cheap residential parking reduces the (fixed) costs of owning a
car and thereby increases vehicle demand (Shoup, 2005; Arnott, 2006). The empirical
literature that quantifies this effect is scarce, but supports the idea that higher residen-
tial parking supply and lower residential parking rents are associated with higher car
ownership (Guo, 2013; Seya et al., 2016).53 Furthermore, waiting time for an on-street
parking permit is shown to negatively affect vehicle demand. Residents in Amster-
dam that have to wait an additional year are 2 percentage points less likely to own
more than one car, corresponding to a price elasiticity of demand for car ownership
of −0.8 (De Groote et al., 2016).54
In order to estimate the impact of on-street parking costs on car ownership, one
would like to observe market prices for on-street parking or close substitutes (for ex-
ample off-street parking). In some countries, we are able to observe market rates for
residential parking, as there is a thick rental market of privately-owned parking (for
example Japan). However, in most countries, such a market is absent, as privately-
owned parking is bundled with housing. Therefore, private off-street parking prices
are not directly observed as residents mainly pay for parking through the purchase
(or rental) of residential property or via regulated parking permits. Furthermore, in
areas with excess demand, parking costs also include the time cost associated with
cruising for parking.
This paper contributes to the literature on residential parking and car ownership by
developing and applying a two-step approach which enables us to estimate local pri-
vate parking costs and test to what extent these costs affect household car owner-
ship.55 In the first step, we identify the implicit price for parking through the effect of
an outside private parking spot – arguably an almost perfect substitute for on-street
parking – on house prices.56 We exploit variation in the supply of private parking
within a parking district to identify district-specific residential parking prices using
semi-parametric hedonic house price methods.
Households considering car ownership face the same parking cost, on average, if they
live in the same parking district. Hence, in the second step, we estimate the effect of
residential parking costs on car ownership using variation in residential parking costs
53In their study for New York, Guo (2013) addresseses endogeneity issues by instrumenting parking
variables using housing and demographic characteristics in the neighbourhood. However, these
instruments can be criticised as these characteristics are determined by demand factors, so the
exclusion restriction is not fulfilled. Seya et al. (2016) study the impact of residential parking rents
in Japan, ignoring simultaneity issues.
54Average waiting times are around three years in the city centre of Amsterdam.
55In our application, local is defined as administrative parking districts.
56Parking comes in different forms. In our data we observe garages, carports and outside parking
spots.
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between districts. Endogenous parking costs are instrumented using the median con-
struction year of properties in a district. Arguably, this instrument affects the supply
of parking, while having no direct affect on parking demand, as it is determined in
the past, often before cars were present.57 We acknowledge that the construction year
of properties is not random over space. Therefore, more precisely, we argue that,
conditional on location controls, including, most importantly, distance to the nearest
major train station, and household characteristics, historical supply decisions impact
current building costs of a parking space, without directly affecting current demand
for cars. We discuss this identifying assumption in more detail in the methodology
section.
We focus on the Netherlands. In this context, residents who do not own private park-
ing receive parking permits at very low fees and households with private parking are,
in principle, not eligible for a parking permit. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that
in equilibrium, the residential parking price for households that own private parking is equal
to the opportunity cost of parking on-street, which equals the sum of the permit fee and
cruising costs. The latter includes private search costs, walking time and uncertainty
(Van Ommeren et al., 2011).58 In case there is no cruising and street parking is not
priced, residential parking prices should approach some underlying value of private
parking, such as the security value or convenience of always having the car on hand.
This approximately equals the value of private parking in locations where on-street
parking is free.
We apply our approach to the four largest metropolitan regions in the Netherlands
and estimate residential parking costs at the parking district level for owner-occupier
households. On average, annual parking costs are around e1000 in city centres but
are less than e400 in the urban periphery. We identify the impact of these costs on car
ownership and find that owner-occupier households facing a one standard deviation
increase (e503) in annual parking costs own 0.085 fewer cars on average, correspond-
ing to a price elasticity of car demand of about −0.7. Our findings indicate that the
disparity in parking costs between the city centre and the periphery explains around
30% of the difference in average car ownership rates between these areas.
Our results have implications for related literature on the urban spatial structure and
transportation. Dense urban form is associated with lower vehicle ownership and
kilometers travelled (Bento et al., 2005a; Bhat and Guo, 2007; Duranton and Turner,
2018). Furthermore, transport infrastructure has been shown to affect residential loca-
tion and mode choice, however parking is usually ignored (Baum-Snow, 2007; Garcia-
57Supply-side instruments have also been used, for example, to investigate the effect of car ownership
costs on the house price gradient in Singapore and housing supply elasticities in the US (Huang
et al., 2018; Saiz, 2010).
58In waiting list districts, the implicit price also includes costs associated with waiting for a permit.
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López et al., 2015; Baum-Snow et al., 2017; Levkovich et al., 2017; Heblich et al., 2018).
Our findings shed light on one of the mechanisms which explains why car ownership
levels are lower in dense urban areas and indicates that residential parking costs are
a significant determinant of mode choice.
Our findings also relate to the growing literature on estimating the potential effects
of automated vehicles (AVs).59 We employ our estimates to consider the potential
implications of raising fees of parking permits to the market value and eliminating
parking costs from a widespread adoption of AVs. Increasing permit fees in the city
centre of Amsterdam to the market value is expected to reduce average car ownership
by 17 to 24 percent. Furthermore, the annual gains per household from facing lower
parking costs are estimated to be between e450 and e850 in city centres, depending
on whether AVs are private or shared. This is associated with an increase in average
car demand between 8 and 14 percent. The effects are smaller in the periphery where
parking costs are lower.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 5.2 we introduce the research context, data
and provide some descriptives. In Section 5.3 we elaborate on the methodology. We
report the main results in Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 concludes.
3.2 Data and context
3.2.1 Parking and car ownership in the Netherlands
Dutch car ownership is low compared to most industrialised countries. Households
own around one car on average, while in the UK and US they own around 1.5 and 2
cars, respectively (Clark and Rey, 2017). Moreover, in the Netherlands, as in other
countries, car ownership is substantially lower in denser urban areas (see Figure
3.1).
Our methodology relies on house prices and therefore we focus exclusively on house-
holds that own a residence. In the Netherlands, around 95% of owner-occupiers own
at least one car while only 30% also own a private off-street parking spot, so most
owner-occupiers park their car(s) on-street. Regulation of parking has shifted over
the last 30 years. In metropolitan areas, paid on-street parking was introduced in
the early 1990s to tackle the growing problem of excess demand for parking. Cur-
rently, most dense urban areas have paid parking (see Figure 3.2). Due to scarcity of
59See for example Fagnant and Kockelman (2014); Childress et al. (2015); Zakharenko (2016); Gelauff
et al. (2019).
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Figure 3.1: Map of car ownership per household in the Randstad
Note: The spatial unit is the four digit post code area.
land in these areas, there has been an ongoing policy shift towards discouraging car
use through parking policy (Antonson et al., 2017). These policies include increases
in parking prices for visitors, introducing parking permits and fees for residents, re-
moval of on-street parking spots, lowering parking requirements for new buildings
and developing fewer on-street spots (Mingardo et al., 2015; Gemeente Amsterdam,
2018b).
Parking policy is determined at the municipal level and on-street parking is almost
owned entirely by local authorities. Policies are geared towards charging high hourly
prices to visitors and providing residents with the option to apply for a permit. In
contrast to many countries, including the US, where on-street parking is generally
cheap, prices for on-street parking in the Netherlands are comparable to commercial
off-street garages and can cost up to e5 per hour. Paid parking generally starts early,
between 8:00-9:00, and ends late, between 18:00-23:59. Permits cost less thane100 per
year, except in Amsterdam (see Table 3.1). Compared to visitor tariffs and commercial
off-street parking, the daily permit fee is a fraction of the cost. For example, in the city
centre of Amsterdam, permit fees are the highest in the country, but still only cost
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Figure 3.2: Map of parking districts and hourly rates
Note: The rates in this figure refer to visitor tariffs for non-residents.
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Table 3.1: On-street residential parking permit fees
Amsterdam Rotterdam The Hague Utrecht
Permit fee (e/yr)
Centre (<2 km) 500 70 40 70
Urban ring (2-5 km) 200 70 40 30
Periphery (>5 km) 0 0 0 0
Notes: Fees are rounded averages for the areas indicated in 2018. During the period of study, 2000-
2016, fees where lower.
e1.40 per day, while an identical on-street spot costs visitors around e45 per day.
Therefore, as its costly, on-street parking without a permit is not a realistic option for
most residents.
Residents with a car can choose to apply for an on-street parking permit except when
they live in a property with private parking.60 Depending on the location, house-
holds can apply for one or two parking permits. In Amsterdam almost all inner city
locations allow only one permit and in some areas in the centre residents need to wait
several years before obtaining a permit (De Groote et al., 2016). All metropolitan ar-
eas have good transport alternatives to the private car. These include a high quality
public transport system of buses, trams, trains and in the case of Amsterdam and
Rotterdam, a metro system. Furthermore cycling usage in cities is high, around 35%
of all trips within 7.5 km are on the bike (Rietveld and Daniel, 2004).
3.2.2 Data
We use three main datasets. In the first step we use transaction data on houses from
the Dutch Association of Real Estate Agents (NVM). The dataset contains around 80%
of all residential property transactions in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2016 and
is recorded at a highly detailed level. It includes location coordinates for each unit,
structural, historical and qualitative housing characteristics and transaction details.
This data allows us to estimate private residential parking costs in the first step. We
match the property data to administrative parking districts and select housing trans-
actions within the four largest metropolitan regions of the Netherlands.61 On average,
each district has approximately 2000 properties, so parking districts are small. We re-
move districts with few observations and exclude large outliers from the remaining
60Renting a parking spot, for example from a private company, occurs seldom and prices of these
parking spots reflect implicit parking prices paid for residential parking (Van Ommeren et al., 2011).
61Peripheral areas generally do not have paid parking (see Figure 3.2). Therefore, in these areas we
designate four digit post code units as parking districts.
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dataset.62 After selections, the transactions dataset contains a total of 535,097 obser-
vations.
In the second step, we obtain household information from Bisnode and current build-
ing registry information from Building Characteristics Netherlands (GKN). Bisnode
is a marketing firm that carries out representative surveys of households around the
Netherlands, of which we have data between 2004 and 2014. The dataset distin-
guishes between zero, one and two or more cars per household.63 Household location
is precisely measured at the six digit post code (PC6) level, which contain around 20
properties on the same side of the street. Household characteristics include income,
size, type, education, age and home-ownership status, which we use to select adult
owner-occupiers.64 We use the GKN dataset to construct geographical variables in-
cluding the median construction year of residential properties in a parking district
and building density in a PC6 area.65 Finally, we also measure proximity to transport
infrastructure and the city centre by calculating the distance from each PC6 area to
the nearest train station, highway, highway ramp and metropolitan city centre. The
availability of public transport is measured by the number of bus, metro and train
stations within 100, 250 and 500 meter buffers of the PC6 centroid.
3.2.3 Descriptives
Table 3.2 presents the main descriptive statistics for property transactions. The aver-
age transaction price is around e230,000, average size of a property is around 100
m2 and the majority of properties are apartments (56%). Around 20% of proper-
ties have off-street private parking of which almost a third are outside, one fifth are
semi-sheltered carports, half have a garage structure and very few have space for two
cars.
Table 3.3 provides an overview of the main household characteristics. We have infor-
mation about 98,659 owner-occupier households in 493 geographically distinct park-
62We select districts with at least 10 transactions of houses with outside parking and 10 transactions
of houses without outside parking. This is explained in more detail in Section 3.3.1. Outliers are
determined to be transactions abovee2.5 million, e5,000/m2 property size, e5,000/m2 parcel size,
500 m2 parcel size, 250m2 property size and 25 rooms. Similarly, we remove observations below
e25,000, e500/m2 property size, e400/m2 parcel size, 50 m2 parcel size and 40 m2 property size.
63Only 4.2% of households own three or more cars in the Netherlands (CBS Statline, 2015). This is
likely to be much lower in the metropolitan areas we focus on. Therefore, any measurement error
from not observing the exact number of cars is negligible.
64Income is measured at the household level, while education and age is for the household head.
65The median construction year is truncated at 1900 as there is little variation in parking supply before
1900.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics: Main transaction variables
Mean Std. dev Min Max
Transaction price (e) 227,923 111,246 26,092 1,200,000
Size of property (m2) 104.88 35.66 41 249
Size of parcel (m2) 168.10 77.43 51 499
Distance city center (km) 7.06 5.13 0 29
Apartment 0.56 0.50 0 1
Private parking 0.20 0.40 0 1
Outside 0.07 0.25 0 1
Carport 0.04 0.20 0 1
Garage 0.09 0.28 0 1
Carport & garage 0.00 0.06 0 1
Double garage 0.01 0.09 0 1
# Transactions 535,097
Note: We only observe parcel size for single family homes (234,395 observations). See Appendix A for
a full list of variables.
ing districts. The average household in the sample owns 1.2 cars, has an annual
income of e46,000 and consists of 2.8 members.66 Around 60% own one car, 30% own
two or more cars, whereas few do not own a car (around 10%). Households live far-
ther from the city centre than in the transaction dataset, 9 km vs 7 km and around
30% of households are apartment dwellers.67 Most households live in highly built up
urban areas, average building density is 33,700 m2/ha, and the median construction
year of properties is 1966.
3.3 Empirical methods
We develop a two-step methodology to estimate the effect of residential parking costs
on car demand. In the first step we use hedonic house price methods to estimate im-
plicit market prices for parking. To be more precise, we focus on local implicit prices
for private outside parking spots which is a close substitute to on-street parking. In
equilibrium, private parking prices should reflect (unobserved) outside parking costs.
In the second step we investigate the effect of these prices on car ownership.
66Owner-occupiers tend to own more cars, are richer and have more individuals than an average
Dutch household which owns 1 car, earns e45,000 and is composed of 2.2 people (CBS Statline,
2015).
67This is less than in the transactions data, as apartments are generally sold more frequently than
single-family houses.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics: Main household variables
Mean Std. dev Min Max
Number of cars 1.20 0.62 0 2
No car 0.11 0.31 0 1
One car 0.58 0.49 0 1
Two or more cars 0.31 0.46 0 1
Income (e) 46,052 21,954 15,178 120,750
Education low 0.27 0.44 0 1
Education middle 0.37 0.48 0 1
Education high 0.36 0.48 0 1
Age 46.75 15.00 18 90
Household size 2.80 1.24 1 6
Apartment 0.31 0.46 0 1
Distance city center (km) 9.03 5.41 0 29
Within historic district 0.05 0.21 0 1
Building density (m2/ha) 33,743 26,820 523 190,895
Median construction year 1966.33 21.85 1900 1999
# Households 98,659
Note: See Appendix A for a full list of variables.
3.3.1 Step 1: Estimating parking costs
Our methodology exploits variation in the allocation of private parking within a park-
ing district to identify district-specific residential parking costs using hedonic house
price methods. As a household is only eligible for a parking permit when no private
parking is available, spatial equilibrium theory predicts that for household utility to
be the same in a given district, the implicit residential parking price should equal the
costs of using a permit, i.e. the sum of the permit fee and cruising costs, capitalised
in house prices (Van Ommeren et al., 2011).
We identify the implicit price of parking defined by the effect of having a private
parking spot on house prices. Let us start with the following, naive, hedonic price
regression:
Pijt = ρSijt + Tijtα + φt + εijt, (3.1)
where Pijt is the price for residential property transaction i in parking district j at
time t, Sijt is an indicator variable which equals one if the property has a private
parking spot and zero otherwise. We also include four parking type dummies, Tijt,
for carport, garage, carport and garage and double garage, which captures additional
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value of the building structure. Therefore, ρ can be interpreted as the implicit price
(or cost) for a private outside parking spot. Lastly, φt is a vector of time fixed effects
and εijt is the error term.
We are interested in the causal effect of Sijt, captured by ρ. It is unlikely that the es-
timate of ρ in (3.1) generates a causal estimate. For example, districts have different
parking policies and may be attractive to car users for other reasons. Therefore we
include parking-district fixed effects, φj , which absorb differences between parking
districts and allow us to identify parking costs via variation within a parking dis-
trict.68 Moreover, there may be other housing or locational characteristics within a
district that are correlated to property prices and parking allocation. For example,
bigger properties are generally more expensive and are also more likely to have a
parking spot. Hence we control for a large set of property and locational characteris-
tics, Xijt.69
Parking costs are likely to vary locally, because supply and demand factors vary over
space, so we allow ρ to vary at the parking district level j. Furthermore, the implicit
price for housing and locational characteristics, as well as changes in property prices
over time, are also likely to vary over space and may be correlated to local parking
allocation.70 Therefore we also allow the effect of housing and location characteristics
Xijt and time dummies φt to vary with j. This leads to the following regression:
Pijt = ρjSijt + Tijtαj + Xijtγj + φjt + φj + εijt, (3.2)
where the coefficients ρj , αj and γj represent the implicit price for parking, the as-
sociated structure and other housing characteristics, respectively. The interaction φjt
captures a district-specific time fixed effect.71
68This implies that we can only identify ρ in districts where there is variation in the supply of outside
parking.
69Property characteristics include; the log of size and parcel size (for single-family houses), the num-
ber of floors, rooms and bathrooms, and dummies for garden, balcony, central heating, new, mon-
ument, good inside maintenance, good outside maintenance, insulation (five levels) transaction
year, construction year (nine interval dummies) and house type (apartment, terraced, detached,
semi-detached, corner). Location characteristics include; distance to the metropolitan centre, clos-
est train station and closest highway ramp and are specified in logs.
70For example, an additional meter of house size is likely to have a higher implicit price in the city
centre than in the periphery as the demand for space is higher and the supply is fixed in the historic
central part of most cities. This may lead to less allocation of parking as the space could be used
for more valuable uses.
71As we perform local linear regression, a linear form for the dependent variable is preferable because
implicit prices do not directly depend on average house prices.
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The coefficients, ρj , αj and γj can be estimated by interacting Sijt, Tijt and Xijt with
parking district dummies. However, as most districts have few observations and
there are many coefficients to be estimated, the variance of the implicit price esti-
mates are high and outliers can lead to considerable variation in ρj (McMillen and
Redfearn, 2010). To tackle this issue, we assume that districts neighbouring j have
similar implicit prices as j which can be used to reduce the estimates’ variance.72 A
semi-parametric approach can then be applied where neighboring parking districts
receive a higher weight than distant districts. To be more precise, we use the distance
between the centroid of each parking district j, and any other district.73 We estimate
a partially linear regression model:
Pijt = fj(Sijt,Tijt,Xijt, φt) + φj + εijt, (3.3)
where the function fj(·) is estimated in a non-parametric way. We estimate fj(·) by
locally weighted regression, implying:
fj(·) = ρj(uj, vj)Sijt + Tijtαj(uj, vj) + Xijtγj(uj, vj) + φt(uj, vj),
where (uj, vj) are the centroid coordinates of parking district j. The district-specific
implicit parking costs ρj are then defined by ρj(uj, vj).
Locally weighted regression techniques have been extensively used in the hedonic
house price literature where parameters depend on geographic location (Sunding and
Swoboda, 2010; Grislain-Letrémy and Katossky, 2014). For each parking district j,
we estimate a weighted least squares (WLS) regression using an exponential distance
decay kernel:
wjk =
{
e−hdjk , if djk < 5
0, otherwise,
(3.4)
where wjk is the weight applied to all property transactions in parking district k, the
72To prevent estimating ρj for districts without any outside private parking, we select districts with
at least 10 transactions with outside private parking and 10 transactions without outside private
parking.
73To speed up the estimation, we set 5 km as the cutoff point. Therefore the weight for any observation
i in parking district k greater than 5 km from j is set to zero. This does not materially effect the
estimates of ρj as weights are approximately zero after 5 km (see Figure 3.A.1 in Appendix 1).
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bandwidth h determines the speed of the decay and djk is the euclidean distance, in
km, between the centroids of parking district j and k. Figure 3.A.1 in Appendix 1
illustrates the weighting function using various distance decay bandwidths. In our
application, we estimate these partially linear regression models for each region sep-
arately as this makes the estimation procedure faster.74
As a part of the model is parametric, specifically the district fixed effect φj , we use
a two-step estimation procedure (Bontemps et al., 2008). In the first step, the linear
part of the specification, can be estimated using the Robinson (1988) approach. This
method separately regresses Pijt and the parametric part φj on the non-parametric
part fj(·) using local WLS and generates residuals, P̃ijt and φ̃j . The residuals P̃ijt are
then regressed on the residuals φ̃j using OLS and the coefficients ζ̂ on φ̃j are cap-
tured.75 In the second step, we then regress Pijt− ζ̂φj on the non-parametric part fj(·)
using local WLS to get the parking district specific coefficients of interest.
An important parameter in non-parametric estimation is the bandwidth. A lower
bandwidth implies more bias, but lower variance, as the estimates are smoothed more
over space. Meanwhile, a higher bandwidth implies less smoothing, therefore less
bias and higher variance.76 We will use a bandwidth of h = 2, which allows for a
sufficient amount of variation in the estimates over space, while also having a vari-
ance that is economically meaningful. In Section 5.4 we show that lower bandwidths
provide larger estimates of the price elasticity of car demand, so our approach is
somewhat conservative, while higher bandwidths provide unrealistic estimates (for
example negative parking costs and many large outliers).77
It is important to discuss the interpretation of the estimated implicit price, ρ̂j . As
parking is a discrete variable, those that own a private spot are willing to pay at least
ρ̂j , while households that do not own a private spot are maximally willing to pay ρ̂j
(Bajari and Kahn, 2005).78 Hence, we interpret the implicit price of a private outside
parking spot as the (average) cost for an outdoor parking space for all residents living
in district j.
74This provides essentially the same results as estimating all regions simultaneously as most regions
are more than 5 km apart, therefore observations of other regions are given a weight of zero.
75We estimate ζ̂ by regressing: P̃ijt = ζφ̃j + uijt. Under regularity conditions, Robinson (1988) shows
that the coefficient is a
√
n-consistent and asymptotically normal estimator for ζ̂.
76A bandwidth of h = 0 implies each observation gets wjk = 1 and we are back to specification (3.1),
including more controls, where parking costs are assumed to be constant over space (causing high
bias). A bandwidth of h =∞ implies that we do not take into account the spatial correlation in ρj ’s
as in specification (3.2).
77We detect any remaining large outliers as greater than or smaller than mean(ρ̂j)± 4 ∗ std(ρ̂j).
78The Bajari and Kahn (2005) approach has also been used to study car ownership, see for example
Mulalic and Rouwendal (2015).
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3.3.2 Step 2: Parking costs and car demand
In the second step, we aim to estimate the effect of residential parking costs on vehicle
demand. As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, implicit parking prices reflect parking costs,
which are assumed to be the same for all households within a parking district. The
identification strategy exploits spatial variation in implicit residential parking costs
between parking districts to explain household vehicle demand using a multinomial
logit (MNL) model. The MNL model assumes a random utility framework with k
alternatives and i individuals, living in district j at time period t. As utility is not
directly observed, we construct a model:
Ukijt = λ
k
ijt + εijt, (3.5)
where the unobserved utility derived from alternative k, Ukijt, is composed of a deter-
ministic component, λkijt, and a random component, εijt, which is independently and
identically distributed across alternatives with an Extreme Value Type I distribution.
Therefore, the probability a household owns Cijt = k cars, where k = 0, 1,≥ 2, can be
written as:
Pr[Cijt = k] =
eλ
k
ijt
2∑̃
k=0
eλ
k̃
ijt
. (3.6)
We are mainly interested in how residential parking costs, ρ̂j affect the probability of
owning k cars. Therefore, we specify the deterministic part λkijt as:
λkijt = β
kρ̂j + φ
k
t , (3.7)
where we control for year fixed effects, φkt , and the error term is clustered at the park-
ing district level, j, as parking costs are at a more aggregate level than household car
ownership. The reference category is k = 0 cars, so we set βk=0 = 0.
One concern with equation (3.7) is that households with a higher (lower) preference
to own a car may sort into areas with lower (higher) parking costs. Therefore βk will
be overestimated as parking costs and household characteristics related to vehicle de-
mand are correlated. For example, larger families may want to own more than one
car or live in a larger house and therefore choose to locate outside the densest areas in
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cities where parking costs are lower. Furthermore some households may have strong
preferences for car ownership or urban amenities. Therefore, we control for house-
hold characteristics, Hijt, which include income, age, size, type and education.
The availability of substitutes and the ease of using a car may also correlate with vehi-
cle demand and parking costs, so we add location characteristics, Ljt, which include
distance to transport infrastructure, the availability of public transportation, distance
to the city centre, whether the household lives in a historic district and building den-
sity. Controlling for distance to the city centre is particularly important as it captures
the stylised fact that in European cities, urban amenities are highly correlated with
distance to the city centre and therefore may also be correlated to preferences for car
ownership and residential parking costs. Finally, as parking policy is determined at
the municipality level, we include municipality fixed effects, φkm, which also controls
for other local unobserved characteristics of the built environment such as land use
regulations that may influence vehicle demand and parking costs. This would sug-
gest the following specification:
λkijt = β
kρ̂j + Hijtγ
k + Ljtθ
k + φkm + φ
k
t . (3.8)
A major concern with (3.8) is that because residential parking costs are determined by
supply and demand for parking, vehicle demand will be correlated to parking costs.
Therefore, the specification suffers from reverse causality and the estimated coeffi-
cient βk is inconsistent. We attempt to solve this problem by instrumenting ρ̂j using
the median construction year of properties in a district, Bj , similar to Van Ommeren
et al. (2012). The median construction year of properties is a conditionally-valid in-
strument as it affects current parking costs via historical supply restrictions, reflecting
historical land and building costs. Therefore the main assumption for identification
is that, conditional on household and location controls, the median construction year
of residential properties in area j only affects current vehicle demand via historical
supply factors and is uncorrelated to the current demand for parking in area j.
It may be the case that households with preferences for car ownership sort into park-
ing districts with newer buildings and lower costs. We argue that this is a minor
threat to our identification as the lion’s share of sorting is likely controlled for by the
detailed set of housing characteristics, Hijt, and distance to the city centre. Further-
more, we exclude parking districts with a median construction year after 1999 and
exclude households living in properties constructed after 1999 as parking costs in
newer districts and houses may be affected by current parking demand. It is impor-
tant to note that in the first-step the implicit parking costs are estimated conditional
on construction year of the property, so the cost should not be influenced by its own
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construction year.
There are two additional advantages of instrumenting for ρ̂j , compared to using a
standard MNL model. Firstly, because we identify the impact of changes in park-
ing costs due to a shift in supply, conditional on controls, we address the issue that
random measurement error is introduced during the estimation of costs in step 1
which usually causes a downward bias in the estimated βk coefficient. Secondly, it
mitigates issues from any other omitted factors, correlated to vehicle demand and
parking costs.
As a MNL model is non-linear in parameters, 2SLS estimators are inappropriate, so
we apply a control function approach (Petrin and Train, 2010; Wooldridge, 2015). In
the first stage we estimate:
ρ̂j = ηBj + Hijtγ + Ljtθ + φm + φt + υj, (3.9)
where Bj is the median construction year of residential properties in parking district
j and υj is the residual. In the second stage, we plug in v̂j linearly as an additional
control and specify:
λkijt = β
kρ̂j + Hijtγ
k + Ljtθ
k + φkm + φ
k
t + υ̂j, (3.10)
where standard errors are bootstrapped (250 replications) over both steps and clus-
tered at the parking district level j.
The parameters of a MNL model represent the probability one alternative is chosen as
compared to the base category. Therefore, the directionality and magnitude of the co-
efficients are not straightforward to interpret. In light of this, we calculate and present
the average marginal effect (AME) for the variables of interest on the choice probabili-
ties of each car ownership alternative (Bhat and Pulugurta, 1998). The marginal effect
of a continuous variable, for example parking costs ρ̂j , on the probability a household
i chooses k cars, πkijt = Pr[Cijt = k], can be written as:
∆Pr[k] =
∂πkijt
∂ρ̂j
= πkijt(β̂
k −
2∑
k̃=0
πk̃ijtβ̂
k̃). (3.11)
We take the average of the marginal effects over all households to get the AME, de-
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noted as ∆Pr[k]. Using the AMEs, we can calculate the change in average car owner-
ship as:
∆E[C] = 1 ·∆Pr[1] + 2 ·∆Pr[2]. (3.12)
When estimating a MNL model, one does not impose restrictions on the marginal
effect of a variable on the probability an alternative is chosen. If parking costs have a
larger impact on the demand for a second car because it is for example less essential
than the first car for mobility, we can test whether the effect of parking costs varies
over each car ownership alternative. When the AME on k = 1 car, ∆Pr[1], is zero,
it indicates that the number of households switching from k = 1 to k = 0 cars is
the same as from k = 2 to k = 1 cars. This suggests that the assumption of a linear
restriction holds and therefore, we can apply linear regression techniques, such as
2SLS, which are more efficient. We therefore also estimate 2SLS models.
3.4 Results
In this section we present the results from estimating implicit parking costs (Section
3.4.1), the impact of these costs on household vehicle demand (Section 3.4.2) and ad-
ditional sensitivity checks (Section 3.4.3).
3.4.1 Step 1: Estimating parking costs
In Table 3.4 we present the average implicit parking prices, or costs, of various park-
ing types for each region obtained by estimating equation (3.3). The implicit parking
price can be interpreted as the average price for a private outside parking spot. This
represents the net present value of future benefits from private parking as compared
to parking on-street with a permit. The average price for an outside private parking
space is around e12,000 and is highest in the Amsterdam region. Prices are gen-
erally higher for parking spaces with structure, such as garages, and for larger lots
which suggests higher construction costs and other uses such as storage.79 Prices
79Implicit prices for large parking spots are based on few observations (see Table 3.2), therefore esti-
mates are less precise (have large standard errors) and should be interpreted with caution. A priori,
it is not clear whether carports should be cheaper or more expensive than garages as carports may
have space for more than one car while garages include a physical structure. Our findings indicate
that garages are more expensive than carports in general, however carports seem more valuable in
Utrecht.
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Table 3.4: Average implicit parking costs (e)
Amsterdam Rotterdam The Hague Utrecht Overall
Private (outside) parking 14147 12747 9264 10422 11914
[12825] [11010] [9992] [8089] [11188]
Carport 18353 15816 17996 20200 17990
[13990] [15485] [16336] [15419] [15281]
Garage 21384 18683 20486 10851 18788
[10051] [8542] [9689] [9310] [10194]
Carport & garage 21042 27973 31542 14569 24331
[21242] [26953] [30522] [23034] [26282]
Double garage 22651 29765 16886 10907 20781
[27077] [27730] [25906] [15945] [26173]
# Transactions 182,958 121,128 142,303 88,708 535,097
Notes: Costs are a representative average for all transactions over the time period 2000-2016. Standard
deviation in brackets. Full table of implicit prices are available upon request.
Table 3.5: Average annual implicit outside parking costs (e/yr)
Amsterdam Rotterdam The Hague Utrecht Overall
Overall 707 637 463 521 596
[641] [550] [500] [404] [559]
Centre (<2 km) 1609 826 953 771 1023
[215] [181] [347] [422] [463]
Urban ring (2-5 km) 1060 1122 535 420 792
[513] [669] [365] [354] [552]
Periphery (>5 km) 354 476 322 455 395
[481] [475] [554] [370] [487]
# Parking-districts 147 141 155 99 542
Notes: Costs are a representative average for all parking districts, weighted by the number of transac-
tions in a parking district, over the time period 2000-2016. Standard deviation in brackets.
vary slightly between regions which suggests different supply and demand condi-
tions. As we are interested in estimating the effect of parking costs on car ownership,
we derive annual parking costs by assuming zero depreciation costs and an annual
discount rate of 5%.80 Hence, we multiply the implicit price ρ̂j by 0.05.
Table 3.5 presents the average annual implicit outside parking costs. There are a total
of 542 parking districts in the sample. On average, annual parking costs are around
e600 and seem to follow an approximately normal distribution (see Figure 3.B.1 in
80Outside parking is unlikely to depreciate as it does not include any building structure. This discount
rate gives realistic parking cost estimates, as discussed at the end of this section.
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Figure 3.3: Map of annual residential parking costs (e/yr)
Appendix B). Around 13% of the estimates are negative, most of which are close to
zero and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, another 21% of the estimates are
positive and not significantly different from zero (see Table 3.B.1 in Appendix B).
Hence, for about one third of the estimates, parking costs are essentially zero. This
makes sense as outside parking costs are close to zero in peripheral areas.
We also separate the results by distance to the metropolitan centre and present the re-
sults graphically. Table 3.5 and Figure 3.3 show that there is substantial heterogeneity
in annual parking costs over space with higher costs generally in central city areas,
especially in Amsterdam where annual costs are around e1600 within 2kms from the
city centre and fall with distance. Costs in the periphery level off at around e300 to
e500. Parking costs in Rotterdam are slightly different from the general trend and
are higher surrounding the city centre. This is likely because the city centre of Rot-
terdam was re-built after the bombings in WWII and therefore has a higher supply of
parking than the historic neighbourhoods surrounding the centre (Koster et al., 2012).
Overall, the estimated implicit parking costs appear realistic.81
81Based on current list prices from Funda, the largest online multi-listing housing market platform in
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Table 3.6: Main results
MNL MNL-CF 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parking cost (e100/yr)
Pr[0 car] 0.00356∗∗∗ 0.00120∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.00597∗∗
(0.000548) (0.000351) (0.00179) (0.00241)
Pr[1 car] -0.00170∗∗ -0.00131∗∗ 0.00516∗∗ 0.00269
(0.000682) (0.000597) (0.00210) (0.00379)
Pr[2 cars] -0.00186∗∗ 0.000105 -0.0177∗∗∗ -0.00866∗
(0.000929) (0.000606) (0.00331) (0.00501)
∆E[C] -0.005∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.030∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
εCP -0.23
∗∗∗ -0.05 -1.26∗∗∗ -0.61∗∗ -1.45∗∗∗ -0.70∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.03) (0.20) (0.29) (0.21) (0.20)
Controls (18) N Y N Y N Y
Year FE’s (10) Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mun FE’s (45) Y Y Y Y Y Y
First stage F-statistic 51.55 15.64 65.68 22.00
# Parking-districts 493 493 493 493 493 493
# Households 98,659 98,659 98,659 98,659 98,659 98,659
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of cars per household. Standard errors are in parenthesis
and are clustered at the parking-district level. For MNL specifications, AMEs and two-stage clustered
bootstrapped standard errors and (Kleibergen-Paap) First stage F-statistics (250 replications) are pre-
sented. MNL-CF refers to MNL model with a control function approach. ∆E[C] represents the change
in average car ownership from a e100 increase in parking costs and is calculated as in equation (3.12).
See Appendix 2 for calculation of εCP , the implied price elasticity of car ownership, standard errors are
calculated using the delta method. See Tables 3.B.2 and 3.B.3 for full table with controls and first-stage
regression results. Stars denote * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
3.4.2 Step 2: Parking costs and car demand
The maps of car ownership and parking costs in Figures 3.1 and 3.3 suggest that there
is an inverse relation between vehicle ownership and residential parking costs. This
relation is investigated in more depth in this section. Table 3.6 presents the main
results.
Firstly, in columns (1) and (2) we present the average marginal effects (AME) from
the Netherlands, rental prices in 2019 for private parking spots in city centres are around e3000
in Amsterdam and are around e1500 in Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht (Funda, 2019). Note,
these prices are not directly comparable as housing prices have almost doubled since 2008 (the
average year in the data), private rental spots are generally garages which are more expensive and
because implicit prices should be lower than market prices due to permits.
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estimating specification (3.7) and (3.8) using MNL, hence we still ignore a range of
endogeneity issues. We see that there appears to be a small, negative effect of park-
ing costs on car ownership, with a smaller effect size when controlling for household
and location characteristics. These results are however difficult to interpret as causal
estimates because reverse causality and measurement error will likely bias the esti-
mates towards zero. Owning a vehicle creates demand for parking and thereby raises
prices, resulting in a positive bias in the coefficient for parking costs on vehicle de-
mand, whereas if there is (random) measurement error in step 1, results will be biased
towards zero.
In columns (3) and (4) we estimate specification (3.10), using a MNL control function
approach, where parking costs are instrumented with the median construction year
of buildings in a parking district. It is useful to discuss the sign of the instrument. In
the Netherlands, car ownership has grown over the last century. Hence, we expect
that, ceteris paribus, parking supply will be higher in areas where buildings have
been constructed more recently, as parking does not need to be re-developed from
pre-existing land uses which is costly in built-up areas. Therefore we should see
a negative relation between the median construction year of residential properties
in a parking district and parking costs. Results from the first stage show that the
instrument is strong, the Kleibergen-Paap First stage F-statistic is 51.55 and 15.64,
respectively, and indeed has the expected negative sign.
The results from column (4) indicate that the AME of residential parking costs on the
probability of owning one car is zero, while for the second car it is negative. This in-
dicates that as parking costs increase, around the same number of households switch
from two to one car as the number that switch from one to zero cars, implying that
the effect of parking costs on vehicle demand is approximately linear and therefore
2SLS can be applied. Comparing the effect of parking costs on average car ownership,
∆E[C], with and without control variables in columns (3) and (4) suggests that con-
trolling for household and location characteristics are important for the conditional
validity of the instrument.
In columns (5) and (6) we present the results using 2SLS, which allows us to immedi-
ately estimate the average effect on car ownership, ∆E[C].82 Our preferred estimate
in column (6) indicates that the marginal effect of parking costs on car ownership is
statistically significant at the 1% level and can be interpreted as an increase in park-
ing costs of e100 is associated with a reduction in average car ownership of 0.017.83
82Results from a control function ordered logit model are essentially the same and are available upon
request.
83In general, the control variables have plausible signs. Income, household size, age, level of educa-
tion and distance to the nearest major train station have a positive effect on car ownership while
building density and the availability of public transport in the near vicinity have a negative affect.
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This is qualitatively the same as the outcome in column (4) using the MNL-CF ap-
proach and is larger than the estimate in column (2) where parking costs are not
instrumented.84 Given the result in column (7), this suggests that the implied price
elasticity of car ownership is: εCP = −0.7.85 The results can also be interpreted in
standard deviations (see column (3) of Table 3.B.6 in Appendix B). A one standard
deviation increase in parking costs (e503) is associated with a reduction in average
car ownership of 0.085.
The implied elasticity is within the range (but at the higher end) of estimates from the
literature, which ranges between [−0.3,−0.8].86. Car ownership elasticities with re-
spect to fuel prices are generally below−0.3, so parking costs seem to have a stronger
effect on car ownership than variable costs such as fuel prices (Goodwin et al., 2004;
De Jong et al., 2009). This suggests that, at least for the Netherlands, permit pricing
may be an effective tool to reduce car ownership. This likely reflects the availabil-
ity of close substitutes to cars, such as public transport and bicycles, in the dense
metropolitan regions we focus on.
It is important to put this result into context. Average car ownership in the city centres
is around 0.90, while in the periphery it is 1.27, so the difference is 0.37 (see Table 3.B.7
in Appendix 1). Meanwhile parking costs in these areas are e1023 and e395, respec-
tively, so the difference is around e630 (see Table 3.5). This suggests that, conditional
on household and location characteristics, parking costs explain −0.017 × 630
100
= 0.11
or around 30% of the difference in car ownership between the centre and periphery.87
This seems realistic given the large parking costs, relative to ownership costs. The
remaining difference in car ownership rates can likely to be explained by substitutes
to cars available in the city centre such as walking and cycling, sorting of households
and the difficulty of driving in the city centre, which are controlled for in our regres-
sions.
Table 3.B.2 and 3.B.3 in Appendix B suggest that the most important control variables are house-
hold type and location characteristics such as distance to the nearest major train station, distance
to the metropolitan city centre and building density.
84This suggests that reverse causality and measurement error indeed cause a bias towards zero.
85Annual average car ownership costs, excluding parking, are assumed to be e5000 (Nibud, 2017).
See Appendix 2 for the full calculation. If ∆Pr[1] is zero, ∆E[C] = −0.017 while if we include
∆Pr[1], ∆E[C] = −0.015.
86Note the range presented is based on the elasticities with respect to purchase or fixed costs. See
Dargay (2002); De Jong et al. (2009); De Groote et al. (2016); Seya et al. (2016).
87The magnitude is slightly higher for Amsterdam and The Hague at around 40%, while in Rotterdam
and Utrecht it is around 15%.
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Table 3.7: Sensitivity: Heterogeneous effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Flats Houses Renter Amsterdam Rest
∆E[C] -0.0130∗∗∗ -0.0185∗∗ -0.00734∗ -0.0287 -0.0152∗∗∗
(0.00443) (0.00829) (0.00379) (0.0186) (0.00526)
εCP -0.66
∗∗∗ -0.71∗∗ -0.54∗ -1.53 -0.62∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.32) (0.28) (0.99) (0.22)
Controls (18) Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE’s (10) Y Y Y Y Y
Mun FE’s (45) Y Y Y Y Y
Mean car ownership 0.99 1.30 0.68 0.94 1.22
KP F-statistic 33.60 9.30 35.24 3.76 16.86
# Parking-districts 484 480 492 49 445
# Households 29,222 65,700 52,871 7,517 91,142
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of cars per household. Standard errors are in parenthesis
and are clustered at the parking-district level. ‘Ams’ refers only to the municipality of Amsterdam
while ‘Rest’ refers to all other municipalities. All models are estimated using 2SLS. Kleibergen-Paap
First stage F-statistic is presented. We directly estimate the change in average car ownership, ∆E[C],
from a e100 increase in parking costs as the marginal effect of parking costs on car ownership. See
Appendix 2 for calculation of εCP , the implied price elasticity of car ownership, standard errors are
calculated using the delta method. The elasticity is corrected for differences in mean car ownership
between groups, as indicated above. See Table 3.B.3 for first stage results. Stars denote * p < 0.1, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
3.4.3 Sensitivity
The results indicate that an increase in residential parking costs of e100 is associated
with a reduction in average car ownership of around 0.017, indicating an implied
price elasticity of car ownership of−0.7. In this section we perform a range of robust-
ness checks.
In Table 3.7 we test the robustness of the specified demand for cars over various
sub-groups.88 In columns (1) and (2) we estimate specification (3.10) separately for
households living in flats and single-family houses and find that the elasticities are
the same. In the analysis above, we exclude renters because our estimated parking
costs (using house prices) most likely reflect prices faced by owner-occupiers which
may differ from parking prices faced by renters. In the Netherlands, the majority
of urban renters live in public housing which generally does not have private park-
ing. Therefore, these residents will mainly park on-street using a parking permit. If
(public) renters respond less to cruising (time) costs, as they have lower incomes, the
elasticity may be smaller. In column (3), we check whether renters have a different car
88Note the elasticity takes into account differences in mean car ownership between groups.
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demand function as compared to owner-occupiers. The results suggest that renters
may be slightly less responsive to changes in parking costs, however the elasticity is
not statistically different.
In the municipality of Amsterdam, most districts allow a maximum of only one per-
mit, while some districts also have waiting lists and permit fees are substantially
higher than in other metropolitan areas. Therefore, households may be willing to pay
more for a private spot and also may respond more strongly to permit fees. Therefore,
in columns (4) and (5) we estimate the model separately for Amsterdam and all other
municipalities. The effect of parking costs on average car ownership is roughly twice
as high in Amsterdam. However, because it is imprecise, the estimate is statistically
indistinguishable from the effect in other municipalities.
We also test the sensitivity of the results to various functional form assumptions and
bandwidth sizes (see Table 3.B.5 in Appendix B). We specify the functional form of
control variables more flexibly by measuring income, age, distance to the city cen-
tre and availability of public transport using more detailed categories.89 The average
change in car ownership increases slightly to −0.018. We also test whether chang-
ing the functional form of the instrument from linear to quadratic affects the results.
Column (2) suggests that the marginal effect declines slightly to −0.014. In column
(3) and (4) we test the sensitivity of the implied elasticity to alternative discount rate
assumptions. Lower (higher) discount rates are associated with larger (smaller) elas-
ticities, suggesting our estimate is conservative.
Lastly, we test the effect of adjusting the bandwidth used to estimate parking costs
in step 1. Table 3.B.6 in the Appendix B indicates that a one standard deviation in-
crease in parking costs has a similar effect on vehicle demand with lower bandwidths
implying larger elasticities. We decide to take a conservative approach and use the
implied elasticity for h = 2.
3.4.4 Counterfactual analysis
In order to apply our estimates, several assumptions are required. Most importantly,
we assume a partial equilibrium setting where residence and job locations are fixed,
therefore commuting patterns remain unchanged. We also assume that households
respond to changes in (monetary and time) costs in the same manner, that vehicle
89Income is split into 6 categories: <20k, 20-40k, 40-60k, 60-80k, 80-100k and >100k. Age is split into 4
categories: <26, 26-45, 45-65 and >65. Distance to city centre is split into 10 1km bands and public
transport availability is split into number of bus, metro and train stops within 100, 250 and 500
meters.
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externalities are zero and that the implicit price for a marginal parking spot applies to
all households. Additionally, we assume that cruising costs are zero in the periphery,
where there is no paid parking. Therefore the value of a private off-street parking
spot in the periphery captures the security value attributed to private parking, which
we assume does not vary systematically over space. As such, we can calculate annual
cruising costs per district, ζj , as the difference between the implicit parking cost, ρ̂j ,
minus permit fees, Fj , and the parking cost in the periphery, ρ̂p or ζj = ρ̂j −Fj − ρ̂p.
We follow De Groote et al. (2016) and assume a constant-elasticity inverse demand
function: D(Q) = Pc(Q/Qc)
1
ε , where Pc is the total current annual cost of owning a
car, Q/Qc is the average number of cars in the new scenario, Q, relative to the initial
average number of cars, Qc, and ε is the price elasticity of car ownership which is
assumed to be constant over space. This functional form better accounts for the non-
linearity in demand responses, which is important as we may want to consider large
changes in parking costs.90 We assume that the supply curve is fully elastic. Therefore
the marginal cost of adding or removing a car is roughly constant and equal to the to-
tal average car costs excluding parking, which are around e5000, plus parking costs,
ρ̂j . This would imply a supply curve: S(Q) = 5000 + ρ̂j . As we assume zero external-
ities, welfare effects in the car market can be calculated as the difference between the
inverse supply and demand function.
Given these assumptions, we use information about current parking and vehicle
markets to provide back-of-the-envelope calculations that approximate the effect of
changes in parking costs (see Appendix 1 for calculations and an example). Estimates
are based on a cross-section of transactions and households, therefore represent long
run effects. We discuss the main implications of these assumptions in Section 3.4.5.
3.4.4.1 Implications for parking policy
Residential parking permits are offered at a fraction of the cost in the Netherlands.
Currently, the highest annual permit fees in the country are in the centre of Amster-
dam and cost e500 while the market value of a parking permit is around e3600
(Van Ommeren et al., 2011).91 We apply our estimates to gain insights into the po-
tential implications of raising residential permit fees in the city centre of Amsterdam
90Note assuming a linear demand function, whereby the change in car ownership equals ∆C =
−0.017 ·∆P will likely overestimate the impact for large changes in P .
91Note, we estimate the implicit parking cost, conditional on the current number of permits which is
likely to be an underestimate of the market value of a parking permit. Meanwhile, e3600 is likely
to be an upper bound estimate of the market value as the average residents value for a permit is
likely to be lower than a household with private parking.
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to the market value estimated in Van Ommeren et al. (2011).
Increasing permit fees will likely raise overall parking costs in the short run, however,
the effect on car ownership is likely to be smaller in the long run as higher costs induce
households to give up their car which results in less cruising and shorter waiting
lists.92 We deal with this by considering two extreme cases, assuming; (A) that private
cruising costs are unchanged and (B) that private cruising costs are zero when permit
fees equal the market value.
In case (A), raising permit fees by e3100 (an increase in the total annual car own-
ership costs from around e6600 to e9700), is expected to reduce car ownership by
approximately 24 percent and is associated with a welfare gain of around e300 per
household (see Appendix 1 for calculation). In case (B), cruising costs, which account
for around e800 in private time costs, fall to zero. This results in an increase in car
ownership of around 5 percentage points, corresponding to a rebound effect of 20%.
Therefore, the decline in car ownership is lower overall, 19 percent, and is associated
with a lower annual welfare gain of around e245 per household.
3.4.4.2 Implications of automated vehicles
In the near future, automated vehicles (AVs) may not necessarily require parking
which has implications for vehicle demand in cities. In a residential context, if house-
holds do not need parking anymore, there will likely be three types of welfare effects
from: (1) not facing cruising costs, (2) increases in vehicle demand and (3) the value
of re-purposing land currently designated to parking (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015;
Zakharenko, 2016). Our results allow us to provide estimates for (1) and (2).
We consider two scenarios for AVs. On the one hand, if households own private AVs
and parking costs at the residence are sufficiently high, it is likely that AVs will be
parked at locations in the periphery, where parking costs are relatively low. At these
locations, parking costs will approximately equal the reservation value of land plus
additional costs of traveling to and from the parking area (Zakharenko, 2016). There-
fore in scenario (A), we assume parking costs approximately equal implicit parking
costs in the periphery, ρAj = ρ̂p. On the other hand, if AVs are shared, then cars will
only need to be parked during the evening and parking costs will be almost zero as
they are shared between many users. Therefore, in scenario (B), we assume house-
holds incur zero parking costs, so ρ̂p = 0 and ρBj = 0.
92Note for simplicity we include all additional costs such as waiting times under the header cruising
costs.
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Table 3.8: Implications of AVs
Scenario A: Private AV
Amsterdam Rotterdam The Hague Utrecht Overall
∆ Car demand (%)
Centre 16 4 8 4 8
Urban ring 9 8 3 0 5
Periphery 0 0 0 0 0
∆ Welfare (e/yr)
Centre 641 256 623 235 445
Urban ring 484 632 187 0 321
Periphery 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario B: Shared AV
Amsterdam Rotterdam The Hague Utrecht Overall
∆ Car demand (%)
Centre 22 11 13 11 14
Urban ring 14 15 7 6 11
Periphery 5 7 4 6 5
∆ Welfare (e/yr)
Centre 962 714 985 690 832
Urban ring 843 1194 546 422 760
Periphery 450 629 415 610 515
Notes: In scenario (A), parking costs equal the implicit cost in the periphery. In scenario (B), parking
costs are zero. As in Table 3.5, we define the ‘centre’ as < 2 km radius from the city centre, the ‘urban
ring’ is between 2 and 5 km and the ‘periphery’ > 5 km. ∆ Welfare represents the annual gain for an
average owner-occupier household. See Table 3.B.7 in Appendix 1 for additional information.
To calculate (1), the welfare effect from not facing cruising costs, we compute the
annual cruising costs per car, ζj , and transform this into an average welfare effect
per household by multiplying ζj by the average number of cars per household, Cj .
Therefore, ∆W1j = ζj · Cj . The welfare effect (2), from additional vehicle demand, is
calculated as ∆W2j =
∫ Q′
Qc
(D(Q) − S(Q))dQ, where Q′ equals the average number of
cars, given parking costs as specified in scenario (A) and (B).93
The counterfactual results are shown in Table 3.8. We focus on the “Overall” effects
for an average owner-occupier household in the far right column. In scenario (A),
AVs are privately owned and therefore parking costs equal the implicit cost in the
periphery. This is expected to increase car demand by around 8 percent in the centre,
93We note that car ownership is currently a pre-requisite for car use. However, in the future, this is
unlikely to be the case as AVs can be shared and used on demand. Therefore we consider our
estimates for the effect of residential parking costs on car ownership (2) as providing an indication
of the effect of parking costs on the extensive margin, i.e. whether households use a car.
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5 percent in the urban ring and there is no change in the periphery. This is associated
with annual gains per household of around e450 in the city centre, e300 in the urban
ring and zero in the periphery.
In scenario (B), AVs are shared and therefore parking costs approach zero. As a result,
car demand is predicted to increase by around 14 percent in the centre, 11 percent in
the urban ring and 5 percent in the periphery. Annual gains per household are around
e850 in the city centre, e750 in the urban ring and e500 in the periphery.
Overall, it appears that car use is likely to increase substantially if residents no longer
face parking costs, with larger effects in denser urban areas where parking costs are
high. Given that annual average travel distances per car are approximately 13,000km,
additional vehicle demand may result in up to 1600km of additional annual car use by
households in city centres.94 The largest welfare gains arise from eliminating cruising
costs, which are larger in areas with higher parking costs and higher car ownership.
Meanwhile, the welfare gains in the car market, ∆W2j , which are small, are likely to
be lower due to vehicle externalities, such as congestion, pollution and injury, which
are assumed to be zero in this application (Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2004; Sovacool,
2009).
In a realistic future scenario, one would expect that there will be both private and
shared AVs, therefore the effects of reduced parking costs are likely to be somewhere
in between the two cases presented.
3.4.5 Discussion
It is important to discuss the uncertainties from our application and implications of
our assumptions as there may be reasons to believe that the effects could be over or
under-estimated. Implicit prices from a hedonic model are an outcome of both supply
and demand. Therefore, parking costs may be measured with error when considering
a large change in parking demand. Additionally, estimated parking costs in the first
step may be overestimated if off-street is preferred to on-street parking, conditional
on search, or if parking policy is not binding. We are however not concerned with
measurement error for our estimates of parking costs in the first step because we use
an instrumental variables approach to estimate the elasticity in the second step. In our
analysis, we focus on owner-occupiers which, as we show in the sensitivity analysis,
may respond more strongly to parking costs than renters.
94Assuming that residential parking costs do not affect the number of kms travelled per vehicle and
that new users utilise the car as intensively as an average current user.
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It is more likely however that the estimated welfare changes for owner-occupiers are
conservative. Firstly, the elasticity may vary over space. As there is a higher avail-
ability of substitutes in the city centre, the average elasticity may underestimate the
effect in the dense urban areas which we focus on. Secondly, residential locations
may change. Sorting of households with a high propensity to drive, such as high
income families, into currently expensive parking districts may also result in larger
changes in vehicle demand. Finally, we do not consider additional traffic congestion
externalities associated with cruising and vehicle use. This would cause an underes-
timate for the welfare gains from eliminating cruising and raising permit fees while
overestimating the (small) gains from additional vehicle demand in the case of AVs.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper provides an approach to estimate local residential parking costs and ex-
amines to what extent these costs affect vehicle demand, taking endogeneity issues
into account. We apply the methodology to the four largest metropolitan regions
of the Netherlands. The findings suggest that parking costs vary substantially over
space. For example, in the city centre of Amsterdam, the annual implicit cost of an
off-street, outside, parking spot is around e1600, which is over 20% of total average
car costs and four times higher than in the periphery. Average car ownership for
owner-occupier households in districts with one standard deviation (e503) higher
annual parking costs decreases by around 0.085, corresponding to a price elasticity of
car demand of about −0.7. The disparity in parking costs between the city centre and
the periphery explain around 30% of the difference in average car ownership rates
between these areas, providing an additional explanation for why car ownership is
lower in dense urban areas.
We employ the estimates above to investigate the implications for parking policy.
The municipality of Amsterdam is currently determined to reduce private car own-
ership and promote more sustainable modes of transportation in the city (Gemeente
Amsterdam, 2018b). One tool at their disposal is permit fees. The results, applied to
the city centre of Amsterdam, indicate that raising annual permit fees in the city cen-
tre to the market value, an increase from e500 to e3600, is expected to reduce average
car ownership between 19 and 24 percent, depending on whether the rebound effect
from eliminating cruising is taken into account.
These estimates can also be useful to gauge the potential implications of AVs as
households will no longer require parking directly outside their residence. Our esti-
mates provide long run approximations for the effect of fully AVs on cruising costs
and vehicle demand considering different assumptions about changes in parking
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costs. The findings indicate that the average annual welfare gain per household from
not incurring residential parking costs is between around e450 and e850 in the city
centre, depending on whether AVs are privately owned or shared. This is associated
with an increase in car demand in the city centre by 8 to 14 percent. These effects are
smaller outside the central urban areas where parking costs are lower.
While this paper focuses on the effects of parking costs on car ownership, further re-
search should consider the value of re-purposing on and off-street parking in cities
as the land value is likely to be large. Furthermore, additional attention should be
placed on estimating the effect of parking policy on cruising costs to get a better un-
derstanding of the rebound effect from policies aimed at raising parking fees. Finally,
further research should consider how the elasticity of car ownership with respect to
parking costs is related to the availability of substitutes for the private car.
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Appendix 3.A Additional descriptives
Here we report some additional descriptive statistics of variables used in the analy-
sis.
Table 3.A.1: Descriptive statistics: Transaction variables (cont.)
Mean Std. dev Min Max
Number of rooms 4.00 1.30 1 23
Number of floors 1.96 0.93 1 8
Garden 0.49 0.50 0 1
Terrace 0.09 0.29 0 1
Balcony 0.43 0.50 0 1
Basement 0.01 0.08 0 1
Good maintenance inside 0.20 0.40 0 1
Good maintenance outside 0.16 0.37 0 1
Central heating 0.91 0.29 0 1
Property is monument 0.01 0.08 0 1
New property 0.03 0.17 0 1
Terraced property 0.28 0.45 0 1
Detached property 0.02 0.13 0 1
Semi-detached property 0.05 0.21 0 1
Corner property 0.10 0.30 0 1
Distance to highwayramp (km) 2.06 1.44 0 9
Distance to station (km) 4.57 3.72 0 25
# Transactions 535,097
Table 3.A.2: Descriptive statistics: Household variables (cont.)
Mean Std. dev Min Max
Household single 0.12 0.33 0 1
Household couple 0.38 0.49 0 1
Household family 0.50 0.50 0 1
Distance to highwayramp (km) 2.69 1.97 0 10
Distance to station (km) 3.14 2.59 0 14
Distance to historic district (km) 2.75 2.36 0 13
Number of bus stops within 500m 5.82 3.82 0 55
Number of metros within 500m 0.24 0.58 0 4
Number of stations within 500m 0.06 0.23 0 1
# Households 98,659
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3.A.1 Other methodology
Here we report additional information on how the local weighted regression works
in our application and provide an example of how the price elasticity of car demand
is calculated.
3.A.1.1 Distance weighting function
Figure 3.A.1: Illustration of weighting using
different exponential decay powers
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3.A.1.2 Calculating the price elasticity of demand for car ownership
The elasticity of car ownership with respect to costs can be calculated as: εCP =
∆C
C
∆P
P
,
where ∆C represents the change in car ownership due to a change in parking costs,
C represents average car ownership, ∆P represents the change in prices due to a
change in parking costs and P is the average cost of owning a car, excluding parking.
We assume the average annual total cost of car ownership, excluding parking costs,
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P , equals e5000 in the Netherlands (Nibud, 2017).95 We also know that average car
ownership is around C = 1.2 in our sample. Furthermore, our preferred estimates
suggest that a change in parking costs, ρ̂j , of e100 is associated with a reduction in
average car ownership of ∆C = −0.017. Therefore εCP = −0.0171.2 /
100
5000
= −0.7
95Vehicle costs for a new car range between around e3000 and e7500 per year, depending on vehicle
size, and secondhand cars are around 25− 30% cheaper.
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Appendix 3.B Additional results
Here we report additional results that were omitted from the tables presented in
Section 5.4. This includes descriptives on estimated parking costs, control variables
from our main results, first stage estimates and additional results from our sensitivity
checks.
Table 3.B.1: Descriptives: Annual parking costs
Step 1 Mean Std. dev Min Max
Parking cost (e/yr) 595.69 559.40 -1218 2820
Negative parking cost (%) 12.56 33.14 0 100
Negative (significant) parking cost (%) 4.73 21.22 0 100
Insignificant parking cost (%) 26.01 43.87 0 100
# Parking-districts 542
Step 2 Mean Std. dev Min Max
Parking cost (e/yr) 461.58 503.00 -1218 2820
Negative parking cost (%) 15.15 35.85 0 100
Negative (significant) parking cost (%) 6.14 24.01 0 100
Insignificant parking cost (%) 28.47 45.13 0 100
# Households 98,659
Notes: Step 1 refers to the estimated parking costs weighted by the number of transactions in a parking
district. Step 2 refers to the parking costs weighted by the number of households in a district.
Figure 3.B.1: Histogram of estimated parking costs
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Table 3.B.2: Main results: Adding controls
2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Parking cost (e100/yr) -0.0270∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0169∗∗∗
(0.00400) (0.00487) (0.00482)
Income (ln(e)) 0.318∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(0.00672) (0.00627) (0.00625)
Household size 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗
(0.00398) (0.00392) (0.00392)
Household couple 0.290∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.00892) (0.00869) (0.00869)
Household family 0.378∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0131)
Age 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗
(0.000960) (0.000939) (0.000934)
Age2 -0.000106∗∗∗ -0.000108∗∗∗ -0.000108∗∗∗
(0.00000944) (0.00000922) (0.00000918)
Education middle 0.0201∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0212∗∗∗
(0.00548) (0.00545) (0.00544)
Education high 0.00250 0.00277 0.00336
(0.00733) (0.00673) (0.00670)
Distance city center (ln(km)) 0.0211 0.0208
(0.0201) (0.0197)
Distance to highwayramp (ln(km)) -0.0186 -0.0188
(0.0140) (0.0139)
Distance to highway (ln(km)) -0.00329 -0.00202
(0.00948) (0.00957)
Distance to station (ln(km)) 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗
(0.00806) (0.00953)
Within historic district 0.0865∗∗∗ 0.0824∗∗∗
(0.0256) (0.0252)
Distance to historic district (km) 0.0104∗∗ 0.0103∗∗
(0.00416) (0.00419)
Building density (ln(m2/ha)) -0.0473∗∗∗ -0.0426∗∗∗
(0.00852) (0.00837)
εCP -1.12
∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗∗ -0.70∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.20) (0.20)
Controls (18) Y Y Y
Year FE’s (10) Y Y Y
Mun FE’s (45) Y Y Y
First stage F-statistic 65.26 22.11 22.00
# Parking-districts 493 493 493
# Households 98,659 98,659 98,659
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of cars per household. Number of buses, metros, and train
stations within 500 m omitted due to space constraints. Kleibergen-Paap First stage F-statistic is pre-
sented. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the parking-district level. The average
change in car ownership, ∆E[C], is equal to the coefficient on Parking cost (e100/yr). Stars denote * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.B.3: Main results: First stage estimates
MNL-CF 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Median construction year -0.0927∗∗∗ -0.0611∗∗∗ -0.0927∗∗∗ -0.0611∗∗∗
(0.0129) (0.0154) (0.0114) (0.0130)
Income (ln(e)) 0.0853 0.0853
(0.0748) (0.0754)
Household size 0.0378 0.0378
(0.0380) (0.0374)
Household couple -0.156∗∗ -0.156∗∗
(0.0758) (0.0743)
Household family -0.225∗ -0.225∗
(0.120) (0.119)
Age -0.0130 -0.0130
(0.00934) (0.00934)
Age2 0.000132 0.000132
(0.0000985) (0.0000996)
Education middle -0.0680 -0.0680
(0.0577) (0.0585)
Education high 0.0866 0.0866
(0.108) (0.101)
Distance city center (ln(km)) -2.487∗∗∗ -2.487∗∗∗
(0.878) (0.746)
Distance to highwayramp (ln(km)) 0.142 0.142
(0.610) (0.605)
Distance to highway (ln(km)) -0.0686 -0.0686
(0.477) (0.478)
Distance to station (ln(km)) 0.293 0.293
(0.443) (0.417)
Within historic district 1.498∗ 1.498∗
(0.847) (0.879)
Distance to historic district (km) 0.130 0.130
(0.238) (0.206)
Building density (ln(m2/ha)) 0.135 0.135
(0.467) (0.416)
Controls (18) N Y N Y
Year FE’s (10) Y Y Y Y
Mun FE’s (45) Y Y Y Y
First stage F-statistic 51.55 15.64 65.68 22.00
# Parking-districts 493 493 493 493
# Households 98,659 98,659 98,659 98,659
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual parking cost (e100/yr). Number of buses, metros, and train
stations within 500 m omitted due to space constraints. Kleibergen-Paap First stage F-statistic is pre-
sented. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the parking-district level (and are boot-
strapped in the MNL-CF model). Stars denote * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.B.4: Sensitivity: First stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Flats Houses Renter Amsterdam Rest
Median construction year -0.0691∗∗∗ -0.0528∗∗∗ -0.0657∗∗∗ -0.0575∗ -0.0589∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0173) (0.0111) (0.0297) (0.0143)
Controls (18) Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE’s (10) Y Y Y Y Y
Mun FE’s (45) Y Y Y Y Y
First stage F-statistic 33.60 9.30 35.24 3.76 16.86
# Parking-districts 484 480 492 49 445
# Households 29,222 65,700 52,871 7,517 91,142
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual parking cost (e100/yr). Kleibergen-Paap First stage F-statistic
is presented. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the parking-district level. Stars
denote * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 3.B.5: Sensitivity: Functional form and discount rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Flex Flexiv δ = 0.03 δ = 0.07
∆E[C] -0.0179∗∗∗ -0.0144∗∗∗ -0.0281∗∗∗ -0.00843∗∗∗
(0.00556) (0.00378) (0.00803) (0.00241)
εCP -0.75
∗∗∗ -0.60∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.16) (0.33) (0.10)
Controls (18) Y Y Y Y
Year FE’s (10) Y Y Y Y
Mun FE’s (45) Y Y Y Y
First stage F-statistic 16.23 14.72 22.00 22.00
# Parking-districts 493 493 493 493
# Households 98,659 98,659 98,659 98,659
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of cars per household. Standard errors are in parenthesis
and are clustered at the parking-district level. All models are estimated using 2SLS. Kleibergen-Paap
First stage F-statistic is presented. The change in average car ownership, ∆E[C], from a e100 increase
in parking costs is estimated directly as the marginal effect of parking costs on car ownership. See
Appendix 2 for calculation of εCP , the implied price elasticity of car ownership, standard errors are
calculated using the delta method. Stars denote * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.B.6: Sensitivity: Bandwidth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
h = 1 h = 1.5 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
Parking cost (std) -0.0819∗∗∗ -0.0815∗∗∗ -0.0848∗∗∗ -0.0932∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0225) (0.0242) (0.0293) (0.0403)
∆E[C] -0.0240∗∗∗ -0.0188∗∗∗ -0.0169∗∗∗ -0.0159∗∗∗ -0.0172∗∗∗
(0.00645) (0.00520) (0.00482) (0.00499) (0.00614)
εCP -1.00
∗∗∗ -0.79∗∗∗ -0.70∗∗∗ -0.66∗∗∗ -0.72∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.22) (0.20) (0.21) (0.26)
Controls (18) Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE’s (10) Y Y Y Y Y
Mun FE’s (45) Y Y Y Y Y
First stage F-statistic 30.96 25.74 22.00 16.18 10.85
# Parking-districts 493 493 493 493 493
# Households 98,659 98,659 98,659 98,659 98,659
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of cars per household. Parking costs are standardised, so
the marginal effects represent a one standard deviation increase. Standard errors are in parenthesis
and are clustered at the parking-district level. All models are estimated using 2SLS. Kleibergen-Paap
First stage F-statistic is presented. The change in average car ownership, ∆E[C], from a e100 increase
in parking costs is estimated directly as the marginal effect of parking costs on car ownership. See
Appendix 2 for calculation of εCP , the implied price elasticity of car ownership, standard errors are
calculated using the delta method. Stars denote * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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3.B.1 Counterfactuals
We provide additional calculations for the welfare effects presented in Section 3.4.4.
Given the constant-elasticity inverse demand function:
D(Q) = P ′ = Pc(Q/Qc)
1
ε ,
we can calculate the new level of car ownership, Q′ as:
Q′ =
P ′εQc
P εc
.
In the counterfactual scenario where parking policy changes (Section 3.4.4.1), the new
price, P ′ = 9708, the current price, Pc = 6608, and the current average car ownership
level in the city centre is Qc = 0.750. Therefore Q′ = 0.573. Using these quantities and
prices we can calculate the welfare effects in the car market as:
∆W =
∫ Qc
Q′
(S(Q)−D(Q))dQ =
∫ Qc
Q′
P ′dQ−
∫ Qc
Q′
Pc
(
Q
Qc
) 1
ε
dQ.
Plugging in the prices and quantities indicates a welfare gain (equivalent to the dead-
weight loss) of around e300:
∆W =
∫ 0.750
0.573
9708dQ−
∫ 0.750
0.573
6608
(
Q
0.75
) 1
−0.7
dQ ≈ 1718− 1414 ≈ 304.
In Section 3.4.4.2, there is a downward shift of the supply curve as parking costs
decline and therefore the change in welfare in the car market is calculated as: ∆W =∫ Q′
Qc
(D(Q)− S(Q))dQ.
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Table 3.B.7: Implications of AVs (cont.)
Amsterdam Rotterdam The Hague Utrecht Overall
Car ownership, C
Centre 0.75 0.89 1.01 0.93 0.90
Urban ring 0.90 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.03
Periphery 1.24 1.28 1.26 1.30 1.27
Scenario A: Private AV
∆ Parking cost (e/yr)
Centre 1255 350 631 316 638
Urban ring 706 646 213 30 399
Periphery 0 0 0 0 0
∆ Car demand, C
Centre 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.07
Urban ring 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.05
Periphery 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆ Car demand (km)
Centre 1549 513 1071 486 952
Urban ring 1060 1108 384 53 685
Periphery 0 0 0 0 0
∆W1 (e/yr)
Centre 566 249 597 229 421
Urban ring 455 605 183 0 310
Periphery 0 0 0 0 0
∆W2 (e/yr)
Centre 75 7 26 6 23
Urban ring 29 28 3 0 11
Periphery 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario B: Shared AV
∆ Parking cost (e/yr)
Centre 1609 826 953 771 1023
Urban ring 1060 1122 535 420 792
Periphery 354 476 322 455 395
∆ Car demand, C
Centre 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.13
Urban ring 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.11
Periphery 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07
∆ Car demand (km)
Centre 2103 1307 1705 1277 1628
Urban ring 1686 2078 1016 793 1452
Periphery 791 1094 731 1062 903
∆W1 (e/yr)
Centre 832 673 922 652 768
Urban ring 774 1105 525 410 715
Periphery 439 609 406 592 502
∆W2 (e/yr)
Centre 130 42 63 38 64
Urban ring 69 90 21 13 44
Periphery 11 20 9 19 14
Notes: All units are household averages except parking costs, which are per car. As in Table 3.5, we
define the ‘centre’ as < 2 km radius from the city centre, the ‘urban ring’ is between 2 and 5 km and
the ‘periphery’ > 5 km.
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Smartphone usage and road safety
4.1 Introduction
Traffic accidents are an important loss to society. In the European Union (EU), for ex-
ample, about 25,000 road users lost their lives due to traffic accidents in 2018. For ev-
ery death on European roads, there are an additional 50 injuries of which 8 are severe
and 4 cause permanent disability (European Commission, 2019b). Next to this physi-
cal harm, accidents also cause psychological suffering to those directly involved and
to friends and relatives of the victims. Traffic accidents also lead to monetary losses
due to damages to private and public property and are a major cause of traffic con-
gestion. The total costs of traffic accidents in the EU are estimated to be about e280
billion, or 2% of GDP, which makes it the most important external cost of transporta-
tion (European Commission, 2019a). Similar numbers can be found for the United
States and other countries (Blincoe et al., 2015).
These high costs explain the vast body of scientific literature on traffic accidents that
This chapter is based on Brands et al. (2020). The authors would like to thank Jos van Ommeren,
Erik Verhoef, Hans Koster, Paul Koster, Niels Bos, Jiska Klein, Dan Graham, Csaba Pogonyi, Laila
Ait Bihi Ouali, Niek Mouter, Hendrik Wolff and conference and seminar participants in Amster-
dam (VU), Paris (ITEA), London (Imperial College), Budapest (hEART), Toulouse (SBCA), Jakarta
(Universitas Indonesia), and virtually (EEA and UEA). We would also like to thank Rijkswaterstaat
Netherlands for granting access to the data.
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Figure 4.1: Road fatalities in the EU and 2020 policy target (European Commission, 2019b)
exists today, including important contributions from the field of economics on related
topics such as the risk of drunk driving (Levitt and Porter, 2001a), the size of the ac-
cident externality caused by one typical additional driver (Edlin and Karaca-Mandic,
2006), and the effect of mandatory seatbelt laws on traffic fatalities (Cohen and Einav,
2003).96 The substantial costs of accidents also provide governments with a strong ra-
tionale to prioritise safety in road design, and in traffic and vehicle-related regulation.
Safety concerns in this respect largely shape policy decisions on aspects such as speed
limits, road geometry, obligatory usage of seatbelts, and factors that affect the ability
of road users to maintain attention on the driving task. This includes prohibiting
the use of alcohol and cell phones by drivers. Figure 4.1 indicates that stricter safety
regulations over the past two decades have had a promising impact on the number
of road fatalities in the EU. However, progress in terms of reductions in road fatali-
ties, as compared to the EU policy target formulated by the European Commission,
began to diverge and stagnate in 2013, even after accounting for vehicle kilometres
travelled.97
Despite regulations that forbid car drivers from using mobile phones while driving,
effective regulation has proved to be difficult, and technological progress in recent
years has transformed cell phones into omnipresent devices that can be seen as a
major cause of distraction in traffic. Smartphones stand out as a major culprit, as they
have enabled various novel distractions, including sending and receiving messages
via numerous applications, news updates, video calling, and receiving notifications
from social media platforms. In experimental settings, this has been shown to cause
96Other notable contributions include: Levitt and Porter (2001b), Adams and Cotti (2008), Jacobsen
(2011), and DeAngelo and Hansen (2014).
97Data on vehicle kilometres travelled for all EU countries does not span back until 2000, so we plot
fatality rates per million passenger-km for four major EU countries in Figure 4.A.1 of Appendix A,
which shows a similar trend.
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visual, cognitive, and physical distractions which result in longer reaction times, less
awareness, and various other deficiencies which restrict full control of the vehicle
(Zhao et al., 2013, Young et al., 2014, Haque and Washington, 2015).
Findings from the lab are generally corroborated by observational studies in natu-
ralistic settings and crash-based studies (see e.g. Dingus et al., 2016, Redelmeier and
Tibshirani, 1997, and McEvoy et al., 2005). However, various studies using field data
fail to conclusively prove this relation.98 In the first large scale field study of its kind,
Bhargava and Pathania (2013) estimate the effect of mobile calls on accidents using
a discontinuity in the price scheme at 9 pm between 2002 and 2005. They find a 7.2
percent increase in call likelihood after the price drop but no corresponding increase
in the number of accidents at the 9 pm threshold. Further research on the effect of
statewide mobile phone bans in the US indicates that the effects are short-lived, if
detectable at all (Abouk and Adams, 2013; Burger et al., 2014).
The most recent studies that focus on smartphones find more conclusive negative
safety effects. Hersh et al. (2019) exploit temporal variation in 3G coverage in Cal-
ifornia between 2001 and 2013 to study the effect of gaining access to mobile data
on vehicle accidents. After controlling for vehicle kilometres travelled and road seg-
ment fixed effects, the authors find that crash rates increase by 1.1 percentage points
when roads receive 3G coverage. Furthermore, Faccio and McConnell (2020) find
that locations with a lot of activity of Pokémon Go (a popular video game app on
the smartphone at the time) faced more vehicle accidents after the introduction of the
game, suggesting that 136 of the total 2850 nation wide crashes (approximately 5%)
in the five months after the introduction of the game could be attributed to it.
Although numerous studies have investigated the link between phone use and acci-
dents, a substantial research gap prevails.99 Most existing estimates are dated, while
mobile phone use has dramatically changed since the turn of the century in terms of
adoption, exposure and capabilities.100 For example, in the much-cited study by Re-
delmeier and Tibshirani (1997), only 18% of drivers owned mobile phones which had
limited capabilities, while in more recent studies, Bhargava and Pathania (2013) only
focus on mobile calling and Hersh et al. (2019) end their study in 2013. Furthermore,
studies that do address the interaction between modern smartphones, with data us-
age, and accidents, either focus on very specific non-generalisable phone-use (Poké-
mon Go in Faccio and McConnell, 2020), or only focus on highways (Hersh et al.,
98Drivers may also be able to navigate streets more easily using navigation applications, hence the
effect of phone use on traffic accidents is not per se negative.
99See e.g. reviews by WHO (2011), Oviedo-Trespalacios et al., 2016, and Lipovac et al. (2017).
100Mobile phone subscriptions per capita have been above one in the world since 2016 (World Bank,
2019) and in 2018 smartphone penetration was above 70% in many developed nations (Newzoo,
2018).
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2019). In addition, most studies do not account for unobserved factors that may be
correlated to both phone use and accident likelihood, such as risk preferences at the
individual level and demand factors at the aggregate level. Finally, as sample sizes
were often small in experimental and crash-based studies, generalisation to aggregate
effects is often problematic. Therefore, an important and ongoing research question is
to what extent does smartphone use while driving affect the number and likelihood
of traffic accidents.
We propose a novel approach based on field data and a natural experiment induced
by a change in EU roaming regulations. The specific policy, imposed in June 2017,
mandated mobile phone operators to abolish all roaming surcharges for EU cus-
tomers travelling outside their home country network within the EU. The policy,
dubbed Roam Like at Home (RLAH), implied that people travelling abroad within the
EU now face their home fee, which is substantially lower than pre-policy charges. As
a consequence, growth in roaming cellular traffic increased sharply after the policy.
Mobile data use while roaming grew by over 200 percentage points, whereas local us-
age was not affected by the policy and faced stable growth rates.101 We hypothesise
that, as of June 2017, EU citizens driving abroad are more likely to be distracted by
their phone, while nothing changed for local usage.
We use microdata on all police-reported road accidents in the Netherlands from 2014
until 2018. We then use vehicle registration information to classify which (foreign)
drivers are plausibly treated by the RLAH policy. The causal effect of phone use
on road accidents is then estimated using a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach,
where we use the RLAH policy as treatment, and local users as control group. This
allows us to overcome endogeneity issues from earlier studies due to measurement
error in phone use and omitted variables. Our key identification assumption is that
in the absence of the policy, the number of vehicle accidents by roaming users should
follow similar trends to local drivers, for which we provide evidence in our parallel
trends plot.
Our findings imply that the increase in phone use due to the policy causes the number
of accidents to increase by around 10%. Under plausible assumptions, this implies a
crash risk odds ratio of around 3.8. Under the assumption that this mechanism also
carries over to local drivers and holds for other EU countries, our results then imply
that each year as many as 2,500 road fatalities in the EU can be attributed to phone
use. This suggests that about one-third of the gap between the EU target and the
observed number of fatalities shown in Figure 4.1 could be reduced by successfully
banning mobile phone use of drivers.
101Growth rates have been calculated using information from the International Roaming BEREC Bench-
mark Data Reports (for roaming) and the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (for locals).
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This study contributes to the existing literature in five ways. First, our results pro-
vide a causal estimate of phone use on road safety based on a novel method. Sec-
ond, because our identifying variation comes from a very recent policy intervention,
our estimates take into account modern distractions of smartphones, and particularly
changes in mobile data use. Third, because our analysis is based on revealed and non-
experimental field data of all registered accidents in the Netherlands, we are able to
estimate an aggregate effect. This is especially relevant given the urgency of road
safety issues and the rapid growth in cellular traffic. Fourth, with our approach, we
can estimate how smartphone distractions affect accidents for different severity levels
and on different road types. We show that phone distractions increase accident risk
predominantly on local urban roads, which highlights that studies focusing solely on
highways underestimate the total effect. In addition, our results indicate that both
light accidents, as well as fatal accidents, increase due to smartphone use. Fifth, we
introduce an identification strategy that is directly applicable to all other countries
in the European Union, allowing for convenient cross-validation of our results using
data from other countries in future research.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.3 describes the policy context,
Section 4.4 explains the methods employed, and Section 4.2 presents the data we use.
Section 4.5 discusses our results, robustness checks, and implications. Finally, Section
4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data and context
4.2.1 Road safety data
We observe police reported accidents in the Netherlands as published by the Dutch
Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (specifically ‘Rijkswaterstaat’).
The maps in Figure 4.2 plot the locations and annual counts of vehicles involved
in accidents per province. The maps highlight that accidents are spread across the
country, but more concentrated around urban areas and highways.
Our data contains characteristics of road accidents and of the parties involved.102 For
each accident, we observe accident circumstances, such as day of the week, time of
the day, road type, weather conditions, and road surface conditions. Furthermore,
the dataset contains vehicle related characteristics, such as vehicle type, vehicle ma-
102We use the full dataset available to researchers as we require privacy sensitive information on vehicle
registration nationality. A publicly available version of the data is available on data.overheid.
nl, but does not contain all party characteristics.
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(a) Accident locations. (b) Vehicles in accidents per year per province.
Figure 4.2: Maps of the Netherlands with accident locations and counts per province.
noeuvre just before the crash, sex and age of the driver, and the country in which the
vehicle is registered.103 Finally, party related variables are also reported and provide
information such as age and sex of involved parties, casualty severity and whether
the casualty was a driver, passenger, cyclist, or pedestrian.
We directly observe the vehicles’ country of registration. Drivers of cars registered in
EU countries, but outside of the Netherlands are likely to reside in those EU coun-
tries. Therefore, vehicle registration is a good proxy of whether the driver incurs
roaming costs (before RLAH) or uses the local network instead.104 To abstract from
long term trends, we use data for the years 2014 until 2018, which contains 0.76 mil-
lion vehicles involved in 0.44 million accidents. Most accidents have more than one
103For our particular application we cannot use most of these characteristics as they are often missing
for non-local cars. This is because these data stem from the car registry in the Netherlands, which is
not connected to databases from other countries. The data does not contain information on whether
a car is rented or leased.
104Dutch law requires that any vehicle staying in the Netherlands for more than six months must ob-
tain a Dutch licence plate. Note that, due to our difference-in-difference method, misclassification
can pose a problem for the efficiency of our estimator, but will not bias our estimates under the
plausible assumption that misclassification is not correlated to the roaming regulation.
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Figure 4.3: Number vehicles involved in accidents per month by severity.
vehicle involved (78%), therefore we use information at the party level to avoid mea-
surement error which may be present at the accident level, as police reports do not
indicate which party was at fault. We discuss this issue and how we deal with it in
more detail in Section 4.4.2.
4.2.1.1 Trends in road safety
Figure 4.3 shows that there appears to be an increase in the number of vehicles in-
volved in accidents over all levels of severity. Over the period of study, our data
shows that the annual number of deadly accidents increased by around 20%, while
the number of accidents involving injury and material damage increased by about
50%, with most of the change between 2014 and 2016. In an average month there are
around 74 vehicles involved in deadly accidents, 2,381 vehicle accidents involving
injury and 10,280 vehicle accidents involving material damage.105
105We also checked whether the number of vehicles per accident is stable over time, which turns out to
be the case, both for accidents with only locals as well as accidents with at least one roaming user
involved.
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4.2.1.2 Grouping roaming drivers
We combine observations in our sample into six country groups for our main analysis.
The aim of this grouping is to strike a balance between, on the one hand, optimally
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity per country of origin (by means of group
fixed effects), and on the other hand, preserving statistical power by avoiding zero
counts (which are omitted due to the log transformation of the dependent variable,
see Section 4.4 for a discussion).
The first group contains vehicles with a Dutch registration and is our control group
(95.12% of sample). Second and third, are the two adjacent countries, with 1.76% of
German vehicles and 1.04% of Belgian vehicles, respectively. The fourth group con-
tains other western European countries, which account for 0.42% of vehicles in acci-
dents. Drivers from these countries often visit the Netherlands as tourists.106 The fifth
group contains Romanian, Polish, and Bulgarian vehicles (1.32%) which are relatively
common on Dutch roads due to joint economic activity and labour migration. More
than for other cases, drivers from these labour migration countries may have a Dutch
phone subscription and thus might not be treated by the RLAH policy. Therefore, it
is important to include a separate fixed effect for vehicles from these countries. It also
allows us to run a robustness check where we exclude vehicles from these countries,
which highlights that vehicles from these countries do not drive our overall results
(see Section 4.5.3.1). The sixth group contains all remaining EU countries (0.33%).
4.2.2 Descriptive statistics
4.2.2.1 Vehicles involved in accidents
Around 5% of vehicles involved in accidents are from roaming users, 46% of drivers
are female and the average age is 42 years old. Of the total number of accidents, 0.58%
are deadly, 18.7% result in injury, and 80.72% cause material damage only.107
Local and roaming drivers involved in accidents are roughly comparable, but roam-
ing users tend to be younger, male, and drive more on fast roads than local drivers.108
In terms of the damage reported, the share of material damage is relatively large for
106These are: France, Great-Britain, Denmark, Spain, Austria, Portugal, Luxembourg, Sweden, Italy,
Ireland, Norway, and Finland.
107Table 4.A.1 in Appendix A presents the descriptive statistics for vehicles involved in accidents.
108Table 4.A.2 in Appendix A provides more detailed descriptives of vehicles involved in accidents by
group.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for province-month data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Locals
Vehicles in accidents 720 953.11 757.40 84 3,297
log(Vehicles in accidents) 720 6.52 0.86 4.43 8.10
No trucks 720 189.13 133.80 26 564
Single vehicle accidents (SV) 720 742.60 590.43 72 2,503
Hotel Nights (× 1000) 720 148.99 118.92 11 565
Panel B: Roamers
Vehicles in accidents 3,600 9.78 13.41 0 92
log(Vehicles in accidents) 3,032 1.79 1.19 0.00 4.52
No trucks 3,600 1.68 2.53 0 20
Single vehicle accidents (SV) 3,600 6.16 9.54 0 71
Hotel Nights (× 1000) 3,600 22.21 72.31 0 707
roaming vehicles. This may be a reporting bias, as language barriers can make it
more likely for the police to be called in these situations with only material damage,
whereas locals may more easily settle without police present. Importantly, dissimi-
larities between local and roaming drivers do not threaten our identification under
the plausible assumption that the RLAH policy does not induce sorting.109 Dissim-
ilarities become more relevant when generalizing estimated effects to the untreated
population. We discuss the assumptions required to attribute the estimated effect to
all drivers in Section 4.5.4.
4.2.2.2 Distribution of accidents
Our dependent variable is the number of vehicles involved in accidents, aggregated
by province, month and country group. Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for
various subsets. Naturally, the mean of the count of vehicles involved in accidents is
in levels much larger for locals than for roaming users. In logs, however, the figures
are more comparable and the standard deviation is in the same ballpark. Further
we find that after controlling for the different mean levels —as we do by including
109Figure 4.A.3 in Appendix A shows that the age distribution of roaming users does not change con-
siderably after the policy was implemented. We note, however, that even if we find a policy-
induced sorting in the distribution of drivers in accidents, this does not necessarily bias our esti-
mates, as it may be a result of the policy e.g. younger drivers may be more likely to use their phone
and therefore be more represented in accidents, while the distribution of age groups in kilometres
travelled may be the same.
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Figure 4.4: Histograms of vehicles per month per province.
country fixed effects—the treated and control appear to have similar distributions
(discussed below).
Figure 4.4 shows histograms of the dependent variable after log transformation and
after demeaning for fixed effects. Panels (a)–(c) indicate that these empirical distribu-
tions are left-skewed, as to be expected from count data. Similarly, panels (d)–(f) show
that after taking logs of these counts, distributions still seem to be slightly skewed to
the left. However, if we demean by our panel and time fixed effects, as in panels
(g)–(i), distributions seem quite symmetric, albeit with a larger variance for roam-
ing compared to local users. This is non-problematic, however, when using standard
errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Figure 4.5: Trends in hotel nights and vehicle kilometers
4.2.2.3 Hotel nights data as proxy for traffic intensity
An important concern with our approach may be that country specific trends in traffic
intensity, or vehicle kilometres travelled (VKT), might drive our results. For example,
an increase in tourism over time may result in relatively more VKT by roaming users
and therefore increase the likelihood of a roaming accident after the introduction of
RLAH. We do not observe VKT for each drivers’ country at the required level of
temporal (monthly) and spatial (province) disaggregation. Instead, we use overnight
stays in hotels, obtained from Statistics Netherlands (2019a), to proxy for changes
in tourism and thereby monthly traffic intensity. For each province, we observe the
number of overnight stays per month, disaggregated into guests’ country of origin.
We assess the quality of this proxy in two ways.
First, we observe country wide VKT at the annual level for locals and non-locals.
Figure 4.5 shows annual growth rates of hotel nights and VKT for local and roaming
(non-local) drivers. The figure highlights that over the course of the five years prior to
the treatment, VKT by roaming drivers grew more compared to local VKT. However,
a similar, yet even stronger trend is visible for hotel nights. Even when we exclude
the province containing Amsterdam, an obvious hot spot of growth in hotel nights,
we see a similar pattern. This suggests that we can capture trends in VKT with ho-
tel nights, albeit potentially overestimating changes in VKT as it increases relatively
less.
Second, we analyse how traffic intensity and the number of vehicles involved in acci-
dents are related to hotel nights for Dutch drivers, for which we observe traffic inten-
sities on highways at the province-month level (Statistics Netherlands, 2019b). Table
4.A.5 in Appendix A shows that, after controlling for time and panel (in this case sim-
ply province) fixed effects, there is no statistically significant effect of hotel nights for
Dutch nationals with respect to traffic intensity, or number of vehicles involved in ac-
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cidents. Importantly however, we do find a statistically significant and robust effect
for the case of roaming drivers and the number of vehicles involved in accidents. This
suggests that hotel nights are a good proxy for country specific changes in VKT from
tourism and business related trips. Furthermore, the R2 in column (2) is 0.99, which
indicates that almost all of the variation in the traffic intensity can be explained by our
fixed effects, suggesting that group specific changes in traffic intensity are unlikely to
effect our estimates.110
4.3 The Roam Like at Home Policy
On 27 October 2015, the European Parliament adopted regulation No. 2015/2120
which prescribed that all roaming surcharges should be abolished within the EU.111
Following a decade of EU roaming regulations which aimed to gradually reduce
roaming fees within the EEA, the Roam Like at Home (RLAH) policy meant that, effec-
tive 15 June 2017, telecommunication network providers were required to abolish all
roaming surcharges in addition to domestic retail prices for EU roaming customers.
The policy dramatically reduced the costs of phone use abroad, both compared to the
gradual reductions prior to RLAH and compared to the pre-RLAH prices (BEREC,
2019). For example, leading mobile operators such as Vodafone Germany, offered
daily roaming packages such as EasyTravel in early May of 2017 providing “phone
calls, texting and surfing abroad [within the EU] just like at home” for a price ofe2.99
per day. This equates to arounde90 per month and is over four times more than stan-
dard domestic packages offering calls, texts and data at the time (Vodafone, 2017).112
The special Eurobarameter (2018) survey, carried out one year after RLAH, suggests
that awareness of RLAH was already high with 62% of Europeans that travelled in
the previous 12 months being aware that roaming charges had been eliminated, and
only 19% of travellers claiming to never use mobile data (down from 42%). Neverthe-
less, around 50% of the respondents still claim to restrictively use mobile data while
abroad, suggesting that EU roaming users still use their mobile phones comparatively
less than locals.
110Note that we find a borderline significant (significant only at the 10% level) negative estimate for
hotel nights of locals in column (8). This might be an indication that drivers who are staying in a
hotel, are driving more safely because they are unfamiliar with the area. This would be in line with
findings in observational studies. Another possible explanation could come from region specific
holidays that vary in timing between years for given regions, and between regions for given years.
111Roaming refers to mobile phones connecting to a cellular network abroad. In the absence of regula-
tion, mobile network operators generally charge additional fees for using this service.
112Regulated wholesale data rates were capped at e0.05 per MB or e50 per GB, so using data outside
of a data bundle may have been restrictively expensive.
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To evaluate the effect of RLAH, we collect data on mobile phone usage of roaming
users in the EU from the International Roaming BEREC Benchmark Data Reports
and local usage from the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM).113
Figure 4.6 plots the average monthly data traffic in MB’s per roaming user for each
quarter between 2012 and 2018, with the shaded region representing when RLAH
was active.114 It indicates that since RLAH was introduced, roaming usage appears to
catch up with developments in local cellular data traffic. Roaming usage is still about
four times lower than local usage after the policy, but this is a result of the relatively
short period of time European tourists spend outside their country of residence (e.g.
the average trip duration was about 8.4 nights in 2017 (Eurostat, 2019)). It also shows
that cellular roaming traffic exhibits a strong upward growth trend for both groups
and demonstrates a high degree of seasonal variation for roaming users. This is not
surprising as technological advancements (e.g. introduction of 4G-network) and the
increased adoption of smartphones has resulted in higher speeds, lower prices, and
more demand, while tourism, and therefore roaming usage, tends to be seasonal. It
is therefore useful, when comparing the annual growth rates of cellular traffic, to
compare each quarter with the same quarter in the previous year.
Figure 4.7 illustrates that the RLAH policy resulted in a very large increase in the
growth rate of phone use of roaming users one year after the policy while having no
discernible effect on locals. Table 4.A.4 in Appendix A documents the average annual
growth rate before and after the policy for roaming users as compared to locals. It
indicates a substantial increase in the growth rate of roaming data usage by 200 per-
centage points, while texts and calls also increased by around 20 to 80 percentage
points, relative to locals.115 This further demonstrates that the policy had large effects
on the overall phone use of roaming users, while especially effecting data usage.
113BEREC only includes information on the number of active roaming users, referred to as roaming
subscribers in the BEREC reports, since the second quarter of 2016. BEREC considers a subscriber
to be a roaming subscriber if roaming services were active at least once in the concerned period.
In order to calculate the average monthly usage before this period, we predict the number of sub-
scribers using a log-linear model with a time trend and quarter dummies. Using total data usage
gives almost identical results (available from BEREC upon request). We document this in Appendix
1.
114Note that the second quarter of 2017 already contains 15 days during which the policy was active,
namely the second half of June. Furthermore anticipating RLAH, several large network providers
dropped roaming charges earlier in the year, such as Vodaphone UK in April (CNET, 2017).
115RLAH was not the only roaming policy introduced during the period of study. Other regulations,
notably price caps, also resulted in moderate growth in roaming usage, which may explain the
increased growth in data around the end of 2014 (BEREC, 2016).
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Figure 4.6: Average monthly data traffic per quarter.
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Figure 4.7: Annual growth rates in cellular data traffic per quarter.
4.4 Empirical methods
Our aim is to estimate how smartphone usage affects road safety. Because data on
smartphone usage of drivers is privacy sensitive and not made available for research
purposes, we use the implementation of the RLAH policy as a source of exogenous
variation. We hypothesise that a substantial reduction in phone usage fees induces
more phone use while driving, which in turn leads to an increase in accidents due to
driver distraction. Unique for the RLAH price change, and essential for our identifi-
cation strategy, is that fees for domestic phone use (i.e. within the home country) are
not affected by the policy. This allows us to define a control group, in our case drivers
with a Dutch phone subscription, and a treatment group, drivers with a phone sub-
scription from any other EU country. As a consequence, we can employ a difference-
in-differences (DiD) approach to estimate the effect of the policy-induced increase
in phone use on road safety. Below, we first introduce the general statistical model
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and subsequently discuss how we deal with the statistical challenges that arise in our
setting.
4.4.1 Statistical model
We use a standard DiD approach, where we estimate how the RLAH policy affects
the number of vehicles involved in road accidents. We define Vit as the number of
vehicles involved in accidents for each country-group in each province, indexed by i,
at time t.116 Countries are grouped to strike a balance between optimally controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity per country of origin, and preserving statistical power
by avoiding zero counts (see Section 4.2.1.2 for more details). We consider the general
following model:
log(V )it = βTit + γHit + δWit + φi + κt + εit, (4.1)
where log denotes the natural logarithm. The treatment effect, denoted by Tit, is a
dummy equal to one after the policy was introduced for vehicles from roaming coun-
tries. We proxy for traffic intensity using vector Hit, which contains separate control
variables, in logs, for the number of hotel nights of locals and roaming users, and a
dummy in case we observe a zero.117 Further, vector Wit contains weather controls,
that we include to improve the efficiency of the estimator.118
Finally, we include panel and time fixed effects. Time-invariant characteristics of
drivers and the area in which they drive, such as the road network, attractiveness
to tourists, and number of car users, are captured by a country-group province fixed
effect, φi, which represents the panel element in our analysis. We also control for
any unobserved time trends affecting all drivers, for instance due to road mainte-
nance or infrastructure improvements, by including a time fixed effect, κt, for each
year-month.
We note that using a smartphone was rather costly for roaming users before the pol-
116Because we essentially have a count model, our temporal and spatial resolutions are arbitrary. We
aim for the most fine-grained resolution to maximally use variation over time and space. We are
in this respect, constrained by the resolution of the essential control variables. We aggregate at the
province-month level because this is the most fine-grained resolution for which we can control for
country-specific VKT.
117We obtain hotel nights per province per country of origin from Statistics Netherlands (2019a), which
is measured in thousands. In case of a zero, which we only observe for roaming countries, we set
the value to one (so that the log is zero) and use a dummy to control for these cases separately. This
means that we correct for any bias due to inflation at when a zero is reported.
118These include for each province and month the average temperature, average rainfall, and number
of days with temperatures below 0 °C.
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icy. It might therefore be useful to assume that before the policy roaming drivers
did not use their phone at all while driving. However, if roaming users did use their
phones while driving prior to new roaming regulations, we still accurately estimate
the effect of the price drop, but underestimate the total effect of phone use. Our es-
timates should therefore be considered as a lower bound of the total effect of smart-
phone distractions on road accidents.
4.4.2 Measurement error
Measurement error poses a statistical challenge in our setting, because we do not
directly observe within-vehicle phone use, nor the type of phone subscription drivers
have. Below, we identify three implications of this challenge and discuss how we deal
with them.
First, for multi-vehicle accidents, we cannot identify which driver caused the acci-
dent, if any at all. This means that we have measurement error in the dependent
variable, which makes our estimates potentially imprecise, albeit still unbiased if
the measurement error is random. We address this issue by focussing on vehicles
rather than accidents because multi-vehicle accidents might include both treated and
control-group drivers. In addition, we also perform a robustness check where we
consider a subsample with single-vehicle accidents (e.g. a car crashing into a tree).
This approach rules out measurement error of this sort but comes at the cost of hav-
ing less statistical power, as only a small fraction of the accidents in the data are
single-vehicle accidents (17.58%). As it is a priori not possible to decide which is the
preferred approach, we report results for both estimation strategies.119
Second, some drivers of vehicles that are registered abroad might still have a Dutch
phone subscription. For instance, drivers that live in bordering regions in Belgium
or Germany and often work in the Netherlands. These drivers will be erroneously
classified as treated, and will bias our estimates downwards.120 To address this issue,
we will run a robustness check where we exclude all border provinces, as it is likely
119Another related issue which is solved by taking single-vehicle accidents is that roaming accidents
may result in more multi-vehicle accidents. This would violate the SUTVA, but it is unlikely to
be problematic in this setting due to the size of the control group; around 95% of vehicles in our
accidents sample are part of the control group. Also, we also checked whether the number of
vehicles per accidents changes over time, which is not the case, both for accidents with only locals
as well as accidents with at least one roaming user involved.
120Additionally, some roaming users might be driving a Dutch car, for instance, a rental car, and will
hence be erroneously designated as untreated. This may lead to a small downward bias, how-
ever, due to a large number of accidents in the control group (local users) it is unlikely to have a
substantial effect.
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that this measurement problem is most pronounced in those regions.
Third, some roaming users may not have to pay smartphone charges themselves.
One can think of unlimited subscriptions paid by drivers’ employers or having a
Dutch subscription while living just across the border. This insensitivity to the price
would also result in a downward bias of the estimate. We address this concern in
two ways. Firstly, we re-estimate our main model on a sub-sample where we exclude
trucks and vans, assuming that drivers of these vehicles are most likely to have such
arrangements with their employer, and secondly, on a sub-sample without bordering
countries or typical labour migration countries.
4.4.3 Trends in vehicle kilometres travelled
A potential confounding factor is vehicle kilometres travelled (VKT) by roaming
drivers. For instance, because countries and provinces vary in their popularity as a
holiday destination over time (Taylor and Ortiz, 2009), there may be more roaming
accidents due to increased tourism rather than due to increased phone distractions.
Another potential reason for temporal variation in VKT by roaming drivers could
come from changes in trade and business trips as a result of ongoing globalisation.
Because these trends affect treated drivers (e.g. tourists) but not local drivers, it
poses a potential threat to our identification strategy and may lead to overstating the
effect of phone distraction on road safety.
Ideally, one would want to directly control for VKT to avoid any bias from traffic
intensity, but this information is not available.121 Instead, we show that the number
of hotel nights per country of origin is a good proxy for both tourism and business-
related traffic (see Section 4.2.2.3 for an extensive discussion on the quality of this
proxy). This implies that, if the relation between traffic and hotel nights is stable
over time, then controlling for hotel nights will absorb a bias that stems from VKT
trends of roaming drivers.122 Nevertheless, we also perform two additional robust-
ness checks. Firstly, we include a roamer-specific linear time trend which captures na-
tionwide trends in accidents of all roaming users combined. This approach then esti-
mates the policy effect conditional on a roaming-user-specific trend in accidents, which
provides a lower bound for the estimated effect. This time trend does, of course, also
absorbs part of the treatment effect, such that this estimation is only useful to assess
121For non-Dutch vehicles, Statistics Netherlands only provides imputed annual figures of VKT for
the whole country. For all traffic combined, there are intensity measures available at the province-
month level. These will be used to validate our VKT proxy (hotel nights).
122This is a reasonable assumption for our five-year study period, but may not hold in the long run
(e.g. if cheap flights and high-speed trains make cars a less attractive mode).
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Figure 4.8: Roaming and local user vehicles in accidents.
Figure 4.9: Graphical representation of common trends in aggregated province-month data.
our estimates’ sensitivity to trends. Secondly, we re-estimate our models using only
two years of observations between July 2016 and July 2018 (i.e. one year before and
one year after the policy), for which it is implausible that there are major trends in
tourism transport modes conditional on hotel nights.
4.4.4 Standard errors
In our setting, the number of observations depends on an arbitrary temporal and spa-
tial resolution. We aggregate vehicle data to province-month observations, to align
the resolution with our control variables. However, if accidents are serially correlated,
ordinary least squares (OLS) standard errors may be too small (Bertrand et al., 2004).
To address this issue, we cluster our standard errors at the time-invariant level of a
province and country-group, which leaves us with 12× 6 = 72 clusters (12 provinces
and 6 country groups). In addition, we run a robustness check where we ignore all
time-series variation and aggregate our data into two periods, one before and one
after the policy. This rules out any autocorrelation in error terms, and the outcome
highlights that our results and standard errors are hardly affected by serial correla-
tion.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Parallel trends
We first examine overall trends of local vehicles (control group) and roaming vehi-
cles (treated group) involved in accidents. Figure 4.8 shows that nationwide accident
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Figure 4.10: Treatment effect per month for full sample (top) and single-vehicles (bottom).
counts for these groups follow similar trends.123 The figure also highlights that these
measures are quite noisy and that no clear jump is observable around the policy in-
troduction in 2017.
For a more rigorous analysis of a common trend, in Figure 4.10 we plot estimates of
a monthly treatment effect, while including all controls and fixed effects as in our
preferred specification in (4.1). Here, the coefficients are estimated using an indica-
tor for whether the province-month count of vehicle accidents are for roaming users,
interacted with year-month dummies.124 The results in Figure 4.10 indicate that no
clear pre-trend exists and that local drivers are a suitable control group for roaming
drivers, conditional on controls and fixed effects. Furthermore, after the policy, there
is a clear positive impact on accidents as indicated by the increased proportion of pos-
itive and statistically significant estimates.125 This pattern is even more pronounced
123In January 2014 there are fewer roaming user accidents, this seems to be a reporting-issue in the data
source. Our robustness check where we focus only on one year before and after the policy indicates
that this issue does not affect our conclusions.
124Specifically, the figure plots the βτ coefficients from estimating:
log(Vit) =
60∑
τ=−41
βτRi,t−τ + γ log(Hit) + φi + κt + εit, (4.2)
where Ri,t−τ is an indicator variable for whether the vehicle count is for roaming users or not, in-
teracted with a year-month dummy, and βτ is the effect of the policy for each year-month t. To be
able to include the seasonality fixed effect κt in this setting, we omit the treated×year-month dum-
mies for the first full year; otherwise perfect multicollinearity emerges. The error bars represent
robust 95% confidence intervals for each monthly point estimate.
12544% of the coefficients are positive and statistically significant post-policy as compared to only 10%
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Table 4.2: Main regression results
log(# Vehicles in Accidents)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment effect 0.124∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.025) (0.030) (0.031)
Roamer × trend 0.003∗∗
(0.001)
log(Hotel nights roamers) 0.298∗∗∗
(0.076)
log(Hotel nights locals) -0.089
(0.063)
Temperature 0.057∗∗∗ -0.005∗ -0.005∗ -0.004∗
(0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Rain 0.061 -0.001 -0.001 0.003
(0.061) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
# Frost days 0.157∗∗∗ 0.025∗ 0.025∗ 0.019
(0.040) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72
Local vehicles 686k 686k 686k 686k 686k
Roaming vehicles 35k 35k 35k 35k 35k
Observations 3,688 3,688 3,688 3,688 3,688
R2 0.729 0.748 0.965 0.965 0.967
Notes: Column (1) is a basic DiD regression which includes a dummy for roaming user, policy and
the interaction between roaming user and policy (denoted treatment effect). Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the province and country-group level. Hotel nights are split into two
orthogonal variables for local and roaming users. An additional dummy is included when hotel nights
were inflated (only occurs for roaming users). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
in the bottom panel of the plot, where we focus specifically on single-vehicle acci-
dents.
4.5.2 Estimation results
Table 4.2 shows the estimation results with incremental levels of controls and fixed
effects. Column (1) shows that with only the minimal DiD controls, we find a sta-
tistically significant effect of over 12%.126 Column (2) shows that overall time trends
pre-policy.
126Here we run the most simple DiD regression, which includes a dummy for the RLAH policy, a
dummy for whether the country group consists of roaming users, and the treatment effect is the
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(captured by year×month fixed effects), and weather controls hardly change the es-
timated treatment effect. In column (3) we add panel fixed effects, where our panel
identifier is a province-country group. This increases the point estimates and low-
ers the standard errors, indicating that these fixed effects improve the efficiency of
the estimator and suggests that accident counts are heterogeneous across provinces
and country-groups. Column (4) shows that the estimated treatment effect declines
significantly when we add a linear roaming-specific monthly time trend. This is po-
tentially a bad control that can also pick up part of the treatment effect, but the results
here imply that any major nationwide trends in accidents of roaming users only par-
tially affect the results.
Our preferred specification is the one used in column (5), in which we include controls
for hotel nights as a proxy for traffic intensity. We find a point estimate of 0.094 with
a standard error of 0.031. This implies that the policy-induced increase in phone use
leads to an increase in the number of vehicles involved in accidents of 9.91%, with
a 95% confidence interval of 3% − 17%. The point estimate declines as compared to
(3) and the hotel nights elasticity of roaming users has the expected sign. It indicates
that a 1% increase in hotel nights for roaming users is associated with an increase of
around 0.3% in the number of vehicles involved in accidents. The hotel nights effect
is insignificant for locals, conditional on our set of fixed effects. This makes sense as
traffic intensity for roaming users is likely to follow seasonal tourist trends while most
local traffic is generated by work commutes and other daily activities. Importantly,
fixed effects already absorb overall trends in VKT, heterogeneity across provinces,
and heterogeneity across vehicle countries. Therefore, the statistical significance of
the hotel nights elasticity, and the fact that the point estimate of the treatment effect
is smaller when we include hotel nights, highlights that we indeed capture country-
specific long term trends in VKT.
4.5.3 Robustness checks
In this section we perform a vast range of robustness checks. Tables with results are
available in Appendix B.
4.5.3.1 Measurement error and endogeneity
One type of measurement error arises because we do not accurately observe which
vehicle potentially caused the accident. Table 4.B.1 in Appendix B shows estimation
interaction between these two dummy variables.
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results using different subsets of accident types and vehicle involvement. Columns
(1–2) show that focusing on different types of accidents yields very similar results. Ex-
cluding trucks and focusing on single-vehicle accidents leads to very similar or only
slightly stronger point estimates. Focusing on single-vehicle accidents may suggest
we reduce measurement error slightly, but again the point estimates are not statisti-
cally different from the main estimate.
As discussed before, our analysis may suffer from measurement error in the treatment
assignment, for instance by having a Dutch phone subscription while still driving a
non-Dutch car or vice versa. It is likely that measurement error is most pronounced
in bordering provinces and for drivers with a close connection to The Netherlands.
This can either be due to proximity (like bordering regions or countries) or due to
strong economic links (e.g. labour migration). If we exclude bordering countries, we
find somewhat larger effects while if we remove bordering provinces or drivers from
labour migration countries, we find only slightly smaller effects. Excluding border
provinces also mitigates potential concerns that border provinces face more VKT due
to the policy, e.g. if people are more likely to go shopping across the border because
phone usage is cheaper. Such an endogenous response might induce sorting and
thereby poses a threat to our identification strategy. These results indicate that our
results do not suffer from a severe downward bias from measurement error.
4.5.3.2 Accounting for VKT trends
So far, we have assumed that country-of-origin specific trends in VKT are
well-captured by our hotel nights proxy. Results from Section 4.2 suggest that this is
a plausible assumption. Nevertheless, to further rule out any issue with long-term
trends in non-local road traffic as a potential confounder, in columns (1–2) of Table
4.B.2, we restrict our sample to one year before and one year after the policy (i.e.
from June 2016 to July 2018). This approach yields an estimate of 6.8% for all vehicles
and 14% for single-vehicle accidents which are very comparable to our main results.
This highlights that long term trends in VKT cannot explain the observed increase in
vehicles involved in accidents.
4.5.3.3 Accounting for auto-correlation in error structure
In our main analysis, we use the number of vehicles involved in accidents per
province per month as the observational unit. If there is strong serial correlation,
then OLS standard errors may be incorrect, even when clustering at a time-invariant
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level as we do (Bertrand et al., 2004). To deal with this issue in the most conservative
way, we re-estimate our main models on data aggregated to pre and post-policy
averages.127 Columns (3–4) in Table 4.B.2 show that the statistical significance is only
slightly lower as compared to our main analysis (the t-statistic = 2.1 as compared
to 3.1 in our preferred specification). This provides strong evidence that serial
correlation does not pose a threat to our statistical inference.
4.5.3.4 Weighting
Our aim is to approximately recover the phone-use effect per driver, rather than at a
province level. This suggests that we should use sample weights for VKT at the in-
dividual level.128 Because these data are not available on the vehicle accident level,
we test the robustness of our results to four weighting schemes that are closely re-
lated to VKT.129 As regions differ in the total number of roaming drivers involved in
accidents, this also allows assigning higher weights to provinces that tend to have
relatively more roaming drivers and therefore may be more informative. Table 4.B.3
shows that our main results hardly change if we use weights based on 1) roaming ac-
cident numbers, 2) total accident numbers, 3) traffic intensity, and 4) hotel nights. This
suggests that our fixed effects and log-level specification already sufficiently account
for differences in VKT between regions.
4.5.3.5 Accounting for zero counts
In our main analyses, we use a log-linear specification, which performs well with
a sufficient number of accidents. However, during some months, for some country-
groups, we observe few or even zero vehicles in accidents (14.02% pre and 4.95% post
policy). These cases are naturally excluded from our log-linear regressions. However,
they might be less likely to occur after the policy due to policy-induced phone dis-
tractions. As a consequence, our estimations might suffer from a slight downward
bias by excluding more zero counts before than after the RLAH policy introduction
127After aggregating, the data represents the log number of vehicles, hotel nights, and weather condi-
tions, by country group and province, for an average month in the pre and post data.
128Note however that weighting might lead to erroneously small standard errors when there is clus-
tering in the disturbances (Solon et al., 2015). Therefore, as the latter is likely to be the case in our
setting, we are cautious with weights and report the more conservative estimates (without weight-
ing) as main results.
129Note that for accident numbers we use the time-invariant pre-policy number of roaming and total
accidents.
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for treated vehicles. To test if such a bias exists, we re-estimate our main specifica-
tion as in (4.1) using a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood count model. Table 4.B.4
presents the results from this re-estimation, which allows us to include all province-
month observations.130 The coefficients are remarkably similar and in column (5), our
preferred specification with hotel nights, the results indicate that the policy caused
9.4% more accidents and is statistically significant at the 1% level.131
4.5.3.6 Heterogeneous effects
In addition to the average treatment effect that we estimate in our main analysis, we
test for measurable heterogeneity in the effect of phone use, for various subgroups of
drivers and road characteristics.
We first test whether the effect size varies by age group. Table 4.B.5 in Appendix B
suggests that our main effect predominantly applies to drivers in the age group be-
tween 30 and 50. We find statistically insignificant effects for age groups below 30
and above 50. However, as the 95% confidence intervals overlap, we cannot con-
clusively determine that the effects are statistically different, which might be due to
less precision. Lab-based studies also tend to be inconclusive on the performance
differences of distracted driving across age groups. Oviedo-Trespalacios et al. (2016)
synthesise the most recent literature, and find that although “older drivers tend to
engage less in a secondary task like using mobile phones while driving [...], the per-
formance of younger drivers, who are inclined to use a mobile phone while driving,
has been reported to be less affected by mobile phone tasks than older drivers” (p.
369). It is therefore not surprising that many studies report a negligible effect of age
differences.
We also investigate the treatment effect on different road types. Phone distractions
may disproportionately impact the likelihood of causing an accident in more chal-
lenging road conditions, such as in urban areas and on local roads where drivers
often share the road with other vehicles and modes (e.g. pedestrians and cyclists).
To test this hypothesis, we split the sample into three road types based on the speed
limit. To assure sufficient statistical power, we define the following three road classes
with roughly equal numbers of accidents: below 50 km/h, between 50 km/h and 100
km/h, and above 100 km/h. These groups roughly represent local roads in urban ar-
eas, local roads in rural areas, and highways. Similarly, we test whether our estimates
130This means we have 4,248 province-month observations as compared to 3,688 in column (5) of Table
4.2.
131Column (4) of this specification indicates that it indeed appears that the roamer specific time trend
is a bad control, as could be expected.
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Table 4.3: Estimation results using subsamples of road types and severity.
log(# Vehicles in Accidents)
< 50km/h 50km/h - 100km/h >100km/h Fatal/Injury Material
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment effect 0.098∗∗ 0.050 -0.065 0.115∗∗ 0.083∗∗
(0.038) (0.040) (0.049) (0.054) (0.033)
log(Hotel nights roamers) 0.178∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.078) (0.045) (0.051) (0.075)
log(Hotel nights locals) -0.031 0.004 -0.125 0.214∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗
(0.054) (0.065) (0.116) (0.077) (0.067)
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 72 72 72 70 72
Local vehicles 368k 135k 101k 133k 554k
Roaming vehicles 14k 8k 9k 3k 32k
Observations 3,083 2,796 2,818 2,136 3,636
R2 0.964 0.955 0.934 0.961 0.965
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province and country-group level.∗∗∗,
∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
are different for vehicles involved in more severe accidents (fatal or injury) versus
accidents with only material damage. Results of these estimations are presented in
Table 4.3.
Columns (1–3) indicate that most of the estimated effect comes from local roads, and
we do not find evidence of a reduction in road safety on highways. This suggests
that phone distractions are either more risky on local roads (e.g. due to crossings
and traffic lights), or that drivers use their phone less frequently on highways (e.g.
because it is perceived as more dangerous).132
Finally, columns (4–5) indicate that the main result holds, regardless of accident sever-
ity, suggesting that mobile phone distractions play an important role in accidents with
varying degrees of severity. Our results do not support the hypotheses that phone
distractions predominantly increase accidents with material damage, for instance, if
people mostly use phones in low-speed, low-risk, situations like traffic jams.
132We cannot fully isolate the effect of phone usage from that of increased car navigation, but the fact
that we find only an effect on urban roads may indicate that car navigation does not increase safety
in urbanised areas.
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4.5.4 Implications
Our robustness checks indicate that the effect of phone use generally falls within the
95% confidence interval 3%− 17% of our main estimate. Furthermore, 9.91% is likely
to be a conservative estimate of the total effect of phone use because we only esti-
mate the effect induced by the price drop, while roaming users were likely to use
their phones, albeit infrequently, prior to the policy. In this section, we calculate the
total number of accidents and the relative risk of phone use implied by our main
estimate.
4.5.4.1 Total number of accidents caused by phone use
To calculate the number of accidents associated with phone use, we compare the ob-
served number with a counterfactual situation where all drivers face phone usage
fees equal to the pre-policy roaming charges. In other words, we consider how many
accidents could be avoided if all drivers faced higher phone usage costs and thereby
used their phones less. This is a policy-relevant variable because governments can
directly affect these costs by, for example, imposing more stringent regulation which
increases the costs of being caught using a mobile phone while driving. Importantly,
the RLAH policy abolished additional roaming surcharges, such that after the policy,
roaming and local users face the same phone use costs and accident risk.133
We effectively estimate a local average treatment effect (LATE) of smartphone use
while driving, using the RLAH policy as a shifter. The effect is local because some
roaming drivers may not comply with the new policy in the sense that they may
not increase smartphone usage. If we assume that non-compliance is the same in the
treatment and control group, and that the treatment and control group are sufficiently
comparable, then we can generalise our LATE to an average treatment effect (ATE)
for all road users.
Based on observable driver characteristics, roaming users tend to be younger and
drive on faster roads than local drivers (see discussion in Section 4.2.2). Nevertheless,
our analysis on heterogeneous effects across age groups suggests that differences in
driver age lead to similar results, while highways tend to be safer than local roads
with respect to the accident risk of phone distractions (see Table 4.A.3 in Appendix
133In other words, the RLAH policy caused roaming drivers to ‘catch up’ with local drivers’ smart-
phone usage and the distractions and associated accident risk. There may still be variations across
mobile phone plans and across countries, but these no longer depend on roaming or local use. In
addition, these differences are most likely fairly constant over time in the short run and are more
related to local demand and supply conditions than to the RLAH policy.
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A). Therefore, based on observable characteristics, our estimates may underestimate
the ATE because roaming users are more likely to drive on highways.
One remaining concern might be that unobservable driver characteristics, such as
familiarity with roads and other infrastructure, make roaming and local drivers not
comparable. For instance, if driving on unfamiliar roads increases accidents risk,
then this may be further exacerbated by phone distraction. However, Intini et al.
(2018) find no clear evidence for increased accident risk due to unfamiliarity with the
road network. On the contrary, they find that familiarity is associated with increased
accident risk. More research is required to understand the interaction between driver
distractions and road familiarity, but at this stage there seems to be no clear indication
that our results overestimate the ATE due to road familiarity.
In sum, it seems plausible that our estimate is roughly similar to the ATE. Our results
then imply that phone use causes 13,563 additional accidents annually in the Nether-
lands, of which about 2,536 result in injury and 79 are fatal. Furthermore, if the ATE
is applicable to other EU countries, this would imply that around 2,500 road fatali-
ties in the EU in 2018 may be attributable to phone use.134 As shown in Figure 4.1,
the gap between the EU 2020 target and actual fatalities was 28% (7,044 cases). Our
results then suggest that around one-third of this gap could be closed by successfully
banning mobile phone use while driving.
4.5.4.2 External effect
We do a back-of-the-envelope calculation to determine the share of drivers that got
involved in accidents without being distracted themselves. This can be loosely in-
terpreted as a smartphone-induced increased in the external effect of car use. Let us
assume that in each accident, just one driver was potentially causing the accident due
to phone distraction. Then, out of 764k drivers involved in accidents in our data,
334.89k (43.8%) of them were involved in a crash without contributing to the cause
of the accident themselves. If we focus on local roads—where we find the strongest
effect of distraction—we find a similar figure of 43.9%.
We use these figures to calculate a simple smartphone-induced increase in the ex-
ternal safety effect of car use, expressed in terms of vehicles involved in accidents.
Starting with our main estimate of a 9.91% increase in vehicles involved in accidents
due to phone distractions, we calculate that in all accidents, on average about 4.1%
134This can be calculated by multiplying our main estimate by the total number of fatal vehicle acci-
dents in 2018, so 9.91% × 25,058 = 2,470.
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of vehicles were affected due to distraction of other drivers. Note that this calculation
crucially hinges on the assumption that in each phone-induced accident, only one
driver was distracted. This may seem plausible but may be violated in rare cases.
4.5.4.3 Crash risk odds ratio
We follow Bhargava and Pathania (2013) and translate our estimate for the effect of
the change in mobile phone use, due to the RLAH policy, on the number of vehicles
involved in accidents to the crash risk odds ratio (or ‘relative risk’) which allows us
to compare our results to the existing literature. This requires two key parameters,
the percentage of roaming users that are on their phone while driving or the ‘base-
line prevalence’, and the change in phone use due to the policy, denoted by b and c
respectively.
Observational studies, based on roadside surveys, indicate that average phone use in
the car ranges between 1 − 11% (European Road Safety Observatory, 2015).135 These
field studies do not distinguish between roaming and local drivers. However, there
is a good reason to expect that the baseline prevalence is overestimated for roaming
users because roaming was very costly before RLAH. Therefore we consider a range
of b ∈ [0.01, 0.10], in the sensitivity analysis, but note that lower values are more
likely.
As for the increase in phone use due to the policy, Table 4.A.4 suggests that RLAH
induced an increase in the annual growth rate of mobile data of around 200 percent-
age points, and calls and texts of around 80 and 20 percentage points, respectively.
We assume that aggregate changes in roaming use also apply to drivers visiting the
Netherlands and consider a range of c ∈ [0.5, 2]. It is possible that most of this 200
percentage points increase comes from watching videos and playing songs, which
may not (fully) translate to an equivalent increase in distractions while driving. This
would imply that the lower values in the specified range for c are more relevant and
more applicable to our setting.
Using these parameters, we can calculate a range of possible relative risk factors,
135Based on a naturalistic driving setting between 2012 and 2015, Dingus et al. (2016) observe handheld
cell phone prevalence in the US to be about 6.3%. There is no reason to expect that prevalence is
substantially different in the Netherlands, and therefore, we expect that the findings in European
Road Safety Observatory (2015) capture a meaningful range for our study.
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denoted by RR, implied by our preferred estimate, β̂, using the formulation:
β̂[1× (1− b) +RR× b] = RR× bc− bc. (4.3)
To reflect the uncertainty of these assumptions, Table 4.4 illustrates how our key pa-
rameters influence the implied RR estimates. It indicates that RR is decreasing in the
baseline prevalence and in the change in phone use due to the policy. In other words,
if the policy had a small impact on phone use and roaming drivers used their phone
very little prior to the policy, our estimate implies larger risks associated with phone
use while driving.
That said, we take a conservative estimate for the baseline prevalence of 3% and the
change in phone use due to the policy of 100%. This would imply a relative risk of
phone use of 3.8.136 We consider this to be a conservative estimate as it is unlikely
that roaming drivers used their phones as intensively as local drivers due to the high
pre-policy roaming costs.
Table 4.4: Sensitivity of implied accident risk.
Baseline prevalence, b
∆ phone use due to RLAH, c 1% 2% 3% 5% 10%
50% 17.10 8.90 6.20 4.00 2.30
80% 11.70 6.30 4.40 3.00 1.90
100% 9.80 5.30 3.80 2.60 1.70
150% 7.00 4.00 2.90 2.10 1.50
200% 5.60 3.30 2.50 1.80 1.40
Notes: This table presents the relative accident risk implied by our baseline estimate from column (5)
in Table 4.2. The relative risk is calculated by re-arranging equation (4.3) such that: RR = β̂−β̂b+bc
b(β̂+c)
.
Baseline prevalence reflects the percentage of time roaming drivers spend on the phone while in the
car. An illustration is outlined in the text.
Comparing these estimates to the existing literature suggests that our conservative
estimate of the crash risk associated with modern smartphone usage is similar to
earlier crash-based studies, but are significantly larger than recent field studies.137
This suggests that the crash risks of phone use are slightly lower in magnitude than
those found for positive levels of blood alcohol.138 As mentioned earlier, previous
136Re-arranging terms, we can find RR = β̂−β̂b+bc
b(β̂+c)
. Plugging in b = 0.03 and c = 1 gives: RR = 3.8.
137Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) find a RR of about 4.3, Dingus et al. (2016) find the RR of cell phone
use to be 3.6, and Bhargava and Pathania (2013) do not find any effect. Hersh et al. (2019) do not
calculate the RR, however their main estimate of 1.1% is far lower than our main estimate of 9.91%.
138Levitt and Porter (2001a) finds a crash risk of 7 and 13 for positive levels of blood alcohol and illegal
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research focuses mainly on the effects of calling, or focuses on specific road types
and phone use, however, modern smartphones offer substantially more usability and
potential for distraction, and our findings suggest that these effects are more likely to
be present on local urban roads. Our estimates for the change in mobile phone use
due to the RLAH policy suggest that we mainly pick up an effect from using more
mobile data (increase in the growth rate of about 200 percentage points as compared
to local drivers) which may explain why we find larger implied relative risk estimates
than some earlier field studies.
4.6 Conclusion
In this study, we provide novel evidence on the effect of cell phone use on car acci-
dents. We exploit variation in the cell phone usage fees in the Netherlands following
the Roam Like at Home (RLAH) policy introduced by the European Union (EU) in
2017. This intervention is used as a treatment, and applies to roaming users—non-
Dutch drivers from the EU—, which allows us to employ a difference-in-differences
approach.
We show that the growth rate of mobile calls, texts, and particularly data usage in-
creased substantially after the change in roaming regulations, making roaming phone
use more in line with usage in home countries. While we do not directly observe ac-
tual phone use of drivers, the observed increase in usage is likely to (partly) carry
over to phone use while driving. We estimate that decreased smartphone usage fees
lead to an increase in the number of vehicles involved in accidents of 9.91% (95%
confidence interval 3% − 17%). This is likely to be an underestimate of the total ef-
fect of phone use while driving, as our estimates capture the effect of an increase in
smartphone use, which was not fully absent before the policy.
Under the assumption that the identified mechanism carries over to all EU drivers,
our estimate implies that, in 2018, around 2,500 road fatalities in the EU could be
attributed to phone use. Our results then suggest that around one-third of the gap
between realised safety improvements on roads and the EU 2020 target can be at-
tributed to mobile phone use.139
Our findings indicate that the existing literature may underestimate the risks associ-
ated with modern smartphone usage while driving. Our main result implies a crash
risk odds ratio associated with mobile phone use of around 3.8, which is likely to be
levels respectively.
139In 2018, the EU was 28% away from their 2020 target (see Figure 4.1).
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a conservative estimate. All in all, our results suggest that smartphones are making
roads less safe, and this has important implications for road safety policies.
Our paper provides an estimate of the average effect of smartphone usage on the num-
ber of vehicles involved in traffic accidents, which may conceal considerable differ-
ences between specific groups of drivers. We look into heterogeneous effects by es-
timating models for different sub-samples (e.g. for different age groups, or exclud-
ing trucks). Future research could delve into this further, by estimating propensities
of specific groups of drivers to use their phone while driving. Ride-hailing drivers,
for example, may have a relatively high propensity to be distracted by their phone,
which might be an important factor in explaining the results of Barrios et al. (2020),
who find that ride-hailing services increased the number of traffic accidents in the US.
Such evidence could provide valuable input for related regulation and policies.
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Appendix 4.A Additional descriptives
Table 4.A.1: Descriptive statistics: Vehicles in accidents.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Roaming 764,065 0.046 0.210 0 1
Age 561,136 42.488 15.015 0.000 110.000
Female 764,065 0.455 0.707 0 10
Maximum speed (km) 653,055 63.726 26.823 15.000 130.000
Deadly 764,065 0.006 0.076 0 1
Injury 764,065 0.187 0.390 0 1
Material 764,065 0.807 0.394 0 1
Table 4.A.2: Descriptive statistics by group: Vehicles in accidents.
Variable Roaming Local Diff Tstat
Age 40.903 42.566 -1.663 18.998
Female 0.383 0.459 -0.075 21.007
Maximum speed (km) 74.511 63.200 11.312 -62.898
Deadly 0.006 0.006 -0.000 0.503
Injury 0.088 0.192 -0.103 65.301
Material 0.906 0.802 0.104 -63.736
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Figure 4.A.1: Fatality rates in road accidents over time in major EU countries and the Nether-
lands
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Table 4.A.3: Relative frequencies of road types by severity
Local roads Major roads Highways
Fatal/injury 14.1 % 4.3 % 2.0 %
Material damage 46.8 % 17.9 % 14.8 %
Total 60.9 % 22.2 % 16.9 %
Table 4.A.4: Difference-in-differences in annual growth of phone use.
Annual growth rate (%) ∆ Annual growth rate (p.p.)
Usage User Pre Post Diff DiD
Calls Local 4.29 -2.49 -6.78
Calls Roaming -1.06 71.16 72.21 78.99
Data Local 67.05 83.82 16.76
Data Roaming 68.09 285.89 217.80 201.04
Texts Local -18.24 -1.80 16.45
Texts Roaming -22.01 18.37 40.38 23.93
Notes: Pre-policy refers to the the average annual growth rates of cellular traffic comparing each quar-
ter with the same quarter in the previous year, over three years (Q1 2014 − Q1 2017) prior to the
implementation of RLAH. Post-policy is one year, Q2 2017 − Q1 2018, after RLAH.
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Figure 4.A.2: Age of local and roaming users.
4.A.1 Predicting phone use per subscriber pre-2016
We obtain roaming usage data from the EU Body of European Regulators for Elec-
tronic Communications (BEREC). Their reports include the time series “EEA average
consumption per month per total number of roaming subscribers (in GB)” from the
second quarter of 2016 onwards. Therefore, in order to get a better picture of the long
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Figure 4.A.3: Age of roaming users pre and post policy.
term changes in roaming data usage, we use data on the total “EEA Retail data traffic
(millions of GB)” (available as of 2007) and predict the number of subscribers in ear-
lier periods using a simple model. The advantage of this approach is that the number
of subscribers appears to follow a rather simple dynamic process and means that we
only need to predict the denominator. We can then also compare the growth in our
metric to the total growth in mobile data use which gives us more confidence that the
predictions are as close as possible to actual figures.
We observe quarterly data on the number of roaming subscribers from the second
quarter of 2016 until the first quarter of 2019. The top panel in Figure 4.A.4 indicates
that the number of subscribers appears to follow a somewhat log-linear growth trend
with a strong seasonal pattern which is likely related to summer tourism. We there-
fore estimate the number of subscribers using the following regression equation:
log(St) = γTrendt + φq(t) + εt, (4.A.4)
where log(St) is the natural logarithm of the number of subscribers, Trendt is a linear
time trend capturing the growth over time, and φq(t) are quarter dummies that cap-
ture seasonal variations. The resulting model has an R2 = 0.92, which suggests that it
captures the vast share of roaming subscriber dynamics. This is further confirmed by
the bottom panel of Figure 4.A.4 which compares the actual and predicted number
of subscribers and the resulting calculation of data roaming per subscriber. Finally,
Figure 4.A.5 compares the difference between growth in roaming data per subscriber
and the total roaming data use. While the trends are almost identical, it indicates a
larger growth in total data use which is likely a result of capturing overall trends in
growth in subscribers (which is relatively constant) and may also be a result of the
RLAH policy that causes the number of people actively using roaming while trav-
elling to increase. Overall, it suggests that the predicted change in data usage is a
conservative estimate of the effect of the policy.
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Figure 4.A.4: Predicting number of EU roaming subscribers and data consumption
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Figure 4.A.5: Growth in roaming data usage per subscriber as compared to the total
4.A.2 Analysis of hotel nights as proxy for vehicle kilometres
travelled
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Table 4.A.5: Regression results for analysing traffic and hotel nights for Dutch drivers.
log(Traffic intensity) log(# Vehicles in accidents)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Hot. loc.) 0.241∗∗ 0.043 0.787∗∗∗ 0.114 0.629∗∗∗ -0.132∗
(0.108) (0.065) (0.117) (0.084) (0.070) (0.075)
log(Hot. roam.) 0.288∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.077) (0.082) (0.078)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsample Loc. Loc. Loc. Loc. Roam. Roam. All All
Within R2 0.233 0.017 0.660 0.025 0.241 0.046 0.806 0.047
Observations 564 564 564 564 2,980 3,688 3,688 3,688
R2 0.233 0.992 0.660 0.990 0.241 0.966 0.806 0.966
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province and country-group level.
Hotel nights are split into two orthogonal variables for local and roaming users. An additional dummy
is included when hotel nights were inflated (only occurs for roaming users).∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate signifi-
cance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Appendix 4.B Additional results
Table 4.B.1: Results correcting for sources of measurement error
log(# Vehicles in Accidents)
No trucks SV No border prov. No border countr. No BG/PL/RO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment effect 0.086∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.072∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.037) (0.030) (0.034)
log(Hotel roam.) 0.297∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.056) (0.121) (0.037) (0.084)
log(Hotel loc.) -0.117∗ -0.167∗∗∗ 0.087 -0.038 -0.071
(0.061) (0.054) (0.082) (0.072) (0.064)
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 72 72 30 48 60
Local vehicles 535k 136k 356k 686k 686k
Roaming vehicles 22k 6k 12k 15k 26k
Observations 3,303 2,658 1,523 2,458 3,026
R2 0.966 0.962 0.968 0.977 0.972
Notes:Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province and country-group level.
BG/PL/RO refer to Bulgaria, Poland and Romania respectively, which can be considered to be labour
migration countries.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 4.B.2: Results using only one year pre/post (1–2), and data aggregated to two periods
(3–4).
log(# Vehicles in accidents)
All Single vehicle All Single vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment effect 0.065∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.162∗
(0.029) (0.036) (0.070) (0.091)
log(Hotel nights roamers) 0.316∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.114 -0.082
(0.094) (0.064) (0.094) (0.109)
log(Hotel nights locals) 0.036 -0.053 0.148 -0.037
(0.069) (0.078) (0.424) (0.409)
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 72 72 72 72
Local vehicles 319k 59k 23k 4k
Roaming vehicles 18k 3k 1k 0k
Observations 1,593 1,162 144 143
R2 0.969 0.962 0.999 0.998
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province and country-group level.
Columns (1–2) are obtained using data from June 2016 until July 2018. Columns (3–4) are obtained
after aggregating the data into two periods, one before the policy and one after. For interpretation
purposes, after aggregation, variables are then rescaled to their initial units (e.g. monthly averages).∗∗∗,
∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 4.B.3: Regression results using weighted least squares.
log(# Vehicles in Accidents)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment effect 0.111∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.033) (0.028) (0.037)
log(Hotel nights roamers) 0.196∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.057) (0.059) (0.092)
log(Hotel nights locals) -0.212∗∗∗ -0.173∗ -0.083 -0.221∗
(0.078) (0.094) (0.066) (0.118)
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weights Total veh. Roaming veh. Avg traf. intens. Avg hotel nights
Clusters 72 72 72 72
Local vehicles 686k 686k 686k 686k
Roaming vehicles 35k 35k 35k 35k
Observations 3,688 3,688 3,688 3,688
R2 0.970 0.969 0.966 0.968
Notes: Estimated using weighted least squares, with pre-policy total number of (roaming) vehicles
as weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province and country-group
level.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 4.B.4: Estimation results using Poisson regression.
# Vehicles in Accidents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment effect 0.186∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.0381 0.0899∗∗∗
(0.0234) (0.0210) (0.0223) (0.0262) (0.0298)
Roamer × trend 0.00520∗∗∗
(0.000921)
log(Hotel nights roamers) 0.335∗∗∗
(0.0709)
log(Hotel nights locals) -0.000314
(0.0689)
Temperature 0.0366 -0.00100 -0.00101 -0.00108
(0.0264) (0.000852) (0.000851) (0.000850)
Rain 0.198∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗
(0.0788) (0.00447) (0.00443) (0.00452)
# Frost days 0.0571 -0.000380 -0.000526 -0.000896
(0.0631) (0.00301) (0.00297) (0.00352)
Time FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72
Local vehicles 686 686 686 686 686
Roaming vehicles 35 35 35 35 35
Observations 4,248 4,248 4,248 4,248 4,248
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province and country-group level.∗∗∗,
∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 4.B.5: Estimation results for subsamples with different age groups.
log(# Vehicles in Accidents)
All Age ≤ 30 30 <Age< 50 Age≥ 50 Age≥ 65 Age unknown
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect 0.094∗∗∗ 0.039 0.099∗∗ 0.058 0.055 0.193∗∗
(0.031) (0.038) (0.039) (0.035) (0.051) (0.087)
log(Hotel nights roamers) 0.298∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.027 0.181∗∗
(0.076) (0.039) (0.050) (0.064) (0.049) (0.072)
log(Hotel nights locals) -0.089 0.058 -0.046 0.016 0.063 -0.238
(0.063) (0.070) (0.080) (0.069) (0.096) (0.166)
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 72 72 72 72 62 72
Local vehicles 686k 189k 221k 172k 59k 104k
Roaming vehicles 35k 7k 12k 6k 1k 9k
Observations 3,688 2,638 3,072 2,572 1,422 2,822
R2 0.967 0.959 0.954 0.959 0.970 0.924
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province and country-group level.∗∗∗,
∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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5
Automobiles and urban density
5.1 Introduction
A defining feature of urbanisation in the 20th century has been the introduction and
rapid, wide-scale adoption of the the automobile. By lowering marginal transport
costs and eliminating the need to walk almost entirely, cars allow people to travel
longer distances with greater flexibility in terms of routes and schedules. As Henry
Ford predicted, this facilitated the decentralisation of cities via the outward expan-
sion of people and firms into the periphery, where land is cheaper, thereby radically
changing urban form (Anas et al., 1998; Baum-Snow, 2007; Baum-Snow et al., 2017).
Urban population density is perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of a city
and is a common measure of urban form. Higher density is associated with positive
agglomeration economies, public transport efficiency and urban amenities (see Cic-
cone and Hall, 1996; Glaeser et al., 2001; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Glaeser et al.,
2008), while lower density linked with higher pollution levels, environmental dam-
age, obesity and segregation of rich and poor (see Brownstone and Golob, 2009; Eid
This chapter is based on Koster et al. (2020). The authors would like to thank Wouter Willemsen,
Jip Claassens, Maurice de Kleijn, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, Erik Johnson, and Miguel-Angel Garcia-
López, and conference participants in Birmingham, Philadelphia (UEA), and Singapore (SMU Ur-
ban and Regional Economics). We would also like to thank Jeffrey Kenworthy for generously pro-
viding the Millennium Cities Database.
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et al., 2008; Zhao and Kaestner, 2010; Couture et al., 2019; Gaigné et al., 2020). There-
fore, studying the effect of automobiles on urban density is important in the light
that, in most countries, cars are subsidised, implying that car ownership is too high
and therefore urban densities may be too low from a welfare perspective (Parry et al.,
2007; Au and Henderson, 2006; Brueckner and Helsley, 2011).140
In spite of the relevance of this topic, Glaeser and Kahn (2004) argue that we know
very little about the long-run effect of car ownership on urban density. This knowl-
edge gap is likely related to the econometric challenge for causal inference and the
lack of a consistent dataset on urban and transport indicators. The first challenge is
reverse causality: residents are more likely to use a car in cities with lower urban
densities, therefore car ownership rates in these cities may be higher (Bento et al.,
2005b; Duranton and Turner, 2018; Ewing et al., 2018). Hence, one may overestimate
the causal (negative) effect of cars on density if reverse causality is ignored. The sec-
ond challenge is that urban density is highly persistent over time and is correlated
to many difficult-to-observe factors (for example land use planning). So, in order to
identify the causal long-run effect of cars on urban density, one requires a long-term
exogenous shock in car ownership.
We address these challenges using an IV strategy and by leveraging the best available
global dataset of large cities constructed primarily by Kenworthy and co-authors over
various waves (Ingram and Liu, 1999; Kenworthy and Laube, 2001; UITP, 2015). As
an instrument we use the presence of a domestic commercial car manufacturer in
1920, hence when few people owned cars. We provide evidence that countries with
a historic car manufacturer currently still pay lower prices for car use and ownership
through lower taxation and more roads. Furthermore, we will show that the presence
of manufacturer in 1920 is uncorrelated to urban density around that time, which
supports our argument that historic car manufacturers are a plausible instrument for
car ownership.141
Our research design is inspired by Glaeser and Kahn (2004) who were, to our knowl-
edge, the first (and only) to study the causal effect of car ownership on urban density.
Using legal origin as an instrument for car ownership, they conclude that cities with
lower car ownership rates tend to have higher urban densities. Their main estimate
indicates that one additional car per 100 inhabitants is associated with a reduction
140 For example, in Europe, about 40 percent of all new cars are subsidised through distortionary com-
pany car taxation (Van Ommeren and Wentink, 2012), whereas congestion, safety, and environmen-
tal externalities are only partially included in the overall price of car use in the US (Parry and Small,
2005).
141Up to the extent that one is still concerned that omitted variables bias is an issue, we also estimate
fixed-effects models and use the methodology proposed in Oster (2019) to show that our baseline
OLS and IV estimates are conservative.
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in urban density of 7.2%. However, as the authors acknowledge themselves, given
their limited dataset and identification strategy, these results should be interpreted as
suggestive.142 Our main contribution is to improve on their analysis, by expanding
the dataset considerably, introducing a new identification approach, and performing
a more extensive set of robustness checks. Although for some cities we have obser-
vations for several periods, we treat the data as a cross-section and apply our main
identification strategy for 232 city observations in 123 cities and 57 countries between
1960 and 2012.143
Our work is closely related to a large literature studying the effects of transport in-
frastructure on the spatial distribution of people and jobs (Baum-Snow, 2007, 2010;
Garcia-López et al., 2015; Baum-Snow et al., 2017; Levkovich et al., 2017; Heblich
et al., 2018; Gonzalez-Navarro and Turner, 2018). This literature demonstrates that
highways are an important driver of decentralisation in the 20th century, while sub-
ways only had a moderate impact. However, highways explain only a portion of car-
induced decentralisation.144 Various other policies, such as vehicle taxes, fuel taxes,
and parking regimes, effect car ownership and use, and thereby urban density, so
estimates of the effect of highways only give a partial view.145 Hence, we aim to ob-
tain insight into the overall effect of the automobile, captured by a comprehensive
measure such as car ownership, which is the focus of this paper.
The results indicate that one additional car per 100 inhabitants reduces population
and employment density by around 2.4% in the long-run. This effect appears to
be mainly driven by expansions in the built-up area, and not by population leaving
the city, suggesting that cars facilitate low density urban development in the periph-
ery. We use these estimates to gauge the potential effects of growing car ownership
rates in developing countries and the introduction of automated vehicles. Applying
these estimates, for example, to developing Asian cities indicates that if car owner-
ship increases to similar rates as seen in high-income countries, urban density may
fall by over 50% in the long-run. Our estimates are also relevant for high-income
countries with low car ownership rates (for example Denmark) as automated vehi-
cles will likely increase access to cars and thereby, in the absence of policy, cause cities
to decentralise.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 5.2 we introduce the data and provide some
descriptives. In Section 5.3 we elaborate on the methodology. We report the main re-
sults and discuss some implications in Section 5.4 and finally, Section 5.5 concludes.
142Glaeser and Kahn (2004) employ data from Ingram and Liu (1999), which contains 70 observations
for 35 cities in 18 countries (in 1960 and 1980).
143Cities that are observed multiple times are weighted by the inverse of the number of cities.
144Evidence will be provided in Appendix 4.
145For example, in Norway there are few highways while car ownership is high.
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5.2 Data and context
5.2.1 Data
We use several sources of information. The most important source is city level data
on population, employment, area size, income and transportation, between 1960 and
2012. We obtain data for 1960 and 1980 from Ingram and Liu (1999), which comprises
69 observations from 35 cities in 18 countries.146 Data for 1995 comes from the Millen-
nium Cities Database (henceforth MCD1995) and contains information on 100 cities
from 51 countries (Kenworthy and Laube, 2001; Kenworthy, 2017).147 Finally, we also
obtain data for 2012 from the Mobility in Cities database (henceforth MCD2012), col-
lected by UITP (2015) using the same methodology as MCD1995, which includes 63
cities from 39 countries. A key advantage of these sources is that they rely on a con-
sistent methodology for data collection, which allows us to make accurate compar-
isons between cities from different countries and time periods. Most importantly,
the metropolitan area is consistently defined as the ‘commuter belt or labour mar-
ket region’ for all our data and hence captures the bulk of home-work journeys in a
city.148
Population density is our main measure of urban structure, but we also examine other
measures such as employment density and centrality of employment.149 Population
density is measured as the total population in a metropolitan area divided by the
total built-up area (in km2).150 It therefore captures the density of developed land,
accounting for geographical factors such as water and green space which may limit
density.
These data sources additionally include information on car ownership per capita,
metropolitan GDP per capita, highway length, and the MCD1995 dataset also con-
tains car-related variables such as the average cost of a car trip, annual capital costs
of a car, and the number of kilometres of roads and highways. We also collect climate
14625 cities (mainly in developed countries) are collected from Newman and Kenworthy (1989) and
are supplemented with 10 other (mostly developing) cities, from various sources. We remove the
observation of Guangzhou in 1994 as it overlaps almost exactly with the MCD1995 data.
147The dataset contains full information for 89 cities in 41 countries. We impute the missing data points
for 11 cities to obtain a complete dataset of 100 cities in 51 countries. In four cities built-up area was
missing. In an additional four cities metropolitan GDP was missing and in three cities population
density in 1920 was missing. Appendix 1 documents how we impute these data points.
148This is comparable to the OECD (2013) definition of ‘functional urban areas’, including the hinter-
land or ‘worker catchment area’.
149 Employment information is only observable for MCD1995 and MCD2012.
150 Built-up area includes gardens and local parks, urban wasteland, transport infrastructure, recre-
ational, residential, industrial, office, commercial, public utilities, hospitals, schools, cultural areas
and sports grounds.
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Figure 5.1: Cities in our dataset
and elevation data from Fick and Hijmans (2017) and Reuter et al. (2007) using longi-
tude and latitude coordinates of each city centroid. This allows us to compute average
January and July temperatures, annual precipitation, altitude, and ruggedness of the
terrain.151
To construct our instrument, we collect information on whether a country had a do-
mestic commercial car manufacturer in 1920 by cross-referencing the Timeline of Motor
Vehicle Brands (Wikipedia, 2018). We focus on 1920, because car ownership rates were
still very low, however car manufacturers started to have political influence for an
extended period of time. Therefore, we are mainly interested in domestic commercial
car manufacturers that may have had substantial political leverage over an extended
period of time. Hence, we exclude subsidiaries, niche or boutique car companies,
and countries that had car manufacturers for only a short period after 1920.152 In
Appendix 3, we document which car manufacturers were present in each specific
country, the year they opened and (if relevant) the year they closed down, including
primary sources. To complement our historical instrument, we also collect historical
country-level data on population and GDP per capita for the year 1913, just before
151 We use a similar measure as Burchfield et al. (2006) and calculate ruggedness as the standard devi-
ation of altitude within 50 km from a city’s centroid.
152For example, we exclude a subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company founded in 1919 (Brasil), a luxury
car manufacturer called “Hispano-Suiza” founded in 1904 (Spain), and the Austro-Hungarian man-
ufacturer “Austro-Daimler” which operated from 1899 until 1934, and therefore was not present
over a substantial portion of the twentieth century.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
N Mean Std. dev Min Max
Population density (pop/km2) 232 7342.44 6473.72 530.00 35564.53
Employment density (jobs/km2) 144 3169.18 2712.12 280.00 15127.67
Cars per capita 232 0.32 0.20 0.00 0.84
Car km per capita (100 km) 123 41.90 37.45 0.36 201.97
GDP per capita ($1000s) 232 22.24 21.18 0.22 104.63
Population (millions) 232 4.23 4.92 0.24 37.24
Total built-up area (km2) 232 874.98 1217.04 44.29 10657.15
Total surface area (km2) 153 4293.09 8043.50 126.09 57378.00
Built-up to surface area 153 0.36 0.23 0.03 0.93
January temperature (◦C) 232 9.31 10.26 -10.40 27.60
July temperature (◦C) 232 21.47 5.68 8.80 35.30
Annual precipitation (m) 232 0.97 0.56 0.03 2.93
Altitude (km) 232 0.39 0.53 -0.00 2.60
Ruggedness 232 0.18 0.22 0.00 1.68
Car manufacturer 1920 232 0.37 0.49 0.00 1.00
Country Pop 1913 (millions) 232 49.63 88.85 0.08 437.14
Country GDP per capita 1913 ($1000s) 232 3.77 2.67 0.38 8.38
Pop dens. 1920 (pop/km2) 232 8689.51 9900.78 1308.93 77736.80
Source: Ingram & Liu 1960 232 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Source: Ingram & Liu 1980 232 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00
Source: MCD 1995 232 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
Source: MCD 2012 232 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00
WWI began, from Bolt et al. (2018).153 Finally, we construct a measure for population
density for a representative city in 1920 using data from Goldewijk et al. (2017), as
this information is not available using existing sources.154
5.2.2 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5.1. Population density is around 7, 300
people per km2 and the number of cars per capita is 0.32, on average. An average
city is large, containing a population of around 4.2 million and spanning a built-up
area of around 870 km2, about 36% of the total city surface area. About one third of
153Most car manufacturers were present before 1920, therefore it seems appropriate to use information
for other historic variables slightly prior to 1920.
154We describe the procedure to calculate 1920 population density in Appendix 2. All data are available
upon request.
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Figure 5.2: Population density and car ownership per capita
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Notes: The left plot shows city-year data and the right plot shows country-year data. Y-axis is log
scaled. Filled (black) circles represent countries with a car manufacturer in 1920. City and country
labels are based on minimum, median, and maximum population densities for each bin of 10 cars per
100 people. The solid line represents the bivariate linear regression.
cities are located in counties with a car manufacturer in 1920. We provide additional
histograms of the main variables of interest in Figure 5.A.2 of Appendix 4. They show,
for example, that most cities have population densities below 10, 000 people per km2,
with a median of around 5, 600.
The cities we focus on are rather large and represent labour market areas. Hence, em-
ployment density is highly correlated to population density (the correlation is 0.92).
In the analysis, we focus on the effect of car ownership on population density and
we repeat the main specifications with employment density and other measures in
Section 5.4.3. Figure 5.2, left plot, shows that the bivariate relation between car own-
ership per capita and population density of cities is approximately log-linear and
strongly negative. The right plot confirms that message when aggregating our data
at the country level.155 It also shows that countries with historic car manufacturers
have notably higher rates of car ownership and lower population densities. In line
with common knowledge, US and Australian cities tend to have the highest rates of
155We calculate the urban density in a country, by just considering population in and area size of urban
areas in our sample.
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car ownership and lowest urban densities.
5.3 Empirical methods
We aim to estimate the long-run causal effect of car ownership per capita on popula-
tion density. Indexing city i in country j at time t, we set up the following regression
equation:
log(Dijt) = α + βCijt + γXijt + ζGj + φt + εijt, (5.1)
where log(Dijt) is the natural logarithm of population density,Cijt represents car own-
ership per capita, Xijt and Gj are vectors of observed city and country characteristics,
φt are decade fixed effects, and εijt is an error term. Note that for some cities, we have
more than one observation. We address this issue by using weights, with weights
inversely proportional to the number of observations per city. As observations do
not come from exactly the same year, we control for decade fixed effects, φt, in all
specifications.156 For all estimates, we cluster standard errors at the country level.
Estimating the marginal effect β with OLS gives consistent estimates of the causal ef-
fect of car ownership on urban density, provided that cov(C, ε|X,G) = 0. There are
at least two endogeneity concerns when estimating equation (5.1) by OLS. First, we
may omit important variables which affect both population density and car owner-
ship. Second, changes in the urban structure may lead to changes in mobility, result-
ing in reverse causation as cities with lower densities may induce more car ownership
which may in turn cause lower densities (Duranton and Turner, 2018).
To tackle the first issue we include a range of important controls. Higher incomes are
correlated with higher rates of car ownership (Dargay, 2002) and lower population
densities as people demand more space to live in, therefore, we control for the log
of GDP per capita at the city level (Margo, 1992).157 Geographical factors such as the
climate, altitude and ruggedness of terrain might also effect car ownership and urban
density, for example because larger gardens are more attractive in warmer climates
and construction is more expensive in hilly terrain, while active modes of transport
156 This also controls for data source, as each source comes from a different decade.
157 Note, whether richer households chose to live closer or further from the city centre depends on the
sign of the housing and commuting elasticity with respect to income. In European cities, where the
urban core is characterized by strong residential and workplace amenities, richer households are
likely to locate closer to the centre (Brueckner et al., 1999; Gutiérrez-i Puigarnau et al., 2016).
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like cycling are less likely (Burchfield et al., 2006). Therefore we control for January
and July temperatures, precipitation, altitude and ruggedness. The regulatory envi-
ronment and cultural factors may also play a role in determining attitudes towards
car ownership and urban planning (Duranton and Puga, 2015). La Porta et al. (1999,
2008) argue that legal origins influence a broad range of rules and regulations and
find that civil law countries tend to be more regulated than common law countries.
We therefore control for English, French, German, and Scandinavian legal origins to
capture potential correlation between land-use and vehicle regulations which may
affect both population density and car ownership.
To examine omitted variable bias of OLS estimates, we also perform a bias-correction
approach which allows us to place a bound on the OLS estimate of β, denoted βOLS ,
in the presence of omitted variables. Oster (2019) shows that a consistent estimate
of the bias-adjusted treatment effect can be calculated given assumptions on two key
parameters: (i) the proportion of car ownership explained by unobservables relative
to observables, δ, and (ii) the maximum variation in the log of population density
that can be explained by observables and unobservables, R2max.158 To further address
concerns related to omitted variable bias, we also estimate fixed-effects models in
Section 5.4.5.1.
In order to tackle the issue of reverse causality, we require a long-term exogenous
shock in the use of automobiles. Glaeser and Kahn (2004) apply an IV approach, us-
ing legal origin (French civil law) as an instrument for car ownership, so identification
is based on country differences.159 Legal origin may be argued to be a plausible instru-
ment as it pre-dates the invention of the car and countries with French civil law tend
to be more regulated, hence face higher vehicle costs. However, as mentioned above,
one criticism is that because countries with French legal origins tended to have more
regulation, the instrument may also impact urban density directly via other stricter
regulations such as urban planning (La Porta et al., 2008).160 Another issue is that in
our dataset, the instrument appears to be weak (the F-statistic is 2.78).
We therefore propose the presence of a domestic commercial car manufacturer in a
country in 1920 as an alternative instrument for car ownership per capita.161 In the
158Oster (2019) recommends to use R2max = 1 as an upper bound, which implies that any bias will be
overstated. Our estimator sometimes delivers multiple solutions if the importance of unobserv-
ables is low, i.e. δ ≤ 1. We then select the solution closest to βOLS , as the alternative solution
provides outlier estimates that are not in line with any other specification. In case that the impor-
tance is high, i.e. δ > 1, which is the more interesting case, we only obtain single solutions.
159We collect data on legal origin from Appendix B in La Porta et al. (1999).
160 For example, Titman and Twite (2013) find that a countries’ legal origin is correlated to the building’s
lease duration and to the number of high-rise office buildings, and therefore affects urban density
directly.
161The presence of a car manufacturer at the city level is less likely to be exogenous for two reasons.
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1920s, few people owned cars. At that time, the US led the world in car manufac-
turing and ownership. Nevertheless, in the US there were only 8 million registered
cars and the ownership rate was only 0.08.162 Except for in the US, car ownership
and the construction of highways only started to rise in the world after the 1950s.
As car ownership began to rise, so did the political leverage of large commercial car
manufacturers. Due to their size and scope, throughout the middle to late 20th cen-
tury, commercial car manufacturers had a powerful lobby, particularly in their home
market, to limit vehicle taxes, neglect public transport, and advocate for more road
construction and parking in cities (Reich, 1989; Paterson, 2000; Dicken, 2011). One
may wonder why we do not use, say, 1950 instead of 1920 as the reference year. When
including car manufacturers from more recent years, the first-stage is likely stronger,
but at the same time it is more likely that the instrument is correlated to omitted
variables that are correlated with car ownership and population density. Hence, we
prefer to use car manufacturers from earlier times.163
We emphasise here that we are not the first study to argue for the impact of the auto-
motive industry on current car policy. Probably the most well-known example of how
the automotive industry affected car policies is the so-called Streetcar Conspiracy,
where General Motors and other car manufactures were convicted of monopolising
the sale of buses and accused of controlling the transit system in order to dismantle
existing streetcar networks, which were replaced by buses (Richmond, 1995). In Eu-
rope, Cleff et al. (2005) find that EU “member states having a large car industry tend
not to apply a registration tax, or they apply a lower registration tax, while car im-
porting member states tend to levy a higher registration tax”. There is also anecdotal
evidence that the automotive industry in France launched a powerful lobby in the
1950s against railways in order to promote road construction (Meunier, 2002).
Many large car manufacturers during the 1900s began in the early 20th century, but
not all. Countries such as Japan and South Korea in Asia and Spain and Sweden in
Europe also developed substantial capacity to manufacture cars, while car manufac-
turers also set up plants and subsidiaries in other countries. In both cases however,
it is likely that the political influence was smaller than in the early car manufactur-
ers because these industries were active for a shorter period of time and there is a
tendency to support national industries as opposed to foreign subsidiaries. Never-
Firstly, manufacturing plants were large and employed many workers, therefore car manufacturers
may have had a direct effect on urban structure at the local level. Secondly, in most countries,
national governments determine levels of car and fuel taxation as well as the layout of highways,
which are the mechanisms through which car ownership is likely higher.
162The US had 8,132,000 registered automobiles and a population of 106,461,000 in 1920 (US Census,
2000). Car ownership was much lower in 1910 and is estimated to be around 500,000. In Section
5.4.5 we exclude the US as a sensitivity check.
163We provide robustness of the results of the choice of reference year in Appendix 6.
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theless, if these countries are also treated with lower vehicle costs it implies that our
IV estimate remains unbiased, but our first-stage F-statistic will be weaker.
Countries with a historic car manufacturer after 1920 are therefore likely to have
higher rates of car ownership, while the presence of a car manufacturer in 1920 is
unlikely to be directly related to urban structure after 1950, other than via car owner-
ship. We will also demonstrate that car manufacturers were not more likely to start up
in countries with lower 1920 population density.164 Furthermore, one may argue that
our instrument is conditionally valid on the level of economic development in 1920, as
more industrialized countries were likely to have more car manufacturers. GDP in
1920 may be correlated to current car ownership and urbanisation rates. We therefore
also estimate specifications where we condition on GDP per capita and population at
the country level in 1913.165 We present further evidence, including several mecha-
nisms, and plausibility of the instrument in Section 5.4.2.
5.4 Results
We first present OLS results of the relation between car ownership and population
density (Section 5.4.1), then present evidence on the plausibility of our instrument
(Section 5.4.2) and the IV results (Section 5.4.3). Finally, we discuss some extensions
and perform a range of robustness checks (Section 5.4.5).
5.4.1 OLS Results
First we regress the log of population density on cars per capita, controlling only for
decade fixed effects. There is a strong and statistically significant negative associa-
tion. One additional car per 100 inhabitants is associated with a reduction in average
population density of around 3%.166 In column (2) we control for GDP per capita, but
the effect of car ownership hardly changes.167
164Hence, we address the issue that residents of cities that were more dense before the introduction of
the car may have adopted fewer cars and therefore remained more dense.
165The estimate is somewhat imprecise, but more importantly, the point estimate is essentially the same
as in the preferred specification.
166 This is calculated as 100 · (exp(β)− 1).
167 Note that GDP per capita, or income, does not have a statistically significant effect on population
density when controlling for car ownership. This result holds regardless of functional form (results
from including GDP per capita linearly or with quadratic terms are available upon request). As
we will see that income has a strong positive effect on car ownership, in line with Dargay (2002),
the overall effect of income on population density appears to be via increased car ownership (see
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Table 5.2: OLS estimates
Dep var: Population density (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cars per 100 -0.0307∗∗∗ -0.0302∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.0236∗∗∗ -0.0218∗∗∗
(0.00490) (0.00705) (0.00541) (0.00554) (0.00620)
GDP per capita (log) -0.0115 0.00803 -0.0373 -0.0346
(0.0773) (0.0564) (0.0593) (0.0695)
Pop dens. 1920 (log) 0.455∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗
(0.0706) (0.0705) (0.0621)
January temperature (◦C) -0.00917 -0.00821
(0.00665) (0.00696)
July temperature (◦C) 0.0118 0.00869
(0.0125) (0.00981)
Annual precipitation (m) 0.182 0.173
(0.136) (0.122)
Altitude (km) -0.182∗ -0.185∗∗
(0.103) (0.0792)
Ruggedness 0.541∗∗ 0.292
(0.247) (0.198)
French legal origin 0.476∗∗∗
(0.148)
German legal origin 0.302∗∗
(0.151)
Scandanavian legal origin -0.274
(0.170)
Decade FE Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.502 0.502 0.623 0.660 0.715
No. of countries 57 57 57 57 57
No. of cities 123 123 123 123 123
No. of observations 232 232 232 232 232
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. Statistical significance is denoted as: * p < 0.1, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In columns (3)-(5), we include historical population density in 1920 and some addi-
tional geographical and legal origin controls. The coefficient of historic population
density is positive and statistically significant with an elasticity of 0.46, indicating
that density is persistent over time. Including 1920 population density reduces the
coefficient of interest slightly to −2.4%, meanwhile there is no noticeable effect from
first-stage results in Table 5.4).
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the inclusion of climate and terrain controls in column (4).168 The effect size declines
somewhat in column (5) when controls for legal origin are included. The results indi-
cate that countries with French and German legal origins have higher urban densities
than countries with English and Scandinavian legal origins. The effect of one addi-
tional car per 100 inhabitants is associated with a reduction in population density of
around 2.2% and is still statistically significant at the 1% level.
Let’s now consider Oster’s (2019) bias-adjusted estimate. Under the recommended
assumption of δ = 1 and R2max = 1, the bias corrected estimate is −0.043, with a
95% confidence interval between [−0.060,−0.025].169 We also loosen the assumptions
on the δ parameter (see Figure 5.B.1 in Appendix 1). For δ ∈ [0.75, 2] we calculate
the bounds as [−0.045,−0.038] with an average estimated effect of −0.039.170 This
suggests that the OLS coefficient may be somewhat downward biased. We will see
that bias-corrected estimates are also somewhat larger than the IV results in Section
5.4.3.
5.4.2 Car manufacturers in 1920
There is a priori no reason why city structure in 1920 was related to the presence of
a car manufacturer in 1920 because few people owned cars. Meanwhile, over the
subsequent decades, car manufacturers had substantial political leverage and had a
strong lobby in their home market to increase car demand (Reich, 1989; Paterson,
2000; Dicken, 2011).
To investigate the latter, we will now examine how the presence of a historic car man-
ufacturer is associated with lower generalised prices for car use at the end of the 20th
century.171 In 1920, nine countries had a domestic commercial car manufacturer.172
In Table 5.3 we provide empirical evidence that these countries had lower ownership
taxes and lower costs of car use in 1995, even when we control for GDP per capita
and other controls.173 Column (1) indicates that the monetary price of an average
car trip, which includes both variable and fixed costs, in 1995 is about 30% lower in
168Climate, proxied by summer and winter temperatures, may be correlated to both driving and build-
ing types. Both the OLS results and the first-stage results (see Table 5.4) do not indicate this to be
the case.
169 Standard errors are cluster-bootstrapped (250 replications) based on countries.
170 As δ increases, the causal estimate converges to around −0.037.
171 The MCD 1995 dataset includes information on transport-related costs, however we also have in-
formation on road and highway length for a larger sample of cities and time periods.
172Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. See Appendix 3.
173We have fewer observations here than in the main analysis because of missing information.
159
Chapter 5. Automobiles and urban density
Table 5.3: Underlying mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Car trip cost Capital cost Road length Highway length
Car manufacturer 1920 -0.288∗ -0.109 0.377∗ 0.248
(0.163) (0.146) (0.215) (0.226)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Decade FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.613 0.685 0.679 0.581
No. of countries 43 43 50 44
No. of cities 89 92 108 94
No. of observations 89 92 200 124
Notes: Dependent variables are in logs. See Table 5.A.3 in Appendix for descriptive statistics. Car trip
cost is defined as the direct user cost of an average car trip and includes depreciation, fuel, spare parts,
insurance and taxes. Capital cost is defined as the annual fixed costs which includes depreciation,
insurance and taxes. Controls are the log of GDP per capita, 1920 population density, January and July
temperature, annual precipitation, altitude, ruggedness, and legal origin fixed effects, as in column (5)
of Table 5.2. Road and highway length are per capita. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and
are clustered at the country level. Statistical significance is denoted as: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01.
countries with historic car manufacturers. Furthermore, these countries have lower
annual capital car costs (which include taxes, column (2)), more roads (column (3)),
and more highway kilometres per capita (column (4)). However as these effects are
imprecisely estimated, they should be interpreted with caution. In Appendix 3 we
also document that in 2005, countries with a historical car manufacturer in Europe
charge between 20–50% lower vehicle taxes overall, and face almost zero registration
taxes, while fuel taxes are somewhat higher (Kunert and Kuhfeld, 2007).
We present the first-stage results of the IV estimates in Table 5.4. Columns (1) to (5)
indicate that the presence of a commercial car manufacturer in 1920 is a strong instru-
ment.174 The Kleibergen-Paap first-stage F-statistic is 18.58 in the last (and preferred)
specification. The instrument has the expected positive sign: countries with a com-
mercial car manufacturer owned around 15 more cars per capita (or around 50% more
than the mean city in our sample).
We come now back to our claim that a priori, there is no reason why population
density in 1920 was related to the presence of a car manufacturer in 1920. In Table
5.5 we examine whether car manufacturers in 1920 were more likely to be present in
cities with lower population densities, as arguably, the instrument is more convincing
if it is not related to population density in 1920. Columns (1) and (2) indicate that the
174Note that car ownership at the city level strongly increases with GDP per capita, and falls with
historic population density).
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Table 5.4: First-stage results
Dep var: Cars per 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Car manufacturer 1920 27.95∗∗∗ 15.70∗∗∗ 15.94∗∗∗ 15.86∗∗∗ 14.73∗∗∗
(4.610) (3.711) (3.137) (2.812) (3.411)
GDP per capita (log) 9.318∗∗∗ 8.368∗∗∗ 8.244∗∗∗ 8.309∗∗∗
(0.747) (0.729) (1.059) (1.081)
Pop dens. 1920 (log) -4.406∗∗ -4.913∗∗ -4.524∗∗
(1.891) (1.871) (1.889)
Climate controls N N N Y Y
Terrain controls N N N Y Y
Legal origin FE N N N N Y
Decade FE Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.493 0.726 0.749 0.763 0.765
First-stage F -statistic 36.75 17.89 25.83 31.80 18.64
No. of countries 57 57 57 57 57
No. of cities 123 123 123 123 123
No. of observations 232 232 232 232 232
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. See Table 5.B.1 in Appendix 6 for table including
all controls. Climate controls are; January and July temperatures and annual precipitation, and terrain
controls are; altitude and ruggedness as in column (5) of Table 5.2. Statistical significance is denoted
as: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is presented.
presence of a historic car manufacturer is not correlated to historic population density,
independent of whether we include controls. If anything, the point estimate in the
preferred specification in column (2) suggests that population density was higher in
countries with a car manufacturer in 1920.175
We also estimate the reduced-form effect on current population density (after 1960)
in columns (3) and (4). The results indicate that the presence of a car manufacturer
in 1920 has a strong, negative, and statistically significant, effect on population den-
sity many years later.176 Hence, historic car manufacturers are not related to historic
population density, but have a causal effect on current density. In the following 2SLS
analysis we control for historic population density, but we emphasise that the results
of Table 5.5 imply that our instrument is also unconditionally valid, i.e. when not
controlling for historic population density, we will obtain the same effect for car own-
175This is not surprising given that, for example, US cities faced higher urban densities until 1950, after
which they began to decline (Kim, 2007).
176A formal test for the difference between the effect of car manufacturers in (2) and (4) rejects the null
hypothesis that there is no difference at the 95% confidence level. The difference is −0.62, with a
standard error of 0.26 and a corresponding t-statistic of −2.40.
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Table 5.5: Additional validity tests of instrument
Population density 1920 (log) Population density (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Car manufacturer 1920 -0.227 0.249 -0.819∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗
(0.270) (0.206) (0.289) (0.158)
Decade FE Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
R2 0.0520 0.281 0.232 0.661
No. of countries 57 57 57 57
No. of cities 123 123 123 123
No. of observations 232 232 232 232
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city. The dependent variable is his-
toric (1920) or observed (1960-2012) population density in logs. Robust standard errors are in paren-
thesis and are clustered at the country level. Controls are the log of GDP per capita, January and July
temperature, annual precipitation, altitude, ruggedness, legal origin fixed effects, and in columns (3)
and (4) we also include 1920 population density, as in column (5) of Table 5.2. Statistical significance is
denoted as: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
ership.
5.4.3 IV Results
In Table 5.6 we provide the 2SLS results using the presence of a historic car manufac-
turer as an instrument. The coefficient of interest remains quite stable to the inclusion
of control variables and are of a similar order of magnitude to the OLS estimates. Fur-
thermore, the control variables have a similar effect as compared to the OLS estimates
in Table 5.2.
The preferred specification in column (5) indicates that one additional car per 100
inhabitants is associated with a reduction in population density of around 2.4%. A
Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis that the IV and OLS coefficients on
cars per 100 in column (5) are significantly different from each other.177 The IV esti-
mate in column (5) is in between the OLS estimate in Table 5.2 and the bias-corrected
estimate using Oster’s (2019) method in Section 5.4.1. Apparently, the reverse causal-
ity issue is too small to have consequences for the estimates, at least at the city level.178
The estimate implies that a one standard deviation increase in car ownership (20 cars
177We perform a cluster-robust Hausman test with 250 bootstrap replications (Cameron and Trivedi,
2005). The test statistic is χ2(1) = 0.02, with a corresponding p-value of 0.89.
178 Duranton and Turner (2018) find that urban density has a small negative effect on vehicle kilometres
driven, however their study is at the household level rather than the city level.
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Table 5.6: 2SLS estimates
Dep var: Population density (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cars per 100 -0.0293∗∗∗ -0.0268∗∗ -0.0283∗∗∗ -0.0261∗∗∗ -0.0247∗∗
(0.00718) (0.0133) (0.00989) (0.0100) (0.0102)
GDP per capita (log) -0.0542 0.0550 -0.0103 -0.00380
(0.146) (0.110) (0.109) (0.114)
Pop dens. 1920 (log) 0.439∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗
(0.0726) (0.0752) (0.0693)
Climate controls N N N Y Y
Terrain controls N N N Y Y
Legal origin FE N N N N Y
Decade FE Y Y Y Y Y
First-stage F -statistic 36.75 17.89 25.83 31.80 18.64
No. of countries 57 57 57 57 57
No. of cities 123 123 123 123 123
No. of observations 232 232 232 232 232
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city. See Table 5.B.2 in Appendix
6 for table including all controls. Climate controls are; January and July temperatures and annual
precipitation, and terrain controls are; altitude and ruggedness as in column (5) of Table 5.2. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is
presented. Statistical significance is denoted as: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
per 100 inhabitants) is associated with a reduction in population density of around
40%.179 We find a smaller effect than in Glaeser and Kahn (2004) who find an effect
size around three times as large.180
5.4.4 Extensions
5.4.4.1 Other dependent variables
In Table 5.7 we present results separating population density into population and area
size of the city, and consider two additional dependent variables: employment den-
sity and employment centrality, defined by the number of jobs in the CBD. Columns
(1) and (2) indicate that although the effect of car ownership rates is not statistically
significant when regressing both variables separately, the point estimate of cars per
100 on the log of built-up area is 0.025, which is essentially identical to the estimate
179 This can be calculated as: exp(β̂ ×∆C)− 1 = exp(−0.0245× 20)− 1 = −0.387 or 39%.
180 Here we refer to their coefficient in Table 6, column (3), which is −0.075 or 7.2%.
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Table 5.7: 2SLS Sensitivity checks: Other dependent variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population Area Emp. density Prop. Jobs CBD
Cars per 100 0.000371 0.0250 -0.0216∗ -0.0112
(0.0158) (0.0212) (0.0111) (0.0124)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Decade FE Y Y Y Y
First-stage F -statistic 18.64 18.64 14.53 17.54
No. of countries 57 57 53 46
No. of cities 123 123 112 112
No. of observations 232 232 144 93
Notes: Dependent variables are in logs. Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city.
Controls are the log of GDP per capita, 1920 population density, January and July temperature, annual
precipitation, altitude, ruggedness, and legal origin fixed effects, as in column (5) of Table 5.2. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is
presented. Statistical significance is denoted as: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
of cars on population density in column (5) of Table 5.6, meanwhile the point esti-
mate on population is essentially zero. This is in line with the sprawl hypothesis as
it suggests that the overall effect of cars on population density appears to be via cars
causing cities to spread out further (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004; Nechyba and Walsh,
2004; Su and DeSalvo, 2008).
As mentioned in Section 5.2, population and employment density are highly cor-
related – therefore one expects similar effects for population and employment den-
sity.181 Column (3) indicates that one additional car per 100 inhabitants causes a re-
duction in employment density of around 2.1%, but this effect is just not statistically
significant at the 5% level, and only significant at the 10% level. We also examine
whether car ownership rates reduce the proportion of jobs in the CBD in column (4),
however we do not find a statistically significant effect.
5.4.4.2 Heterogeneous effects
We also investigate whether the effect of car ownership on population density varies
by (i) infrastructure quality, (ii) level of GDP, and (iii) origin of law system. Table 5.8
reports the results.182 Columns (1) and (2) suggest that roads and highways appear
181 Baum-Snow (2010) also finds similar effects of highways on the decentralisation of firms and house-
holds.
182 To improve efficiency of the estimates, we include interactions of the fitted values from the first-
stage with road length, GDP per capita and legal origin. We refer to Levkovich et al. (2017) who
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to have a complementary effect, so both roads and cars are important in facilitating
urban decentralisation. Interestingly, roads also have a statistically significant and
negative effect on population density, while the effect of highways is a lot smaller.
This may be because road space occupies a large share of land, which can no longer
be used for residential purposes.
In column (3) we find some evidence that the effect of car ownership on population
density is larger in countries with a higher GDP. This result might be reasonable as
richer countries are likely to invest in road infrastructure that strengthen the effect of
car ownership.
Finally, column (4) indicates that while the effect of car ownership appears to be sim-
ilar for countries with English, German, and Scandinavian legal origins, countries
with French legal origins appear to have significantly smaller effects (around half).
This indicates that countries with French legal origins are not only more regulated
in terms of taxation (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004) but also have more planning restric-
tions.
5.4.5 Robustness
The IV results indicate that one additional car per 100 inhabitants reduces population
density at the city level by 2.4% in the long-run. In this subsection we perform a wide
range of robustness checks, and provide some tentative evidence on the middle-run
effect.
5.4.5.1 Fixed-effects models
Up to now, we have exploited (mainly) cross-sectional variation in population den-
sity and car ownership. We assess the sensitivity of our results to various alternative
types of variation, by gradually including a more detailed set of fixed effects. The
first column of Table 5.9 shows IV results and columns (2)-(5) show OLS results. In
column (1) and (2) we include continent fixed effects. The limitation of this analysis
is that because our instrument varies at the country level, the degrees of freedom at
the country level is strongly reduced. As a consequence, the first-stage F-statistic falls
below 10 and the coefficient of interest becomes imprecise. Nevertheless, including
continent fixed effects leads to similar (slightly larger) results than our main specifi-
compare different methodologies.
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cation. The OLS regression with continent fixed effects in column (2) delivers a very
similar estimate as compared to the baseline OLS estimate.
Next we include country fixed effects, therefore we only exploit cross-sectional vari-
ation within a country. This has the advantage that we can control for unobserved
factors at the national level such as regulations that effect both vehicle ownership
and urban density, however as our instrument does not vary at the city level, we are
unable to correct for reverse causality. So far, our results have shown that the OLS
and IV results are remarkably similar, and the OLS results are generally more con-
servative, therefore we tentatively perform this analysis to check the robustness of
our results, but urge caution when interpreting the coefficients as causal effects. The
results in column (3) indicate that the effect is roughly similar, one additional car is
associated with a reduction in population density of around−1.5% and is statistically
significant at the 10% level.
We then exploit temporal variation by including city fixed effects in column (4). This
provides a tentative estimate of the middle-run effects. The estimate however be-
comes close to zero and is not statistically significant. An issue with this specification
is that urban density changes slowly and information about cities that are observed
with few years in between comes from different sources, implying substantial mea-
surement error. The latter is problematic, because the downward bias due to measure-
ment error is compounded with panel data. In order to overcome the inconsistency,
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) recommend using longer differences, therefore in speci-
fication (5) we only select observations for cities that are at least 20 years apart. This
leaves us with 77 cities and 29 observations. The coefficient is −1.5% and statistically
significant at the 1% level. This is smaller in magnitude than our main IV result, but
around the same size as the OLS result when including country fixed effects, suggest-
ing that the middle-run effect may be about half of the size of the long-run effect.
5.4.5.2 Other robustness checks
In Appendix 3 we consider alternative proxies for automobile use. We include mo-
torbike use as a separate variable and together with car ownership, leading to similar
results. We also consider measuring car usage directly, by using car km per capita and
car km per car. For car km per capita we find almost identical results. However, for
car kilometres per car the results are imprecise because of a weak first stage. This may
be because car manufacturers focus lobbying efforts on car ownership and purchase,
while having smaller effects of car usage such as fuel taxes, which is corroborated by
our analysis on European countries in Appendix 3. Still, despite weak instruments,
we find a negative second-stage coefficient of car use on population density of the
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same order of magnitude as the baseline estimates.
A large literature has investigated the effects of highways on population density and
decentralisation. In Appendix 4 we further investigate whether the effect of car own-
ership and infrastructure on population density are complementary. However, note
that roads and highways cause cities to decentralise only when there is sufficient car
use. We show that roads and highways have the expected negative effect on popu-
lation density. The effect of car ownership is only reduced by about 20%, suggesting
that we also expect decentralisation to happen when the infrastructure is still imma-
ture (say in cities in Sub-Saharan Africa).
Our data is composed of three main data sources, obtained from Ingram and Liu
(1999), Kenworthy and Laube (2001), and UITP (2015). In Appendix 5 we assess the
sensitivity of our results to the various data sources. There are two important obser-
vations from this exercise. The first-stage F-statistic becomes weaker for more recent
data; and the second-stage estimate becomes lower. This suggests that car manufac-
turers were more powerful in the 1960s and 1970s in influencing policy, which is in
line with anecdotal evidence. The reduction in the magnitude of the second-stage
coefficient appears to be driven by the inclusion of other cities and countries. This
suggests that the sample of cities in Ingram and Liu (1999) is not completely repre-
sentative.
We consider various other robustness checks in Appendix 6. We first make sure that
the effect of car manufacturers in 1920 on car ownership is not confounded by GDP
per capita around that time, as car manufacturers in 1920 tended to be present in
higher income countries. Although the coefficient of interest becomes somewhat im-
precise, the magnitude of the point estimate increases slightly and is very close to our
preferred baseline estimate.
One may be worried that our results are driven by cities in the US due to their firmly
established car culture and the abundance of land for urban expansion. However,
when we exclude the 12 cities in the US from our sample (27 observations) the effect
size decreases only slightly to −2%. Furthermore, country borders changed over the
twentieth century. This may affect assignment into treatment as these countries were
possibly treated at some point in time, but would be mislabelled as non-car manufac-
turing. Therefore we exclude countries that were formerly part of the Soviet block.
This has no meaningful impact on the second-stage results, while the first-stage F-
statistic increases.
As an instrument we use a dummy whether there is a car manufacturer in 1920. Al-
ternatively, we also consider to use a dummy whether there is a car manufacturer
in 1910 or 1930. This leads to similar results, although the results are statistically
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stronger once we use the dummy indicating whether there is a car manufacturer in
1930.
5.4.6 Implications
Overall, our preferred estimate from column (5) in Table 5.6 implies that an increase
in car ownership of one car per 100 inhabitants leads to a reduction in population
density of around 2.4%. In this section, we apply this estimate to gauge the potential
effects of growing car ownership rates in developing countries and the introduction
of autonomous vehicles on urban density.
5.4.6.1 Growing car ownership in developing countries
In 1995, cities located in developing Asian countries owned substantially fewer cars
per capita and faced higher population densities (see Table 5.A.4 in Appendix). Ap-
plying our estimates suggests that if car ownership increases to similar rates as seen
in western Europe, urban density would fall by around 50% in the long-run, while if
car ownership rates reach levels seen in North America and Oceania, density would
even fall by around 60%.
We have applied our estimates for three Chinese cities in our dataset: Beijing,
Guangzhou, and Shanghai. In 1995 average car ownership in these cities was 2.6
cars per 100 inhabitants which grew to 17.5 by 2010.183 According to our results
this would result in a reduction in population density of around 30%, whereas the
actual reduction was around 60% (it declined from 14, 600 to 5, 600 people per km2).
This suggests that changes in car ownership explain about half the reduction in
population density.184
5.4.6.2 Automated vehicles
Our estimates are also relevant in the broader context of future transport develop-
ments such as fully automated vehicles (AVs) which are expected to increase access
183Information for the year 2010 is gathered from ITF (2017) and Demographia (2010).
184As the period between 1995 and 2010 is relatively short, it is plausible that the contribution of car
ownership is less.
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to cars (Meyer et al., 2017; Gelauff et al., 2019). These results are particularly rele-
vant to cities with relatively high incomes, but low levels of car ownership such as
Copenhagen (Denmark) and Tokyo (Japan). Currently, car use is limited by owner-
ship, however, AVs are expected to reduce the fixed costs of owning a car and thereby
may substantially increase vehicle access. In the absence of policy, our results suggest
that cities are expected to become more decentralised.
Fagnant and Kockelman (2015) assume that AVs are expected to increase vehicle kilo-
metres travelled (VKT) by 10− 20% in the US. We use our estimate for the change in
VKT per capita in column (4) of Table 5.B.3 in Appendix 3 and consider these changes
as lower and upper bounds of the effects of AVs. In scenario (A) effective car owner-
ship for an average city in our dataset increases by 10%, or 420 km per person, leading
to a decline in population density of around 6.5%. In scenario (B) we consider a more
extreme situation where equivalent car use increases by 20%, which is expected to
result in population density declining by around 12.5% in the long-run.
While these estimates provide a rough indication of the potential effects of AVs, there
may be reasons to expect that they may be over- or under-estimates. On the one
hand, because AVs can be shared and therefore do not require car ownership, this
this may free up vast amounts of parking space in inner cities which could be used
for residential and other purposes, while on the other hand, because commuters can
engage in other activities in the vehicle, such as sleeping or working, this might lead
to longer commutes than currently tolerated (Pudāne et al., 2019).
5.5 Conclusion
Cars have dominated the urban landscape over the past century. In this paper we in-
vestigate the long-run impact of car ownership on urban form, in particular on pop-
ulation density, in an international sample of cities. Using the presence of a car man-
ufacturer in 1920 as a source of exogenous long-term variation in vehicle costs, our
IV estimates indicate that higher car ownership rates, induced via lower ownership
costs, substantially reduce densities. A one standard deviation increase in car owner-
ship rates (or 20 cars per 100 inhabitants) causes a reduction in density of around 40%
in the long-run. Disentangling this effect between population and city size suggests
that the major driver of this reduction in urban density is via the outward expansion
of the city as the size of urban areas increase. Furthermore, we find that the effects are
larger in cities with more roads and highways, and a higher income; they are lower
in countries with French legal origins, which may have stricter vehicle taxation and
land use regulations.
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Our findings suggest that unpriced market failures in the car market have additional
spillovers on urban density. This has implications for the key benefits of living and
working in a city, and may justify higher taxes on private vehicle ownership and
use in order to increase the benefits associated with higher densities, such as posi-
tive agglomeration economies and public transport efficiency, and decrease the costs
associated with lower densities, such as pollution and environmental damage. Fur-
thermore, the paper also has implications for expected urban growth in developing
countries, where car ownership rates and populations are rapidly increasing, and
future transport technologies such as automated vehicles, which are expected to dra-
matically reduce the costs of using a private vehicle.
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Table 5.8: 2SLS sensitivity checks: Heterogeneity
Dep var: Population density (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Road leng. Highway leng. GDP Legal origin
Cars per 100 (demean) -0.0178∗∗ -0.0146 -0.0176 -0.0330∗∗∗
(0.00859) (0.0106) (0.0113) (0.00921)
× Road length demean (log) -0.00781∗∗∗
(0.00175)
× Highway length demean (log) -0.00772∗∗∗
(0.00235)
× GDP per capita demean (log) -0.00438∗∗
(0.00215)
× French origin 0.0226∗∗∗
(0.00449)
× German origin 0.00218
(0.00675)
× Scandanavian origin -0.0111
(0.0131)
GDP per capita demean (log) -0.140
(0.149)
Road length demean (log) -0.111∗∗∗
(0.0397)
Highway length demean (log) -0.0460
(0.0553)
GDP per capita (log) -0.118 -0.176 -0.00991
(0.118) (0.150) (0.108)
French legal origin 0.333∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.174) (0.153) (0.131)
German legal origin 0.123 0.235 0.316 0.229
(0.204) (0.211) (0.200) (0.185)
Scandanavian legal origin -0.265 -0.299 -0.178 -0.264
(0.227) (0.308) (0.266) (0.219)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Decade FE Y Y Y Y
First-stage F -statistic 18.64 18.64 18.64 18.64
No. of countries 50 44 57 57
No. of cities 200 124 232 232
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city. Controls are 1920 population
density, January and July temperature, annual precipitation, altitude, ruggedness, and legal origin
fixed effects, as in column (5) of Table 5.2. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered
at the country level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is presented. Statistical significance is denoted as: * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5.9: Additional sensitivity checks: fixed effects models
Dep var: Population density (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV OLS OLS OLS OLS
Cars per 100 -0.0303 -0.0198∗∗ -0.0145∗ -0.00374 -0.0156∗∗∗
(0.0309) (0.00840) (0.00811) (0.00434) (0.00488)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Decade FE Y Y Y Y Y
Area FE Continent (6) Continent (6) Country City City
R2 0.742 0.888 0.964 0.967
First-stage F -statistic 3.895
No. of countries 57 57 57 34 15
No. of cities 107 107 107 60 29
No. of observations 232 232 232 169 77
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city. Controls are the log of GDP per
capita, 1920 population density, January and July temperature, annual precipitation, altitude, rugged-
ness, and legal origin fixed effects, as in column (5) of Table 5.2. Robust standard errors are in paren-
thesis and are clustered at the country level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is presented. Statistical signif-
icance is denoted as: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix 5.A Additional descriptives
5.A.1 Appending data sources
Our main datasources are from Ingram and Liu (1999), Kenworthy and Laube (2001),
and UITP (2015). Several important aspects should be noted. As some data points
were missing in the original data, we imputed these observations using the most
reliable data available.
5.A.1.1 Population density missing
The MCD 2012 dataset (UITP, 2015) was missing population density information for
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Dublin (Ireland), Glasgow (Scotland), Izmir (Turkey), Johan-
nesburg and Tshwane (South Africa), Mumbai (India), Nairobi (Kenya), Tehran (Iran),
and Tokyo (Japan). Therefore, we collect data on the average population density of
the built-up area in the closest available year (2015) from Smith (2017).185
Additionally, the MCD 1995 data (Kenworthy and Laube, 2001) did not include data
for the total urbanised area in 1995 for Istanbul (Turkey), Lisbon (Portugal), Salvador
(Brasil) and Turin (Italy). Therefore, we impute the data using two methods. Firstly,
if there are other cities from the same country and year in the dataset, we take an
average of the ratio between total surface area to urbanised area in the metropolitan
region from the observable cities and use this to calculate the urbanised area in the
missing city (the data always includes information on total surface area). If this was
not possible, we used the urbanised area derived from 2002-2003 MODIS satellite
data at 1 km resolution available from Schneider et al. (2003) for a given metropolitan
area.
5.A.1.2 GDP per capita missing
The MCD 2012 dataset (UITP, 2015) is also missing GDP per capita for several cities,
including; Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Chicago, Portland OR (United States), Glasgow
(Scotland), Helsinki (Finland), Izmir and Kocaeli (Turkey), Jerusalem (Israel), Johan-
nesburg and Tshwane (South Africa), Mumbai (India), Nairobi (Kenya), Mashhad
and Tehran (Iran), Melbourne (Australia), Montreal and Vancouver (Canada), Seoul
185An interactive chart is available at: http://luminocity3d.org/WorldPopDen/#9/-26.
2047/27.9987.
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(South Korea), Taipei (Taiwan), and Tokyo (Japan). We replace these missing data
points using the most reliable online sources.
Furthermore, Caracas (Venezuela), Moscow (Russia), New Delhi (India) and Santiago
(Chile) had no GDP data for 1995. For these cities we fill in the country level GDP per
capita (in 1995 current USD) from the World Bank national accounts data.
5.A.1.3 Historical GDP and population 1913 missing
Historical data in 1913 is missing for Russia, Czech Republic, South Africa, Cote
d’Ivoire, Israel, Senegal and Zimbabwe. For Russia and Czech Republic, we use data
in 1913 from the Former USSR and Czechoslovakia. For South Africa, GDP data is
taken from the closest year to 1913 which is 1910. For all other countries, except Is-
rael, we back extrapolate the real GDP per capita in 1913 by calculating the average
growth rate over the 20 year period 1950 - 1970. Using these growth rates we calcu-
late a rough estimate for 1913. For Israel, it is less convincing to back extrapolate as
the countries growth was substantially different after 1950 as Israel did not exist be-
fore 1948. Therefore we take an average of the neighbouring states in 1913, including
Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Jordan. Finally, we collect historical population data at
the country level from Lahmeyer (2006).
5.A.2 Historical population density
We use two main datasets to calculate a proxy of population density in 1920. We
collect historical data on population size and the built-up area from the HYDE3.1
dataset and the spatial extent of urban areas in 2000 from sattelite images provided
by Landscan (see Goldewijk et al. (2017) and Dobson et al. (2000), respectively, for the
methods used). We perform the following steps:
1. Determine the urban spatial extent of metropolitan areas in 2000, the closest
year we have global satellite data from Dobson et al. (2000) using methods from
the Landscan (Patterson and Kelso, 2012).
a) Using the Landscan dataset, we reclassify areas into urban if population
density ≥ 200 pop/km2.
b) We then apply focal statistics to remove highways which are classified as
cells with a height and width ≤ 2.
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c) In the resulting focal statistics raster, cells having a (height and width)
value ≥ 3 are considered urban so we assign value 0 to every cell with
value < 3 and 1 for very cell with value ≥ 3.
d) Convert raster to polygons based on cells with values 1, which results in
polygons of the urban areas.
2. Overlay the spatial extent polygons in 2000 on the HYDE data from 1920 and
extract the sum of the population and built-up area in 1920.
3. Divide the 1920 population by the total built-up area in 1920 within the
metropolitan boundaries of a city in 2000 to obtain population density in
1920.186
There are three limitations with the proposed estimate. Firstly, estimates of popula-
tion density in 1920 are related to the urban spatial structure in 2000, and therefore
may capture some of the effect of transport technologies over the past century. For
our estimates this will mean that they are downward biased as the variable may cap-
ture some of the effect of interest and it will increase the likelihood of finding that car
manufacturers were present in cities with lower densities. Note however that we do
not find this (see Section 5.4.2).
Secondly, in order to estimate population densities in the past, Goldewijk et al. (2017)
require assumptions on the dynamics of population density. Using the best cross-
country data available, the authors find that population density at the city level ini-
tially increases until a certain point and then decreases, similar to the findings by
Kim (2007) for US cities. The authors argue that this relation can be characterised by
an asymmetric bell-shaped distribution. For each country, the size and the shape of
the curve differ depending on the development stage in time. While we think this
is a plausible assumption, as the distribution is fitted using few data points, it may
not represent the true development pattern of cities in the past and especially may
be poorly suited to represent cities outside Europe and North America where most
historical city level data is available.
Finally, the historical estimation procedure assumes that all cities within a country
develop in the same manner according to the country level distribution, therefore the
186For three cities we were unable to compute a population density measure because the polygon did
not correctly overlay the raster file of population and built-up area (Dakar and Wellington) and
because the city did not exist in 1920 (Brasilia). In the case of Dakar and Wellington, we selected
the grid cell adjacent to the polygon area. For Brasilia, we took the average city density of the other
Brasilian cities in our dataset.
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Figure 5.A.1: Comparison of population density in data to 1920 estimate
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Notes: This figure compares data from our compiled dataset which ranges between 1960 and 2012 to
estimates from 1920 based on the method outlined above. The dotted line represents the 45 degree line
of equality. City labels are based on minimum and maximum population densities for each 0.5 bin of
estimated population density 1920 (log).
estimates are not able to capture the potential diversity in city developments over
the past century and should be interpreted as an average city in a country. As our
instrument is at the country level, we are interested in whether car manufacturers
where more likely to be present in countries with lower city population densities, so
a country level average is sufficient.
We perform various tests to confirm the reliability of the 1920 population density
estimates. Firstly, a correlation of population density from the MCD in 1995 and our
estimate using the method above for the year 2000 in logs is 0.84. This indicates a high
correlation, and implies that our method of constructing population density seems
valid. Secondly, Figure 5.A.1 illustrates the 1995 population density measures from
MCD as compared to the estimates from 1920. The correlation in logs is 0.64 showing
that density is persistent over time (Angel et al., 2010). It appears that density fell in
63% of cities between 1920 and our observatiton in the dataset which ranged between
1960 and 2012, declining on average from 8500 to 7800 people per km2. Kim (2007)
finds that average densities of US cities rose between 1890 and 1950 and fell between
1950 and 2000, however declined on average over the entire period. This is in line
with Figure 5.A.1, as the majority of cities above the line of equality are in low and
middle income countries where we may have expected densities to increase since the
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early 20th century, while cities below the line are generally in high-income countries
where average densities generally fell.
Overall, it is plausible that the constructed measure captures the variation in popu-
lation densities in urban areas between countries over the period, which is what we
aim to measure in order to test the plausibility of our proposed instrument.
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5.A.3 Car manufacturers in 1920
In Table 5.3 we show evidence that cities in our dataset from countries with a car
manufacturer in 1920 had lower vehicle costs and more roads per capita. Kunert and
Kuhfeld (2007) collect regulatory charges for a representative European car, the Golf
1.4 with petrol engine in 2005. Table 5.A.2 provides additional descriptives which
indicate that, even in 2005, countries in the European Union with a historical car
manufacturer, still faced far lower levels of registration taxes while having higher
taxes on petroleum.
For petrol cars, total charges were 20% lower in countries with a historical car manu-
facturing country and registration taxes were almost zero as compared to an average
of around e400 in non car manufacturing countries. Meanwhile, fuel taxes were ap-
proximately 25% higher although there is little difference in VAT on fuel. We see a
similar albeit larger difference for diesel cars with total charges around 50% lower in
countries with a historical car manufacturer. This provides additional evidence that
car manufacturers lobbied particularly to keep costs of purchase low and encourage
car ownership in their home countries, while we do not find evidence that in 2005,
usage costs were particularly targeted.
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Table 5.A.2: Additional evidence on mechanism: Private car charges in European countries,
2005
Car manufacturer Non car manufacturer
Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev Difference (%)
Total charges petrol engine (e) 1266.00 217.63 1518.18 783.95 -19.92
Registration charges 29.00 28.61 384.68 542.02 -1226.49
VAT 326.80 28.12 345.77 117.16 -5.81
Vehicle tax 83.60 82.43 142.50 124.39 -70.45
Charges insurance 43.40 29.12 23.05 30.94 46.90
Petroleum tax 590.60 113.88 439.05 113.47 25.66
VAT on pretrolium 192.60 20.43 182.82 54.31 5.08
Total charges diesel engine (e) 1042.20 207.03 1563.00 931.79 -49.97
Registration charges 29.00 28.61 555.05 689.24 -1813.95
VAT 326.80 28.12 359.14 155.66 -9.89
Vehicle tax 122.60 127.78 238.95 221.64 -94.91
Charges insurance 53.80 36.13 28.59 38.26 46.86
Petroleum tax 369.40 105.84 252.77 50.98 31.57
VAT on pretrolium 140.40 16.68 128.55 32.97 8.44
GDP per capita indices 102.60 19.27 96.45 42.37 5.99
Notes: Data is collected from Kunert and Kuhfeld (2007). Regulatory charges are calculated for a
representative European car, the Golf 1.4 with petrol engine and Golf 2.0 SDI with diesel engine in 2005.
European countries with a car manufacturers in 1920 include: the Czech Republic, France, Germany,
Italy, and the United Kingdom.
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Figure 5.A.2: Histogram of key variables
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5.A.4 Additional descriptives
In Figure 5.A.2 we report histograms of the key variables of interest. We observe that
population density is approximately normally distributed when taking the log. How-
ever, it makes more sense to take car ownership in levels (as we do in the analysis);
otherwise logged car ownership is strongly left-skewed.
In Table 5.A.3 we report additional descriptives for cost of car trips, annual capital
costs for owning a car and length of roads and highways per capita, which we all use
in Table 5.3. Because the cost of car trips and annual capital costs is only available in
the MCD1995 data, we have fewer observations for these data.
In Table 5.A.4 we provide descriptive statistics by region and income level for popu-
lation density and car ownership. Unsurprisingly, car ownership is positively corre-
lated to the level of economic prosperity, with North America, Oceania and Europe
having the highest car ownership levels. Cities in Asia have, by far, the highest pop-
ulation density.
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Table 5.A.3: Additional descriptive statistics
N Mean Std. dev Min Max
Cost of car trip 89 3.07 1.63 0.13 9.33
Annual capital car cost 92 2628.06 1517.25 152.32 10159.36
Road length per capita (m/pop) 200 3.47 3.28 0.15 17.21
Highway length per capita (m/pop) 131 0.12 0.21 0.00 1.63
Table 5.A.4: Main variables by region and income level in 1995
Population density (pop/km2) Cars per 100
Region N. cities Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Africa 5 5901 3058 11.45 10.22
Asia (high income) 6 15032 10126 21.03 11.78
Asia (low/middle income) 12 18639 8774 8.11 8.18
Eastern Europe 5 7136 4204 30.60 11.38
Latin America 10 9211 3634 18.74 7.86
Middle East 7 11657 7741 13.51 7.32
North America 15 1867 752 56.79 9.36
Oceania 5 1502 529 57.54 6.14
Western Europe 35 5483 2872 41.19 10.09
Note: Calculated based on our data.
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Appendix 5.B Additional results
5.B.1 Oster’s bias-adjusted estimates
Here we report the results of Oster’s (2019) bias-adjusted estimates for different val-
ues of δ. We set R2max to 1. Recall that δ depicts the relative degree of selection on
observed and unobserved variables and R2max denotes the hypothetical R2 resulting
from a regression of population density on all observable and all unobservable vari-
ables. Because of measurement error, R2max is likely lower than 1 in most empirical
application (Oster, 2019). We use cluster-bootstrapped standard errors (250 replica-
tions) based on countries to construct 95% confidence bands.
Figure 5.B.1 shows that the bias-adjusted estimate is always more negative as com-
pared to the baseline OLS estimate. This suggests that the OLS coefficient may be
biased downwards and provides a conservative estimate.
Figure 5.B.1: Oster’s (2019) bias-adjusted estimator
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Note: The solid line represents the bias-adjusted estimates and the dashed lines represent the 95% con-
fidence interval where standard errors are cluster-bootstrapped (250 replications) based on countries.
The short dotted line represents the OLS estimate in column (5) of Table 5.2.
183
Chapter 5. Automobiles and urban density
Table 5.B.1: First-stage results
Dep var: Cars per 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Car manufacturer 1920 27.95∗∗∗ 15.70∗∗∗ 15.94∗∗∗ 15.86∗∗∗ 14.73∗∗∗
(4.610) (3.711) (3.137) (2.812) (3.411)
GDP per capita (log) 9.318∗∗∗ 8.368∗∗∗ 8.244∗∗∗ 8.309∗∗∗
(0.747) (0.729) (1.059) (1.081)
Pop dens. 1920 (log) -4.406∗∗ -4.913∗∗ -4.524∗∗
(1.891) (1.871) (1.889)
January temperature (◦C) -0.0784 -0.117
(0.121) (0.132)
July temperature (◦C) 0.167 0.147
(0.175) (0.185)
Annual precipitation (m) -2.005 -1.875
(2.218) (2.095)
Altitude (km) 2.405 2.128
(1.929) (1.992)
Ruggedness 4.639 5.517
(4.953) (4.933)
French legal origin -2.364
(2.960)
German legal origin -2.236
(4.112)
Scandanavian legal origin -2.837
(5.104)
Decade FE Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.493 0.726 0.749 0.763 0.765
First-stage F -statistic 36.75 17.89 25.83 31.80 18.64
No. of countries 57 57 57 57 57
No. of cities 123 123 123 123 123
No. of observations 232 232 232 232 232
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. Statistical significance is denoted as: * p < 0.1, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is presented.
5.B.2 Main tables with all controls
In Table 5.B.1 and 5.B.2 we present first-stage results and IV estimates, respectively,
while showing the coefficients of the control variables. As can be seen, the controls
have a similar effect as in the OLS specification in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.B.2: 2SLS estimates
Dep var: Population density (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cars per 100 -0.0293∗∗∗ -0.0268∗∗ -0.0283∗∗∗ -0.0261∗∗∗ -0.0247∗∗
(0.00718) (0.0133) (0.00989) (0.0100) (0.0102)
GDP per capita (log) -0.0542 0.0550 -0.0103 -0.00380
(0.146) (0.110) (0.109) (0.114)
Pop dens. 1920 (log) 0.439∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗
(0.0726) (0.0752) (0.0693)
January temperature (◦C) -0.00955 -0.00929
(0.00623) (0.00690)
July temperature (◦C) 0.0119 0.00848
(0.0118) (0.00919)
Annual precipitation (m) 0.174 0.169
(0.129) (0.114)
Altitude (km) -0.178∗ -0.184∗∗
(0.101) (0.0766)
Ruggedness 0.551∗∗ 0.307
(0.240) (0.195)
French legal origin 0.460∗∗∗
(0.150)
German legal origin 0.273∗∗
(0.138)
Scandanavian legal origin -0.325
(0.215)
Decade FE Y Y Y Y Y
First-stage F -statistic 36.75 17.89 25.83 31.80 18.64
No. of countries 57 57 57 57 57
No. of cities 123 123 123 123 123
No. of observations 232 232 232 232 232
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is presented. Statistical
significance is denoted as: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
5.B.3 Alternative proxies for automobile use
In Table 5.B.3 we assess the stability of our main results to various alternative mea-
sures of private vehicle usage. In column (1) we replace cars per 100 with private
vehicles per 100, which therefore also includes motorbikes which are more promi-
nent in low and middle income countries. The first-stage F-statistic is slightly lower
at 14.12 (the first-stage results are reported in Table 5.B.4). One additional vehicle per
100 inhabitants results in 2.7% lower density, which is slightly larger than our main
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Table 5.B.3: Total vehicles and car km per capita
Dep var: Population density (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vehicles per 100 -0.0277∗∗
(0.0113)
Cars per 100 -0.0287∗∗∗
(0.00991)
Motorbikes per 100 0.0265∗∗∗
(0.00736)
Car km p. cap. (100 km) -0.0204∗∗∗ -0.0159∗∗∗
(0.00338) (0.00495)
Car km p. car (100 km) -0.0338∗ -0.0278
(0.0198) (0.0208)
Controls Y Y N Y N Y
Decade FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
First-stage F -statistic 14.22 21.31 8.215 12.49 1.565 1.173
No. of countries 55 55 51 51 51 51
No. of cities 123 123 107 107 107 107
No. of observations 222 222 123 123 123 123
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city. Controls are the log of GDP per
capita, 1920 population density, January and July temperature, annual precipitation, altitude, rugged-
ness, and legal origin fixed effects, as in column (5) of Table 5.2. Robust standard errors are in paren-
thesis and are clustered at the country level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is presented. Statistical signif-
icance is denoted as: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
result. In column (2) we split cars and motorbikes per capita and only instrument cars
per 100. Although it is unlikely that the coefficient on motorbikes per 100 inhabitants
represents a causal effect, for example because scooters are a more attractive mode
of transport in dense urban areas such as Rome and Amsterdam, the estimates in (1)
and (2) along with the first-stage results in Table 5.B.4 suggest a positive correlation
between motorbikes per capita and population density and a (weakly) positive cor-
relation to car ownership. This likely explains why the coefficient of interest becomes
slightly larger.
The final four columns of Table 5.B.3 regress the log of population density on the
number of car km per capita and car km per car. The results in column (4), including
all control variables from our preferred specification, indicates that the 2SLS estimates
are statistically significant at the 1% level, although our instrument is less powerful
(the first-stage F-statistic is 10). The coefficient suggests that a one standard devi-
ation (3534 km) increase in car km per capita causes population density to decline
by around 38% in the long-run, which is essentially identical to the results from our
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Table 5.B.4: Total vehicles and car km per capita (First-stage results)
Vehicles/Cars per 100 Cars km per capita/car (100 km)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Car manufacturer 1920 15.02∗∗∗ 14.66∗∗∗ 44.75∗∗∗ 28.70∗∗∗ 26.99 16.18
(3.984) (3.176) (15.61) (8.122) (21.58) (14.94)
Motorbikes per 100 0.260
(0.185)
Controls Y Y N Y N Y
Decade FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.707 0.779 0.365 0.726 0.0847 0.340
First-stage F -statistic 14.22 21.31 8.215 12.49 1.565 1.173
No. of countries 55 55 51 51 51 51
No. of cities 123 123 107 107 107 107
No. of observations 222 222 123 123 123 123
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city. Robust standard errors are
in parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. Controls are the log of GDP per capita, 1920
population density, January and July temperature, annual precipitation, altitude, ruggedness, and
legal origin fixed effects, as in column (5) of Table 5.2. Statistical significance is denoted as: * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is presented.
main specification with car ownership rates as the main variable of interest. Finally,
in columns (5) and (6) we estimate the effect of car km per car, however find that
our instrument performs poorly and hence our 2SLS results are not very trustworthy.
This may be because car manufacturers focus lobbying efforts on car ownership and
purchase, while having smaller effects of car usage such as fuel taxes. Still, despite
weak instruments, we find a negative second-stage coefficient of car use on popula-
tion density.
5.B.4 Roads or cars?
The earlier literature emphasises the importance of road infrastructure in the decen-
tralisation of cities. We expect that roads and highways are complementary to car
ownership, and both are required to facilitate decentralisation. Although we do not
have an instrument for road length, in Table 5.B.5 we examine whether including the
log of road length as a control variable meaningfully impacts our coefficient of inter-
est.187 If car manufacturing countries built significantly more roads and highways, it
is likely that our IV results will decline as part of the effect may be captured by the
187 Road length is measured as the total centre-line kilometres or miles of all public roads, or segregated
express roads in the case of highways, therefore we may have measurement error as multiple lane
roads are counted the same as single lane roads. Furthermore, several missing observations for
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Table 5.B.5: 2SLS sensitivity checks: Roads
Dep var: Population density (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Subset roads Road leng. Subset HW HW leng. Subset Roads&HWs
Cars per 100 -0.0311∗∗∗ -0.0258∗∗∗ -0.0277∗∗∗ -0.0256∗∗∗ -0.0299∗∗∗ -0.0253∗∗
(0.0102) (0.00953) (0.00954) (0.00976) (0.00975) (0.00998)
Road length (log) -0.140∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗
(0.0364) (0.0525)
Highway length (log) -0.0814∗ 0.0126
(0.0453) (0.0660)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Decade FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
First-stage F -statistic 16.03 15.52 18.73 17.90 18.91 17.35
No. of countries 50 50 44 44 44 44
No. of cities 108 108 94 94 94 94
No. of observations 200 200 124 124 120 120
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city. Controls are the log of GDP per
capita, 1920 population density, January and July temperature, annual precipitation, altitude, rugged-
ness, and legal origin fixed effects, as in column (5) of Table 5.2. Robust standard errors are in paren-
thesis and are clustered at the country level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is presented. Statistical signif-
icance is denoted as: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
roads coefficient. Column (2) indicates that including the log of road length reduces
the size of the 2SLS coefficient by around 20% while the F-statistic is around the same
size and the coefficient on road length is negative and statistically significant at the
1% level. Columns (4) and (6) also suggest that highways reduce the effect of cars
on population density in our 2SLS estimates, however highway length appears to be
less important than overall road length.
5.B.5 Sensitivity to various data sources
Our data is composed of three main data sources, obtained from Ingram and Liu
(1999), Kenworthy and Laube (2001), and UITP (2015). In Table 5.B.6, we assess the
sensitivity of our results to the various data sources. In columns (1) − (3), we sep-
arately estimate the effect of car ownership rates on population density, including
all main controls, on each dataset. There are two important observations from this
exercise. Firstly, the first-stage F-statistic appears to decline and secondly, the long-
run effect of car ownership rates appears to decline. This may be due to changes
over time, or due to the inclusion of additional cities and countries in the analysis.
road length and highway length is not present in the Ingram and Liu (1999) data, therefore the
relevant comparison group is the subset roads and subset HW columns.
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Table 5.B.6: 2SLS Sensitivity checks: Data sources
Dep var: Population density (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ing & Liu MCD 1995 MCD 2012 Ing & Liu cities No weights
Cars per 100 -0.0744∗∗∗ -0.0347∗∗∗ -0.0117 -0.133∗∗∗ -0.0357∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0121) (0.0160) (0.0500) (0.0117)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Decade FE Y Y Y Y Y
First-stage F -statistic 25.22 14.62 6.531 5.003 20.03
No. of countries 18 51 39 18 57
No. of cities 35 100 63 31 123
No. of observations 69 100 63 50 232
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city. Controls are the log of GDP per
capita, 1920 population density, January and July temperature, annual precipitation, altitude, rugged-
ness, and legal origin fixed effects, as in column (5) of Table 5.2. Robust standard errors are in paren-
thesis and are clustered at the country level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is presented. Statistical signif-
icance is denoted as: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Therefore in column (4) we estimate the effect on the same cities as in Ingram and
Liu (1999), but for later periods. The first-stage F-statistic goes down, while the mag-
nitude increases, suggesting that car manufacturers were more powerful in the 1960s
and 1970s in influencing policy, which is in line with anecdotal evidence. The re-
duction in the magnitude of the second-stage coefficient appears to be driven by the
inclusion of other cities and countries. This suggests that the sample of cities in In-
gram and Liu (1999) is not completely representative.
5.B.6 Other robustness checks
We test the sensitivity of the results to various alternative specifications and report
the results in Table 5.B.7. Car manufacturers in 1920 tended to be present in higher
income countries. If commercial car manufacturers were more likely to have begun
in countries that had larger, more developed, markets in 1920, the instrument may be
correlated to the rate of urbanisation and thereby population density in later years.
Therefore, in column (1) we include the log of GDP per capita and population size
at the country level in 1913 as additional controls. The first-stage F-statistic falls to
10.25 and the estimate becomes imprecise, but the magnitude of the point estimate
increases slightly and is close to our preferred specification, suggesting that our main
result still holds.
189
Chapter 5. Automobiles and urban density
Table 5.B.7: 2SLS sensitivity checks: Alternative specifications
Dep var: Population density (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hist. controls Ex. US Ex. East bloc IV1910 IV1930
Cars per 100 -0.0334 -0.0200∗ -0.0247∗∗ -0.0196∗ -0.0333∗∗∗
(0.0206) (0.0117) (0.0100) (0.0116) (0.0110)
GDP per cap 1913 (log) -0.0438
(0.237)
Pop 1913 (log) 0.0661∗∗
(0.0286)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Decade FE Y Y Y Y Y
First-stage F -statistic 10.25 12.36 22.23 10.46 25.13
No. of countries 57 56 54 57 57
No. of cities 123 111 119 123 123
No. of observations 232 205 226 232 232
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of observations per city. GDP per capita and population
in 1913 are at the country level. Controls are the log of GDP per capita, 1920 population density,
January and July temperature, annual precipitation, altitude, ruggedness, and legal origin fixed effects,
as in column (5) of Table 5.2. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the country
level. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is presented. Statistical significance is denoted as: * p < 0.1, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Just over 10% of the observations in our dataset (12 cities and 27 observations) come
from the US, which may be an outlier due to their firmly established car culture and
the abundance of land for urban expansion, so in column (2) we exclude US cities.
The findings suggest that the effect size decreases only slightly to −2% and becomes
less precise (statistically significant at the 10% level).
Country borders changed throughout the twentieth century. This may affect the
strength of the instrument if some countries where treated with a car manufacturer
in 1920 or in a subsequent period, but became independent thereafter. In our dataset,
this only affected countries formerly part of the USSR and potentially countries in
the Eastern block, and includes Estonia, Poland and Hungary. Therefore in column
(3) we exclude these countries, however the effect size is essentially identical and the
first-stage F-statistic increases to 22.
In columns (4) and (5) we test the robustness to specifying the IV at different time
periods (in 1910 and 1930, respectively). In 1910, only Australia did not have a car
manufacturer while in 1930, both Sweden and Japan also had car manufacturers. In
both cases the point estimate does not significantly change. Excluding Australia ap-
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pears to reduce the strength of the instrument to F-statistic = 10 and the point esti-
mate becomes−2% (statistically significant at the 10% level), while including Sweden
and Japan increases the first-stage F-statistic to 25 and the point estimate becomes
−3.3%.
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Conclusion
This dissertation presents four empirical analyses on the urban economic effects of
private vehicles. These analyses contribute to the current debate on urban and trans-
port policy covering topics ranging from the efficacy of hourly and residential park-
ing prices to the implications of in-vehicle distractions on road safety and the long-
term impact of cars on urban density. In each case, the empirical estimates also con-
tribute to a better understanding of how automated vehicles (AVs) may impact our
cities in the future. Section 6.1 summarises the main conclusions, Section 6.2 dis-
cusses the main implications for urban and transport policy, and Section 6.3 outlines
the implications for AVs.
6.1 Main results
Chapter 2 examines the effect of parking prices on hourly parking demand and traffic
in the city of Amsterdam. Using variation from a sudden citywide increase in hourly
on-street parking prices in 2019 of 66%, we estimate citywide price elasticities of de-
mand for hourly on-street and off-street parking using an event study approach. Our
findings show that overall on-street parking demand fell by around 17%, while the
combined demand for the entire hourly parking market (on-street and off-street) de-
clined by 14%. We do not find that the reduction in on-street parking is offset by an
increase in demand off-street. Our results indicate that on-street parking arrivals de-
clined by 9%. This implies a decrease in overall traffic flow of around 2% – 3%, which
is confirmed with traffic flow data. We also estimate the impacts on traffic within the
day and find larger traffic effects during the afternoon peak. This is caused by the
193
Chapter 6. Conclusion
market structure for on-street parking as the combined number of arrivals and exits
is largest between 12:00 – 18:00, and because drivers are more responsive to parking
prices in the evening, which results in larger on-street parking elasticities.
Chapter 3 studies the effects of residential parking prices on car ownership in the
metropolitan areas of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and The Hague. We propose
a new methodology to estimate implicit residential parking prices using a hedonic
house price approach and geographically weighted regressions. We then examine the
effect of these parking prices on household car ownership using a MNL control func-
tion approach. Our results indicate that for city centres, annual residential parking
costs are around e1000, or roughly 17 percent of car ownership costs. Households
facing a one standard deviation (e503) increase in annual parking costs own 0.085
fewer cars on average, corresponding to a price elasticity of car demand of about
-0.7.
Chapter 4 examines the effect of smartphone distractions on road accidents in the
Netherlands. Identification is based on exogenous variation from the Roam Like at
Home (RLAH) policy which resulted in substantially lower phone usage fees for roam-
ing users (people travelling abroad within the EU) as all roaming surcharges were
eliminated. This allows for the estimation of a difference-in-differences model where
non-Dutch drivers from the EU are treated, while Dutch drivers serve as the control
group. We first document a substantial increase in overall roaming usage, especially
data use (MBs per subscriber) which increased by 200 percentage points relative to
locals. The results suggest that the increase in mobile phone use by roaming users,
due to the policy, caused the number of vehicles involved in accidents to increase by
around 10% and that these accidents mainly happen on urban roads. This implies a
crash risk odds ratio associated with mobile phone use of around 3.8, which is larger
than earlier field studies performed on data before the prevalence of widespread
smartphone adoption.
Finally, Chapter 5 investigates the long-run impact of car ownership on urban popu-
lation density, based on a sample of 123 cities in 57 countries. Using the presence of a
car manufacturer in 1920 as a source of exogenous variation, our IV estimates indicate
that car ownership substantially reduces urban density. A one standard deviation in-
crease in car ownership rates causes a reduction in population density of around 40%.
The results are similar for employment density and we find that the effect appears to
be driven by expansions in the built-up area, rather than population leaving the city,
suggesting that cars facilitate substantially lower density urban development in the
periphery.
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6.2 Implications for urban and transport policy
The four main sections of this thesis examine how private vehicles impact urban
mobility. This section outlines the key take-aways for policy makers and discusses
some of the practical considerations that transport modellers should take into ac-
count when applying these estimates. Section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 discuss the implications
for hourly and residential parking policy. Section 6.2.3 discusses the implications for
road safety and Section 6.2.4 discusses the long-term implications of car use on urban
density.
6.2.1 On-street hourly parking policy
Chapter 2 shows that hourly on-street parking prices are an effective tool to reduce
overall traffic in the city while generating a substantial increase in government rev-
enues. This supports the theoretical literature which indicates that parking prices are
an integral part of urban transport policy. However, as theory suggests and our em-
pirical estimates show, parking policy is not a silver bullet. In Amsterdam, only about
one quarter of traffic in the city uses paid (hourly) on-street parking, with the rest
of traffic composed of motorists parking in off-street garages, residents (that receive
cheap permits from the municipality), commuters (that often receive free parking
from their employers), shared transport (taxi’s, buses, and shared cars), and deliv-
ery vehicles. Our estimates indicate that increasing on-street parking prices by 50%
causes the number of parking arrivals and exits to decline by around 8% and traffic
flows by around 2%. Although one positive consequence of the policy is that the ef-
fects on traffic flow are larger during the evening peak hour between 16:00 – 20:00
than at other times, the overall impact on traffic and congestion is constrained by the
share of traffic that uses hourly on-street parking.
When applying this estimate to other cities, policy makers should consider (1) the
share of traffic that will be impacted by the policy, (2) the responsiveness of drivers
to changes in parking prices, and (3) the absolute level of the current pricing regime.
First, the percentage of traffic that parks on-street determines the size of the group
that will be affected by the policy (in Amsterdam around one quarter). Second, the
price elasticity of parking depends on the availability of substitutes (parking as well
as other transport options). Amsterdam has very good quality substitutes to the car,
including world-class cycling infrastructure and an excellent public transport net-
work, but also has a competitive off-street parking market. If substitutes to the car
are of lower quality or if motorists are less responsive to price changes, such as mo-
torists with a work purpose, the effects are likely to be smaller. Third, it is important
to highlight that on-street parking prices in Amsterdam were already high (compared
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to world standards) and are similar to off-street prices. In cities where on-street park-
ing prices are close to zero or significantly different to off-street prices, the effects may
be larger or smaller due to the corresponding reduction in cruising for parking and
potential non-linearities in price effects. This would be a useful direction for further
research.
6.2.2 On-street residential parking policy
Local governments can also target traffic generated by other users, for example resi-
dents. In Chapter 3 we provide an estimate of the impact of residential parking costs
on car ownership. Policy makers can directly impact parking costs via on-street res-
idential parking permits. Other studies have shown that these residential parking
permits are often offered to residents for prices far below the market rate, which is
likely to result in excess car ownership. We estimate that excess car ownership in the
city centre of Amsterdam may be as large as 24%, which is associated with annual
welfare losses per household of around e300. Closing this gap would result in ad-
ditional reductions to traffic as residents account for around half of within city car
trips.
In order to apply this estimate to other cities, transport modellers should take into
account cruising costs, vehicle costs, and the urban context. First, the parking costs
we estimate are composed of residential permit prices and private cruising costs. As
residential permit prices increase, this will result in less cruising as fewer households
own a car. Therefore, raising residential permit prices is likely to be less effective than
overall residential parking costs at reducing car ownership and depend both on the
size of cruising costs and the effect of raising prices on cruising costs. Further re-
search should attempt to exploit quasi-experimental variation in residential parking
prices over time in order to examine these dynamic changes. Second, we calculate
the elasticity with respect to the overall costs of car ownership, which is likely to
differ between countries. When calculating the effects of raising residential parking
costs, modellers should take overall annual costs into account, which in the case of
the Netherlands, approximately equalse5,000 (excluding residential parking). Third,
urban context is important. Residential parking prices in the cities we study in the
Netherlands are already higher than many other cities around the world, few house-
holds have access to private garages, and there are good quality substitutes. The
elasticity is likely to be lower in cities where residential parking prices are cheaper
(or free) and where drivers have fewer substitutes.
Both of these parking studies also provide policy makers with tools to free up valu-
able space in cities currently designated to on-street parking. Many cities around
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the world are currently experimenting with transforming on-street parking into var-
ious other uses in order to improve the quality of urban space. This includes adding
more greenery (Lisbon), improving cycling infrastructure (Amsterdam), and expand-
ing the outside areas of cafes, bars, and restaurants (Paris). It is important to imple-
ment demand-side policies (tackling prices) alongside supply-side policies (removing
parking) to avoid the detrimental consequences from additional cruising for parking,
which results in more congestion, pollution, and accidents.
6.2.3 Road safety policy
Chapter 4 provides evidence for the size of the detrimental effects of driver distrac-
tions on accidents in the Netherlands. Experimental studies suggest that drivers in
a foreign environment are not more behaviourally impacted by phone use. Given
that our estimate captures the effect of an increase in phone use due to the RLAH pol-
icy, which was not entirely absent before roaming surcharges were eliminated, this
implies that 10% may be an underestimate of the total effect of phone use on acci-
dents.
Our estimates for the Netherlands then imply that phone distractions may be respon-
sible for at least 13,000 additional accidents annually, of which about 2,500 result in
injury, and 79 are fatal. Assuming that the effects carry over to other drivers in Eu-
rope, the results suggest that around one-third of the gap between realised safety
improvements and the EU target in 2018 could have been closed by successfully ban-
ning mobile phone use while driving. We calculate that the range of plausible relative
crash risks implied by our estimate is between 2 – 6. This is slightly lower in mag-
nitude than those found for positive levels of blood alcohol (relative risk of 7 – 13)
and suggests that you are two to six times more likely to be in an accident when
using a mobile phone. These findings corroborate earlier literature which suggests
that mobile phone bans alone are not enough to eliminate the detrimental effects on
road safety. Policies targeting enforcement or social compliance, such as monitoring
phone use and an effective public health campaign, may result in substantial safety
improvements on roads.
Several aspects of the Dutch context need to be discussed. Roads in the Netherlands
are relatively safe and infrastructure is designed to minimise accident likelihood, by
for example separating cycling paths, replacing intersections with roundabouts, and
diverting traffic from narrow urban streets to highways. Our findings suggest that
the effects are mainly on urban roads, where there is more variation in the road con-
ditions, while we do not find an effect on highways. This may suggest that better
infrastructure could reduce the effects of distractions, however further research is re-
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quired to determine the impact of phone use in other settings.
6.2.4 Urban spatial planning and vehicle taxation
Chapter 5 finds that additional car ownership results in substantially lower urban
density. An increase in car ownership of one car per 100 inhabitants leads to a reduc-
tion in population density of around 2.4%. This has implications for low and middle-
income countries, where car ownership is low and urban density is high. Applying
our estimates to developing Asian countries in our dataset suggests that if car own-
ership increases to similar rates as seen in Western Europe, urban density will fall
by around 50% in the long-run, with larger reductions if car ownership rates reach
levels seen in North America and Oceania. Furthermore, we apply the estimates to
three Chinese cities and find that between 1995 and 2010, up to 50% of the reduction
in population density can be attributed to changes in access to cars.
Several aspects should be considered when applying this estimate to a particular city.
First, the stringency of land use regulations on new developments and the availability
of developable land may affect the ability for the urban area to expand outward and
thereby impact the size of the estimated effect. Furthermore, other transport policies
such as parking pricing, road pricing, and investing in good quality transport infras-
tructure are likely to reduce the dependence on automobiles and thereby decrease the
effect of car use on urban density.
6.3 Implications for AVs
We now turn to a discussion of the implications for AVs in the absence of policy
intervention. As discussed in Section 1, AVs are likely to impact mobility and thereby
urban economic outcomes via changes in parking, safety, cost, and convenience. The
studies in this dissertation provide order of magnitude estimates for the potential
spatial economic impacts of AVs via the mechanism of lower hourly and residential
parking prices, eliminating phone distractions, and increased access to cars.
One key effect of AVs is via parking demand. AVs are expected to be able to park au-
tonomously and without a driver in the vehicle, thereby decoupling parking demand
with a passengers destination. As parking prices vary strongly within space, traffic
demand is expected to increase more in dense urban centres, because parking prices
in these areas are currently higher. Chapter 2 provides an indication of the extent to
which road traffic is expected to increase via lower hourly parking prices. The estimates
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indicate that if prices were to fall dramatically because AVs no longer require parking
at a passengers final destination, traffic demand in Amsterdam is expected to increase
by 15% – 33% in the city centre, depending on whether AVs are shared or privately
owned.
Chapter 3 provides an indication for the impact of AVs on residential car demand
via lower residential parking costs as households will no longer require parking directly
outside their residence. Our estimates provide long-run approximations for the effect
of AVs on cruising costs and vehicle demand. The findings indicate that the aver-
age annual welfare gain per household from not incurring residential parking costs
is between e450 and e850 in the city centre, depending on whether AVs are privately
owned or shared. This is associated with an increase in car demand in the city centre
of 8 to 14 percent, respectively. These effects are predominantly driven by gains from
eliminating private cruising costs and are smaller outside central urban areas where
parking costs are lower. Given that annual average travel distances per car are ap-
proximately 13,000 km, additional vehicle demand may result in up to 1,600 km of
additional annual car use by households in city centres.
Chapter 4 provides an indication for the potential safety benefits from AVs via fewer
phone induced vehicle accidents. Computers are expected to be more reliable than the
average human driver and therefore AVs are likely to improve road safety. Our find-
ings indicate that 10% of all vehicle accidents in the Netherlands are caused by phone
distractions. This implies that AVs could result in about 13,000 fewer vehicle acci-
dents annually, of which about 2,500 result in injury and 79 are fatal. Most of these
accidents occur in urban areas, which suggests substantial welfare gains for urban
residents.
Chapter 5 provides an indication of the extent to which AVs will result in decentral-
isation of cities via increased access to cars. Currently, car use is constrained by own-
ership. However, AVs are expected to reduce the fixed and variable costs of using a
car, thereby substantially increasing vehicle access. Taking assumptions on changes
in vehicle kilometres travelled (VKT) from the literature, our estimates suggest that
if VKT increases by 10% – 20%, population density is expected to decline by 6.5% –
12.5% in the long-run.
These findings point towards several directions for urban and transport policy. Hav-
ing lost an important source of revenues from parking, governments may opt for a
more comprehensive solution to mitigating the congestion, pollution, and accident
externalities from vehicle travel, while filling a public financing gap. This could be
achieved through road pricing, which is the preferred economic approach to tackle
traffic externalities. AVs will be easier to track than traditional vehicles which may
remove technical challenges facing the adoption of road pricing. Furthermore, shared
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taxi companies such as Uber and Grab already charge higher fares during peak hours,
so road pricing may become more socially acceptable. Our results suggest that a
shared AV scenario is more socially desirable, however by no means is this transition
automatic. If vehicle externalities continue to go unpriced, AVs may exacerbate the
traffic issues we currently face today. These studies show that effective public policy
remains crucial to maximise the net benefits of an AV future.
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Summary
This dissertation presents four empirical analyses on the urban economic effects of
private vehicles. These analyses contribute to the current debate on urban and trans-
port policy, covering topics ranging from the efficacy of hourly and residential park-
ing prices, to the implications of in-vehicle distractions on road safety, and the long-
term impact of cars on urban density. In each case, the empirical estimates are ap-
plied to improve our understanding of how automated vehicles (AVs) may impact
our cities in the future.
In cities, parking occupies a large share of land and is often provided to residents and
visitors at prices below the market rate. According to economic theory, this causes
excess car ownership and use; however, we lack well-defined quantitative estimates
of these effects. Chapter 2 examines the effect of a large citywide increase in hourly
on-street parking prices on parking and traffic demand in Amsterdam. Our findings
indicate that the citywide increase in hourly on-street parking prices in 2019 of 66%,
resulted in 9% fewer on-street parking arrivals and an overall reduction in traffic flow
of around 2% – 3%.
Chapter 3 focuses specifically on residents and examines how residential parking
prices affect car ownership decisions. Our results indicate that for city centres, an-
nual residential parking costs are around e1000, or roughly 17 percent of car owner-
ship costs, and are more than double the costs in the periphery. Households facing
one standard deviation (e503) higher annual parking costs own 0.085 fewer cars, cor-
responding to a price elasticity of car demand of about -0.7. This implies that the
disparity in parking costs explains around 30% of the difference in average car own-
ership rates between the city centre and the periphery. These two chapters support
the abundant theoretical literature, which indicates that parking prices are an integral
part of urban transport policy.
Chapter 4 studies how the rise in smartphone use over the past decade has impacted
road safety in the Netherlands. Our results suggest that about 10% of vehicle ac-
cidents are caused by smartphone use and that these accidents mainly happen on
urban roads. The findings imply that you are about 3.8 times more likely to cause an
accident if using a mobile phone, which is larger than earlier field studies performed
on data before the prevalence of widespread smartphone adoption.
Chapter 5 studies the long-term effect of cars on urban density. Using a global sample
of cities, we find that a one standard deviation increase in car ownership rates causes
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a reduction in population density of around 40%. This effect appears to be driven by
expansions in the built-up area, suggesting that cars facilitate lower density develop-
ment in the periphery.
AVs are expected to result in improvements to accessibility and safety, increases in
car demand, and a redistribution of people and jobs over space. Chapters 2 and
3 demonstrate how lower parking prices are expected to result in more traffic and
vehicle demand within cities. Chapter 4 provides an indication for the potential safety
benefits from AVs due to fewer smartphone distractions. Finally, Chapter 5 examines
how increases in vehicle access and demand, due to cheaper and more comfortable
car travel, are expected to impact urban population density in the long-run.
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